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Abstract
This thesis attempts to investigate whether Descartes’s epistemoiogy as presented in the 
Meditations should be interpreted in the traditional way, as an example of strong 
classical foundationalism or whether this traditional account needs to be revised. I will 
argue not only that the traditional account of Descartes’s epistemoiogy should be 
revised, but that there is a particular interpretation that may provide compelling reasons 
to adopt foundationalism.
Foundationalism is presented as a theory of epistemic justification. In other words, 
foundationalism attempts to answer the question: how can we justify what we claim to 
‘know’? On the foundationalist account, there are basic beliefs whose justification does 
not depend on any other beliefs. Then there are beliefs whose justification does seem to 
depend on other beliefs, these are the non-basic beliefs. Foundationalist theories 
propose that the basic beliefs provide a solid foundation upon which the rest of our 
knowledge can be built upon. The attraction of a foundationalist theory is that if it is 
true, then it may provide a solution to the infinite regress problem. When we claim to 
know something, the sceptic can ask: how do you know? When we provide an answer 
to that question, once again the sceptic may ask, and how do you know that? This 
process could continue indefinitely, in other words an infinite regress of justification is 
set up. The foundationalist view is that at some point we must reach a base of 
knowledge which is not in need of further justification.
There are two main divisions within foundationalism: Classical foundationalism and 
moderate foundationalism. There are several differences between the two types, but in 
relation to the transfer of justification from basic to non-basic beliefs: classical 
foundationalism advocates strict deduction as the only way to build knowledge. The 
more moderate forms of foundationalism are open to alternative methods of justification 
transfer and therefore do not rely solely on deduction.
I propose that although Descartes’s epistemoiogy has been characterised as classical 
foundationalism, there seems to be traces of non-deductive argumentation within the 
Meditations. I will suggest that although Descartes identifies strong foundations for 
building knowledge upon, he does not exclusively rely on deduction in progressing 
beyond those foundations. For example: there are traces of hypothetico-deductive style 
argumentation within the Meditations. Descartes develops an epistemic principle: the 
clarity and distinctness rule and it seems possible to use this rule in an ‘exemplary’ way. 
The clarity and distinctness rule could be used as an exemplar or standard against which 
other beliefs can be judged. This method of building upon the foundations is a more 
moderate form of foundationalism.
The conclusion I reach is that if the Meditations are interpreted in an exemplary 
foundationalist fashion, then Descartes’s epistemoiogy may be capable of at least 
weakening the kinds of sceptical attacks levelled against foundationalism and although 
it may not provide a definitive account of knowledge possession as Descartes surely 
intended, it may still provide a viable account of knowledge possession.
Abbreviations
All references to Descartes will be given in the following two forms:
(1) AT followed by a volume number and a page number, refers to the standard 
French critical edition of Descartes’s works, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. by Ch. 
Adam and P. Tannery, 11 vols (Paris: Vrin/C.N.S.R., 1964-76). Thus AT VII, 
18-19 refers to a passage on pages 18-19 of volume seven of that work. The 
original Latin text of the Meditations is given in vol. VII of AT.
(2) CSM followed by a volume number and page number, refers to The 
Philosophical Writings o f Descartes, trans. by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. 
Murdoch and A. Kenny, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984- 
91). Thus CSM II 12-13 refers to a passage on pages 12-13 of the second 
volume of that work. The Meditations appears in vol.II of CSM.
Introduction
A central concern within epistemology, or theory of knowledge, is the issue of 
justification. A question that is often asked is: how are we justified in what we claim to 
know? One of the theories of justification that attempts to provide an answer to this 
question is foundationalism. The foundationalist position is that there are beliefs that are 
justified and their justification does not depend on other beliefs that we may hold. These 
foundational beliefs are often referred to as basic beliefs. We also seem to possess 
beliefs whose justification does depend on other beliefs, these are often referred to as 
non-basic beliefs. The foundational picture consists of basic beliefs that somehow 
provide the support for everything else that we may claim to know. Our knowledge is 
built upon these foundations. Traditionally, the epistemology of Descartes, especially 
the ideas expressed in his Meditations, have been regarded as foundational in nature. I 
will examine whether Descartes is a foundationalist and if so what kind of 
foundationalism best describes his views.
In chapter one, I will look at foundationalism in general. I will identify the variations 
that have developed within the foundationalist movement. I will also look at the issues 
that foundationalism must address as an epistemic justification theory. My first chapter 
will also include a key anti-foundationalist argument that critics often use against 
foundationalism.
My second chapter will focus on those elements of Descartes’s epistemological project 
that are relevant to the foundationalist debate. I will present the standard interpretation 
of Descartes’s project in the Meditations, but I will suggest that there are traces of 
evidence to show that the traditional account may need to be revised.
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Chapter three will present in detail the challenges that a foundationalist theory faces in 
general, and the kind of attacks often directed at Descartes’s views in particular. Among 
the challenges that a foundationalist theory must face are the following: is it possible to 
have basic beliefs at all? Secondly, even if there are basic beliefs, how does the transfer 
of justification from those basic beliefs to the rest of what we claim to know take place? 
Another key question is whether foundationalism can provide a solution to the 
seemingly endless cycle of justification that occurs when one tries to justify why 
particular beliefs are to be regarded as true. This is the problem of infinite regress, a 
problem that any epistemic theory must address.
My final chapter will attempt to construct a defence against the challenges to 
foundationalism identified in chapter three. I will argue, drawing on the work of some 
recent supporters of Cartesian style foundationalism, that it may be possible to read 
Descartes’s project in a way that facilitates a reasonable response to the sceptics. I will 
present the case that there can be basic beliefs, that the transfer of justification from 
basic to non-basic beliefs can take place via the mechanism of Descartes’s clarity and 
distinctness rule and that the result may provide a credible solution to the epistemic 
regress problem.
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Chapter One: Foundationalism
In this chapter my goal is to present a general account of the main features of 
epistemological foundationalism. To achieve this I will define foundationalism, 
distinguish between some of the main varieties of foundationalism and examine some of 
the issues it must address as an epistemic justification theory. I will also offer a 
preliminary account of a new classification of foundationalism that will form the basis 
of my subsequent discussion of Descartes’s epistemo logy in the Meditations.
A Definition of Foundationalism
The central claims of foundationalism are (1) that there are beliefs / propositions1 that
can be justified without appeal to further beliefs / propositions, these are the
foundational or basic beliefs / propositions, and (2) that there are beliefs / propositions
whose justification is by reference to the basic beliefs / propositions. The
foundationalist structure was first identified by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics when
he examined scientific knowledge and stated that:
‘A principle of a demonstration is an immediate proposition, and an immediate 
proposition is one to which there is no other prior.’2
An example of a contemporary formulation can be found with Alston:
‘Our justified beliefs form a structure, in that some beliefs (the foundations) are 
justified by something other than their relation to other justified beliefs; beliefs 
that are justified by their relation to other beliefs all depend for their justification 
on the foundations.’3
An important element in Alston’s definition is that the foundations are justified by 
‘something other’ than their relation to other justified beliefs. This leaves the
1 It is a debated issue as to  w hether the basics are beliefs, propositions or m ental states.
2 A ristotle, Posterior Analytics, 72a 7-9, trans. by Jonathan Barnes, Oxford University Press, 1975, p .3.
3 W illiam  P. A lston, ‘Two Types o f  Foundationalism ’, The Journal o f Philosophy, 73 (1976), 165-84 
(p .165).
way clear for further philosophical investigation into what that ‘something other’ could
be. Bonjour provides a similar account of foundationalism:
‘Some empirical beliefs possess immediate, intrinsic justification, not dependent 
upon other beliefs. These basic beliefs are the ultimate source of justification for 
all empirical knowledge’. 4
So the foundationalist picture can be presented as follows:
S’s belief in P is justified if and only if, either
(a) S’s belief in P is foundational or
(b) S’s belief in P rests on foundational beliefs.
The two central questions that foundationalism must answer as an epistemic
justificatory theory are: firstly, what is the nature of foundational beliefs? In other
words, what does it mean to say that some of our beliefs are ‘basic’ in the sense that
their justification is without appeal to other beliefs that we hold? The second question
is: even if we manage to establish that we can and do have some foundational beliefs,
how do the other beliefs that we have, the non-basic or non-foundational beliefs ‘rest’
on the foundations? In order to illuminate the issues concerning foundationalism, at this
stage I will refer to the foundations as beliefs, but it should be noted that whether the
foundations of our empirical knowledge are beliefs, is itself a debated issue within
epistemology. An example of the controversy of the nature of the foundations can be
seen in this statement by Michael Huemer:
‘For some persons S and some propositions P, S is justified in believing P, and 
some of S’s justification for believing P does not depend upon S’s having a 
reason or reasons for believing P.’5
Huemer’s suggestion seems to be that part of the justification for a belief may be simply
the act of having an experience or sensation rather than articulating reasons. Huemer
4 Bonjour, Laurence, The Structure o f Empirical Knowledge, H arvard U niversity Press, 1985, p. 17.
5 M ichael H uem er, ‘A rbitrary Foundations?’, The Philosophical Forum, 34 (2003), 141-152 (p. 141).
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then gives an example: when someone is in pain they do not require any reasons for 
believing they are in pain to be justified in believing that they are. The sensation itself is 
the justification. This issue of the nature of the foundations of empirical knowledge will 
be analysed in greater detail throughout my thesis. The debate concerning the nature of 
epistemological foundations has resulted in the emergence of different strands within 
foundationalism. I will now examine the distinctive features that define the main types 
of foundationalist theories.
Classical versus Moderate foundationalism
To provide answers to the main epistemological questions concerning the nature of the 
foundations of knowledge and the connection between those foundations and the beliefs 
that rest upon them, two brands of foundationalism have emerged: Classical and 
Moderate.
Classical foundationalism
Classical foundationalism is a theory that involves advocating the following:6
1. S has some basic (i.e. non-inferentially) justified empirical beliefs.
2. S has some justified non-basic empirical beliefs.
3. Every branch of an evidence tree supporting any of S’s non-basic empirical 
beliefs ends in a basic empirical belief.
4. The basic beliefs are certain.7
The questions that naturally arise from this are: is it necessary to have certain 
foundations? Is it possible to have such strong foundations? Even if such strong 
foundations are necessary and possible, are they enough to form a structure that we can
b I am using a slightly m odified display o f  T im othy M e G rew ’s ‘A D efense o f  Classical 
Foundationalism ’, in Knowledge: Classical & Contemporary Readings, 2nd edn, ed. by Louis Pojman, 
N ew  York: W adsw orth, 1999, p.225.
7 1 use the word “certain” here but other epistem ic term s such as “ incorrigible” , “ indubitable” and 
“ infallible” are often used. See pages 17 and 79-80 for a more detailed analysis o f  these terms.
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build our empirical knowledge upon? It would seem that to answer the sceptic we need 
strong foundations that do not require justification from other propositions. The sceptic 
can continually press the question how do you know? If we appeal to other propositions, 
the sceptic will ask: how do you know those propositions are true? One possible 
solution is to suggest that there could be some sort of epistemic principle that connects 
the premises to what I infer from those premises. The problem is that for basic beliefs, 
the principle will have to somehow be part of the way in which the belief is formed. If 
any epistemic principle is external to how an allegedly basic belief is formed, then 
justification is needed for the epistemic principle. The sceptic can then continue the line 
of questioning demanding to know what justifies the epistemic principle.
The epistemic principle could be something like: whenever a belief is formed in manner 
X, it is a justified belief. The individual does not have to know what the principle is, but 
the principle has to be true. The other factor is that the epistemic principle must not be 
arbitrary and it must show why the basic belief is justified without any inferential 
support.
Moderate foundationalism
Moderate foundationalism holds that the basic beliefs do not need to be certain, only 
that they must have some level of initial plausibility. The moderate foundationalist 
position involves the following:
1. S has some basic (non-inferentially justified) empirical beliefs.
2. S has some justified non-basic empirical beliefs.
3. Every branch of an evidence tree supporting any of S’s non-basic empirical 
beliefs terminates in a basic empirical belief.
4. Some of S’s basic empirical beliefs are less than certain for S.
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The difficulty that a  moderate foundationalist theory faces is that if  the basic beliefs are 
less than certain, what else props them  up for justification? It seems hard to avoid 
admitting that there are supporting beliefs involved, but then the beliefs are not truly 
basic and we are back at square one trying to identify what justifies the supporting 
beliefs. The sceptic would see moderate foundationalism as unlikely to meet the strong 
sceptical challenge because o f  the lack o f  certainty o f  the foundations.
The distinctions between classic and m oderate foundationalism are not confined to 
differences over the nature o f  the foundations o f  knowledge. The issue o f  transmission 
i.e. how  to get from  the foundations to  the other beliefs or propositions that we hold, is 
also a debated topic. For the classical foundationalist, the transm ission is by deduction 
only, for the m oderate foundationalist, non-deductive inference mechanisms can be 
used. Both the classical and moderate camps within foundationalism attempt to provide 
a solution to a difficult problem: the problem  o f  epistemic regress.
Epistemic R egress
Foundationalist theories, as well as other theories o f  epistemic justification, are 
concerned w ith the problem  o f  epistemic regress. The problem is that we seem to 
possess epistemic chains o f  beliefs: beliefs that are based on knowledge o f  other beliefs. 
The possibilities for such an epistemic chain are:
1. The chain m ight be infinite.
2. The chain m ight be circular.
3. The chain m ight term inate with a belief that is not knowledge.
4. The chain term inates with a belief w hich is direct knowledge.
The foundationalist position is that not only are there non-inferential justified beliefs, 
but the inferential beliefs that are based on them  can be traced back to the non- 
inferential beliefs. There are alternative theories to foundationalism used to counter the
epistemic regress problem ,8 but the advantage o f  a foundationalist approach, if  true, is
that there is a definite stopping point to epistemic regress with basic beliefs.
The classical foundationalist response to epistemic regress
Traditional classical foundationalism is commonly attributed to Descartes9. For the
Cartesian style foundationalist the foundations m ust be indubitable, or self-evident. The
implication being that if  I can rationally doubt that p, my belief is not strong enough for
p to be a strong foundation. This requirem ent for certainty appears as early as the First
M editation  where Descartes states:
‘Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from  opinions 
which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from 
those which are patently false.’10
The classical foundationalist view  is that the move from  foundational propositions to
the non-foundational superstructure o f  beliefs built upon them  is by deduction only. The
inferential beliefs have to be validly deduced from the non-inferential beliefs. It is not
enough, by the classical account, that the inferential belief is somehow inductively
supported by the foundational belief, as this would allow the inferential belief to be
false even if  foundational belief were true.
Descartes seems to have favoured the deductive, mathematical, approach to building 
knowledge. In the Fifth M editation  he states:
‘For example, when I consider the nature o f  a triangle, it appears most evident to me, 
steeped as I am  in the principles o f  geometry, that its three angles are equal to two right 
angles; and so long as I attend to the proof, I cannot but believe this to be true.’11
The key point about mathematical proofs is that the conclusions follow deductively
from  the premises. In  the Discourse on the M ethod  Descartes states:
8 Coherence and Reliabilism  are exam ples o f  alternatives to the foundationalist view on epistem ic regress.
9 1 will be challenging this position in chapter two.
10 F irst M editation: A T  V I 1 18: CSM  I I 12.
11 Fifth M editation: AT V I 1 69-70: CSM  I I 48.
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‘Those long chains com posed o f  very simple and easy reasonings, which 
geometers custom arily use to arrive at their m ost difficult demonstrations, had 
given me occasion to suppose that all the things which can fall under human 
knowledge are interconnected in the same way. And I thought that, provided we 
refrain from  accepting anything as true which is not, and always keep to the 
order required for deducing one thing from  another, then there can be nothing 
too remote to be reached in the end or too well hidden to be discovered. ’12
I think it is easy to  see the appeal o f  a geometrical account o f  the accumulation o f
knowledge. I f  the foundations are certain and every move beyond the foundations can
be traced deductively, then one can proceed without fear o f  error. The problem,
however, is that the geometrical account seems to make knowledge too difficult to
obtain. It is difficult to  see how  empirical knowledge or indeed anything outside o f  the
mathematical or logical arena can satisfy the stringent demand o f  deduction being the
only valid way to build systematic knowledge. So what does the weaker, moderate
foundational position have to offer?
The moderate foundationalist response to epistemic regress
Audi presents a  version o f  m oderate foundationalism  referred to as fallibilist
foundationalism. This position can be stated as:
‘For any S and any time, t, the structure o f  S ’s body o f  justified beliefs is at t, 
foundational. The justification o f  S ’s foundational beliefs is at least typically 
defeasible, the inferential transm ission o f  justification need not be deductive, 
and non-foundationally justified beliefs need not derive all o f  their justification 
from foundational beliefs, they only need enough justification that they would 
remain justified ( if  other things being equal), i f  any other justification they have 
(maybe from  coherence) were eliminated.’ 13
A udi’s brand o f  foundationalism  is fallibilist for several reasons: Foundational beliefs
could turn out to be unjustified, false, or both. The superstructure beliefs may be only
inductively and thereby fallibly justified by the foundational beliefs. A  consequence o f
12 Discourse on the Method: AT V I 19: CSM  1 120.
13 Robert Audi, ‘C ontem porary Foundationalism ’, in Knowledge: Classical & Contemporary Readings, 
2nd edn, ed. by Louis Pojm an, N ew  Y ork: W adsworth, 1999., p.208.
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this could be that the superstructure beliefs could be false, while the foundational beliefs 
are true. Audi’s m oderate foundationalism leaves the possibility o f  error or lack o f  
justification, even w ith the foundational beliefs, open. He argues that foundationalism 
does not entail that a person’s grounds for knowledge must be indefeasible. Perceptual 
grounds may be changed, and we can cease to know a proposition, not because it is 
false, but because w e cease to be justified in believing it.
As Audi sees it, his theory provides a solution to  the epistemic regress problem. It does 
not make knowledge impossible to have as the sceptic would hold, nor too easy to 
achieve. The theory also seems to support common sense in that the kinds o f  beliefs that 
it takes to be non-inferentially justified are those which on reflection, we think people 
are justified in holding, by the evidence o f  the senses or intuition. An example is the 
fact that we do not normally ask people for reasons why they think it is raining when 
they can see clearly from an unobstructed window and they say they can see the rain.
Audi also argues that moderate foundationalism leads to cognitive pluralism. Different 
people have different experiences and anyone’s experiences can change over time, so it 
is not surprising that people differ from one another in their non-inferentially held 
beliefs. W ith inductive inference being part o f  the moderate foundationalist system we 
may be able to  explain strange events with reference to the best explanation.
The difficulty w ith moderate foundationalism is that it may make knowledge too easy to 
obtain. I f  the foundations do not have to be certain, how  else are they justified? Also, if  
the move from the foundational beliefs to  the non-foundational beliefs is through other 
mechanisms than deduction, then the possibility o f  error becomes a significant threat. 
Apart from the classical versus moderate debate, there is also the issue o f  how  far 
foundationalist justification needs to go. The next task is to look at this issue.
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Simple Foundationalism and Iterative Foundationalism
The term s ‘simple’ and ‘iterative’ as applied to foundationalism come from  Alston. He
defines simple foundationalism as:
‘For any epistemic subject, S, there are p ’s such that S is immediately justified 
in believing that p ’. 14
Iterative Foundationalism is defined as:
‘For any epistemic subject, S, there are p ’s such that S is immediately justified 
in believing that p and S is immediately justified in believing that he is 
immediately justified in believing that p ’. 15
Essentially what A lston is proposing is that simple foundationalism just claims that
there are immediately justified foundations, whereas Iterative foundationalism claims
not only that there are such foundations, but also that these foundations themselves can
be know n immediately, w ithout appeal to further propositions.
Simple foundationalism does not set out to prove  the higher level claim that 
foundational beliefs are them selves immediately justified. The simple foundationalist 
account only goes as far as to say that it may be possible  to find adequate reasons for the 
higher level belief that someone is immediately justified in believing a foundational 
belief.
A lston leaves open the possibility that a foundational belief may be immediately 
justified because o f  some epistemic principle16 that sets out the conditions for that 
justification. These conditions do not include the believer having to have other justified 
beliefs. But for this strategy to w ork the epistemic principle has to be valid and the 
foundational belief has to som ehow fall under the principle.
14W illiam  P. Alston, ‘Two Types o f  Foundationalism ’, The Journal o f Philosophy, 73 (1976), 165-84 
(p .171).
15 Ibid, p .171.
16 Ibid., p. 183.
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One o f  the main reasons for adopting foundationalism is the apparent impossibility o f  a 
belief being mediately justified without resting ultimately on immediately justified 
foundations. There is an  intuitive appeal in the idea that there can be a  definite starting 
point to knowledge. This is w hat foundationalism, if  true, offers. On the other hand 
critics o f  foundationalism may argue that a dogmatism charge can be levelled against 
foundationalism as it involves a commitment to adopting beliefs w ithout any reasons for 
regarding them  as acceptable. The adoption o f  foundational beliefs may seem to be 
arbitrary. To avoid the perceived dogmatism o f  foundationalism, coherence and 
contextualist theories have been adopted: theories in which no belief is considered to be 
acceptable unless it is backed by other, reinforcing reasons. But whatever epistemic 
theory one subscribes to , it is normally a response to the challenge o f  scepticism.
Meeting the sceptical challenge
The extreme sceptic, it seems, can be answered w ith a reductio ad absurdum argument. 
Such a sceptic uses reason to ‘know ’ that there cannot be knowledge, the stronger their 
assertion, the more they contradict their own position. But it is the more moderate 
sceptical position attacking limited targets o f  knowledge, which presents the greatest 
challenge. A  successful response might be to demonstrate that we can have some 
knowledge.
U nger17 argues that it is reasonable to hold a sceptical view, and he feels it is not 
necessary to prove that the sceptical thesis is true. Rather than dogmatically insisting on 
the truth o f  a sceptical thesis, which would be counter productive, Unger simply argues 
that there is no powerful reason to dismiss scepticism. There are some important points 
about scepticism that need to be clarified. It may not be necessary for a person to show 
that they are justified in their beliefs in order for those beliefs to be justified.
17 Peter Unger, ‘A D efense o f  Skepticism ’, in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. by G eorge S. 
Pappas and M arshall Swain, Cornell U niversity Press, 1978., pp.317-36.
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Some forms o f  scepticism demand to  be shown justification. A nother assumption is the 
idea that justification is always propositional, that it always involves inferences from 
premises. Some epistemic theories o f  justification dispute this.
Scepticism sometimes takes the form  o f  a lack o f  confidence in our reasoning process 
itself. A n example o f  this is the notion o f  historical conditioning where the argument is 
put in the following manner: how  can I hope to evaluate your argument rationally when 
we are both just historically conditioned products o f  our culture? But this line o f  
argumentation is se lf defeating because if  rationality is rejected on the grounds o f  a 
claim about the hum an situation, then the assumption is that reason is capable o f  
detecting this. I f  we cannot know empirical facts, then we cannot know the facts that are 
supposed to make us sceptical about empirical knowledge.
It is the scepticism regarding em pirical justification that is o f  real concern. The attack 
here is that although w e may have em pirical beliefs, they are not justified by our own 
standards. G iven that theories o f  epistemic justification must address scepticism, what 
exactly has the traditional epistemological project been about?
The traditional epistemological project
Timothy M cG rew 18 neatly summ arises the task that epistemology has traditionally set 
itself to  examine: the starting point is to  take commonsense beliefs, attempt to answer 
the sceptic regarding the possibility o f  knowledge and in answering the sceptic to work 
with a  particular concept o f  justification.
In relation to justification, whether one subscribes to classic or moderate 
foundationalism, simple or iterative, an adequate theory o f  knowledge needs to
18 M e Grew, Tim othy, J., The Foundations o f  Knowledge, Rowm an & Littlefield Publishers, inc.,1995, 
p.2.
recognise the following:
1. Justification is internal19: to do with one’s cognition.
2. Justification is truth-directed: I f  S is justified in believing that p, he has some 
reason to think that p is true, rather than convenient or useful for example.
3. Justifying reasons are not arbitrary: A  justifier cannot simply be inserted.
In  order to face up to  the sceptical challenge, an epistemic justification theory will need 
to deal w ith the issue o f  certainty. I w ill now examine the key issues o f  epistemic 
certainty.
Certainty
As we have seen, the main distinction that is drawn between classical and moderate 
foundationalism centres on whether basic beliefs are certain. But at a more fundamental 
level, the connection between certainty and knowledge itself is a debated issue.
W ittgenstein held that ‘know ledge’ and ‘certainty’ do not belong to the same category 
because knowing requires justification, but a proposition is certain only i f  it does not 
require justification. This view does not necessarily preclude strong foundationalism as 
it claims that basic propositions are certain and not themselves justified in the same 
manner as non-basic propositions. The crucial detail here o f  course is the admittedly 
problem atic nature o f  how  justification works. Unger’s view is that ‘a person knows 
something to be so only if  he is certain o f  it.’21 U nger’s focus is on the meaning we 
attach to words like certain. A distinction is drawn between absolute and relative terms. 
An absolute term  w ould be a w ord such as “flat” .
191 am sum m arising points m ade by M cG rew  in his Foundations o f  Knowledge (1995), p.8. M e Grew 
does not m ention though that there is vigorous epistem ological debate concerning the issue o f  whether 
justification is internal or external. On the externalist side: A lvin Goldm an offers a reliability account o f 
knowledge, w here the im portance o f  the reliability o f  belief form ation is stressed. B ut I will focus on the 
internalist account as it is m ore relevant to  D escartes’s project.
20 W ittgenstein, Ludw ig, On Certainty, Basil B lackwell Oxford, 1969, paragraph 308, p.39e.
21 Peter Unger, ‘A D efense o f  Skepticism ’, in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, ed. by George S. 
Pappas and M arshall Swain, Cornell U niversity  Press, 1978., p .318.
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To say that something is flat is to say that it is absolutely or perfectly flat. A  flat surface 
is not bumpy or curved. The terms “bum py” or “curved” are relative terms, there can be 
grades: a table’s surface could be described as “very bumpy” for example. Something is 
flat only if  it is absolutely flat. But as Unger points out, the term  ‘absolutely’ never 
gives us a standard for any o f  our relative terms: nothing which is bumpy is absolutely 
bumpy.
Unger argues that “certain” is an absolute term, while “confident”, “doubtful”, and
“uncertain” are relative terms. Certainty has two important contexts: the ‘impersonal’
context, as expressed in the sentence: “It is certain that it is raining”, the term “it” here
* 22has no apparent reference. The other context for “certain” is the ‘personal’ context : 
“he is certain that it is raining”.
For Unger, “certain” must mean the same thing in both contexts. This meaning is the 
complete absence o f  doubt. “It is certain that P” means “it is not at all doubtful that P” . 
W hen applied to personal certainty: “he is certain that P ”, means “in his mind, it is not 
at all doubtful that P”.
Another distinction is drawn between being “confident” and being “certain” . I f  we take 
the sentence: “He is more certain that p than he is that q”, we might take from this that 
he is either certain that p while not being certain o f  q, or else he is more nearly certain 
that p than he is that q. But if  we amend the example to be: “He is more confident that p 
than he is that q” , we cannot take from this he is either confident that p while not 
confident that q, or else he is more nearly confident that p than he is that q. The reason 
that we cannot take these options is because he may well already be confident o f  both 
things. As I m entioned earlier, U nger’s goal is merely to show that scepticism is a
22 U nger uses the term s ‘im personal contexts’ and ‘personal context’, op.cit., pp.327-28.
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reasonable position to  adopt, not to definitively prove the sceptical thesis. The 
conclusion drawn is that we should at least suspend judgement, if  not accept the 
sceptical position:
‘That in the case o f  every hum an being, there is hardly anything, if  anything at 
all, which the person knows to be so .,23
W hen Unger refers to two contexts o f  certainty: impersonal and personal, he is
identifying tw o distinct types o f  certainty: propositional certainty and psychological
certainty. I will now  focus on these types o f  certainty.
Propositional and Psychological certainty
Propositional certainty is a claim about the status o f  a proposition itself. Psychological 
certainty is an attitude a person has in relation to a  proposition. For example: the 
statement ‘it is certain that p ’ is an example o f  propositional certainty, whereas the 
statement ‘I am certain that p ’ is an example o f  psychological certainty.
Propositional certainty and psychological certainty are logically independent o f  each 
other. A  person could have ideal grounds for believing a proposition P and have no 
basis for doubt, and yet still fail to believe P maybe out o f  shyness. For example: I could 
have a great singing voice and a good musical ear for picking up melodies, and this 
could be supported with evidence o f  people confirming this to me, but I could still fail 
to believe that I am a good singer because I am shy.
I f  the preceding analysis is correct, then propositional certainty is stronger than 
psychological certainty. The notion o f  psychological certainty plays an important role in 
the foundationalist debate in general, and to D escartes’s epistemology in particular. I 
will be exploring this idea further in chapter two, but for now  I think it is important to
23 See U nger, op.cit.,p.336.
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identify some o f  the additional epistemic term s that are used in the foundationalist 
debate.
Privileged Access
A lston uses the phrase ‘privileged access’24 to refer to the knowledge one has o f  one’s
own mental states. The idea is that on the privileged access thesis, one’s own
knowledge o f  one’s own mental states is superior to anyone else’s knowledge o f  those
states. Alston also uses the phrase ‘first-person-current-mental-state-belief
(FPCM SB)’.25 This will be crucial, as it is these first person reports that seem to form
part o f  the foundations in D escartes’s epistemic scheme. Some o f  the varieties o f
privileged access that Alston refers to are:
‘Infallibility -  FPCM SB’s are in fact, never mistaken.
Indubitability -  N o one, in fact, ever has grounds for doubting a  FPCMSB.
Incorrigibility -  N o one else ever, in fact, succeeds in showing that a FPCMSB 
is m istaken.’26
I will be investigating how  Descartes works with some o f  these concepts in chapter two, 
but for now I think it is important to identify the kind o f  argument that is often used 
against foundationalism.
Bonjour dismisses strong foundationalism as being an untenable position.27 To 
demonstrate this he uses the following argument28:
Suppose person A  has a basic (infallible), empirical belief B. This state is Si.
The content o f  belief B is the proposition that some empirical situation exists, 
this situation is S2. Si and S2 are separate states. (Bonjour notes that although
24 W illiam  Alston, ‘V arieties o f  Priv ileged A ccess’, in Empirical Knowledge, ed. by Roderick M. 
Chisholm  and Robert J. Swartz, P rentice Hall, Inc., 1973, pp.376-410.
25 Ibid.,p.402.
26 Ibid.,p .407.1 am quoting the term s that are m ost relevant to D escartes’s project.
27 It is im portant to note that Bonjour has since sw itched from being an opponent o f  foundationalism , to 
one o f  foundationalism ’s strongest advocates.
28 Bonjour, Laurence, The Structure o f  Empirical Knowledge, H arvard University Press, 1985, p.27.
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beliefs can be about other beliefs, beliefs cannot be directly about themselves. 
Another way o f  stating this is that my belief that I believe that P is distinct from 
my belief that P.
It seems to be possible for Si to occur in the absence o f  S2 (i.e. it seems possible to have 
a belief about an em pirical situation and for the em pirical situation not to exist). In this 
case belief B would be false, because one’s belief is about an empirical situation that 
does not exist.
Bonjour feels that basic beliefs need only be adequately justified, nothing stronger is 
required. Bonjour’s assault is directed at moderate foundationalism, but he does 
m ention that there is a  form  o f  ‘w eak’ foundationalism where the basic beliefs possess a 
very low degree o f  epistemic justification, a justification w hich in itself is insufficient to 
satisfy the adequate justification condition or to allow those beliefs be acceptable as 
justifiers o f  further beliefs. ‘W eak’ foundationalism becom es a kind o f  hybrid between 
moderate foundationalism and coherence theories.
Even if  we set aside the issue o f  what brand o f  foundationalism has the best chance o f  
adequately explaining how  things are, the fundamental question still remains: where 
does the non-inferential justification for basic empirical beliefs come from? What would 
it take to make it reasonable to accept a belief as basic and to use it to justify other 
beliefs? Bonjour29 identifies one o f  the foundationalist responses to that question as 
consisting o f  the following:
An empirical belief B has a certain feature.
Beliefs that have this feature are highly likely to be true.
Therefore belief B is highly likely to be true.
291 am presenting this in a  slightly m odified version, see Bonjour, op.cit., p .3 1.
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It does not seem possible that both premises could be justified on an a priori basis 
because belief B is an empirical belief. The conclusion Bonjour draws is that at least 
one o f  the two premises o f  the justifying argument w ill be empirical.
The other requirement seems to be that the person be in cognitive possession o f  the 
justification. I f  this is not the case, he has no reason for thinking that the belief is true. 
By combining the various strands o f  his argument together Bonjour presents the 
following anti-foundationalist argument:
(1) ‘There are basic, em pirical beliefs which are justified and their justification does 
not depend on any further empirical beliefs.
(2) For a belief to  be justified there needs to be a reason why it is likely to be true.
(3) For a belief to be justified for a  particular person, requires that this person be in 
cognitive possession o f  such a reason.
(4) The only way to be in cognitive possession o f  such a reason is to believe with 
justification the prem ises from  which it follows that the belief is likely to  be 
true.
(5) The premises o f  such a justifying argument for an empirical belief cannot be 
entirely a priori; at least one o f  the premises must be empirical.
Therefore the justification o f  a  supposed basic em pirical belief must depend on the 
justification o f  at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (1); it follows 
therefore that there can be no basic empirical beliefs.’ 30
A key question is: how  has foundationalism responded to  the kind o f  detailed attack that
Bonjour makes? A major response has been by appeal to what has become known as the
doctrine o f  the given.
The Doctrine of the Given
A  response to  the anti-foundationalist argument is to use what is empirically given in 
experience as a solution to the epistemic regress problem. The central theme o f  the 
doctrine o f  the given is that the justification o f  basic empirical beliefs is not by appeal to
301 quote this argum ent in full as it w ill provide a focus for subsequent argum ents. See Bonjour op.cit., 
p.32.
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other beliefs but to states o f  immediate awareness or intuition. These states have the 
pow er to confer justification w ithout themselves requiring justification.
The notion involves w hat Bonjour calls a ‘confrontation’31 where an object is simply 
given or ‘thrust’ upon the mind. The mind is described as an ‘immaterial eye’ and the 
immediately experienced object is open to the gaze o f  the eye. In analysing accounts
T9 » TT •
offered by supporters o f  the ‘given’ theory, such as Schlick and Quinton , Bonjour 
identifies the issue that they m ust face: i f  intuitions or direct awareness are cognitive or 
judgm ental in any way, they may be able to provide justification for other cognitive 
states but they are in need o f  justification themselves. I f  on the other hand they are not 
cognitive or judgm ental in nature, then although they might not need justification 
themselves, they w ill not be capable o f  conferring justification. This is why for Bonjour, 
the given is a m yth.34
Lewis refers to the ‘expressive language’35 used to describe experiences. But the 
strategy o f  Bonjour is to separate the experience from  the grasping o f  the experience. 
Even if  it is argued that elements o f  experience are ‘self-apprehending’36, Bonjour will 
still reply with the question: is the apprehension cognitive or non-cognitive, judgm ental 
or non-judgmental? I f  the apprehension is non-cognitive and non-judgmental then it 
cannot provide justification for a basic belief.
31 See Bonjour, op.cit., p.60.
32 M oritz Schlick, ‘The Foundation o f  K now ledge’, in Empirical Knowledge, ed. by Roderick M. 
Chisholm  and Robert J. Swartz, P rentice H all, 1973, pp. 413-30.
33 A nthony Q uinton, ‘The Foundations o f  K now ledge’, in Empirical Knowledge, ed. by R oderick M. 
Chisholm  and Robert J. Swartz, P rentice Hall, 1973, pp. 542-70.
34 I t is interesting to  note that B onjour’s position now  is that the given is not a myth! I will return to  this 
issue in chapter four o f  m y thesis.
35 Lew is, C.I., An Analysis o f  Knowledge and Valuation, L a Salle, III.: Open Court, 1946, p. 179.
36 B onjour uses this phrase on page 75 o f  h is book: The Structure o f  Empirical Knowledge (1985).
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‘Exemplary’ Foundationalism
As I mentioned previously, the two key questions that face foundationalism are: what 
can be taken to  be foundational? And even if  foundations can be established, what is the 
bridging principle that allows us to  get lfom  the foundations to  the mediate beliefs that 
are connected to those foundations? The difficulty w ith answering the second question 
is that on m ost accounts it seems impossible to avoid the infinite regress argument in 
attempting to justify any beliefs that we may hold. Perhaps we need to create a new 
category o f  ‘Exem plary’37 foundationalism that uses a principle that can be used as a 
blueprint or template for similar experiences: we may have a  way o f  justifying beliefs 
by reference to  this standard.
Perhaps we could use a method that is often used in the legal arena, where a test case 
provides the reference or standard against which other cases can be judged. The idea 
would be that reference could be made to this principle, which would be outside o f  any 
deductive analysis, thereby avoiding the epistemic regress problem. This new 
‘Exem plary Foundationalism ’ as we shall discover, has interesting implications when 
applied to D escartes’s epistemological project in the Meditations.
Conclusion
The tw o questions that any foundationalist theory m ust address are: can there be 
foundations to our knowledge that do not depend on any other beliefs or propositions 
for justification? Secondly, even if  there are such foundations, how  do we build the rest 
o f  our knowledge upon those foundations? In  an attempt to answer these questions, two 
main divisions are noticeable w ithin the foundationalist movement, there are those who 
advocate strong, classical foundationalism w ith it’s insistence that the foundations are
37 M ichelle Beyssade uses th e  term ‘exem plary tru th ’ in referring to the cogito in her article: ‘The cogito: 
Privileged truth or Exem plary T ru th?’, in Essays on the Philosophy and Science o f  René Descartes, ed. by 
Stephen Voss, Oxford U niversity Press, 1993, pp.31-9.
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certain, beyond doubt, infallible. There are also the proponents o f  the weaker, moderate 
foundationalism w hich advocates that the foundations are something less than certain.
The issue that all brands o f  foundationalism  m ust confront is the epistemic regress 
problem. The epistemological project is an attempt to answer the sceptic’s claim that we 
cannot have real knowledge. M ost o f  the emphasis in analysing foundationalism seems 
to be targeted on the nature o f  the foundations. The concept o f  the ‘given’ element o f  
experience developed out o f  the need to provide self-justifying foundations. But as I 
have suggested, it is in relation to the other question o f  how  to bridge the gap between 
the foundations o f  our knowledge and the beliefs or propositions that are somehow 
connected to the foundations, that our attention should now  be drawn. This is the task 
that exemplary foundationalism  sets itself. In  this chapter I w anted to identify the 
foundationalist epistemological framework. The next task  is to  investigate how this 
fram ework can be applied to  D escartes’s epistemological project in the Meditations.
22
Chapter Two: Descartes’s Epistemological Project
In  this chapter I will examine some key issues o f  Descartes’s epistemology in the 
Meditations to determine w hether his project is foundationalist in nature, and if  it is 
what kind o f  foundationalism is involved. To accomplish this task I will look at 
D escartes’s general approach, examine the role o f  scepticism, establish what Descartes 
seems to take as foundational and identify how he moves beyond the basics. I will 
attempt to show that although Descartes is normally portrayed as a  strong, classical 
foundationalist, it may be appropriate to revise this view.
D escartes’s  Task
D escartes’s quest in the Meditations is the timeless quest o f  the philosopher: the search 
for truth. In the First Meditation the goal o f  his project is identified: to ‘establish 
anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last’.1 The method Descartes 
employs is to  ‘demolish everything completely and start again right from the 
foundations.’2 Descartes wants to establish epistemological foundations that are secure 
and upon which additional knowledge can be built up.
The seeds o f  D escartes’s method for building knowledge emerge in his writing o f  Rules
for the Direction o f the Mind where in Rule Five he states:
‘The whole m ethod consists entirely in the ordering and arranging o f  the objects 
on which w e must concentrate our m ind’s eye if  we are to discover some truth. 
We shall be following this method exactly if  we first reduce complicated and 
obscure propositions step by step by simpler ones, and then, starting with the 
intuition o f  the simplest ones o f  all, try to ascend through the same steps to 
knowledge o f  all the rest.’3
It is the emergence o f  this initial foundational approach that is more fully developed in
the Meditations. The foundational stance that Descartes seems to adopt is psychological.
1 F irst M editation: AT V I 1 17: C S M II 12.
2 F irst M editation: A T V I 1 17: CSM  I I 12.
3 Rules for the D irection o f  the M ind: A T X 379: CSM  1 20.
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I f  we apply modern classifications to Descartes, then he is part o f  w hat Triplett calls
‘Psychological foundationalism’.4 This is the view  that basic propositions are
propositions about one’s current m ental states. In  the Second M editation  the following
observation is noted:
‘I certainly seem to  see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is 
called ‘having a  sensory perception’ is strictly ju st this, and in this restricted 
sense o f  the term  it is simply thinking.’5
The direction that D escartes’s enquiry takes is to  start from within, the psychological
position, and to eventually move outwards to examine the external. It is not until the
Fifth and  Sixth M editation  that a  detailed account o f  the existence and essence o f
m aterial objects is provided.
At the beginning o f  the Fifth Meditation, Descartes informs the reader o f  his approach:
‘But before I inquire w hether any such things exist outside me, I must consider 
the ideas o f  these things, in so far as they exist in m y thought, and see which o f  
them  are distinct, and which confused.’6
On D escartes’s account the source o f  knowledge ultimately involves ideas, and the
source o f  ideas is in the mind o f  the person who has them. Having identified the
psychological approach that Descartes takes, the next question that arises is what is the
starting point in the search for foundations o f  knowledge? To establish this starting
point an issue that must be addressed is scepticism.
Scepticism  in D escartes’s  system
As I mentioned in chapter one7, part o f  the traditional epistemological project is to 
attempt to answer the sceptic regarding the possibility o f  knowledge possession.
4 Timm Triplett, ‘R ecent W ork On F oundationalism ’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 27 (1990), 93- 
116 (p.97).
5 Second M editation: A T  V I 1 29: C S M I I 19.
6 Fifth M editation: A T V l l  63: CSM  I I 44.
7 See chapter one, page 13.
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Descartes uses scepticism as a  tool to  get rid o f  uncertainty and replace it w ith 
knowledge. As W illiam s8 observes, there are three levels o f  doubt employed by 
Descartes in the M editations:
1. Illusions o f  the senses
2. Phenomenon o f  dreaming
3. M alicious demon.
The first level o f  doubt: the illusions o f  the senses, is the one that is real to our everyday
experiences. It is not unreasonable to  take the data lfom  our sense experience as being
foundational, unproblem atic. But as Descartes discovers, the senses cannot be trusted.
In the First M editation  Descartes states:
‘W hatever I have up till now  accepted as m ost true I have acquired either from 
the senses or through the senses. But from  tim e to time I have found that the 
senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have 
deceived us even once.’9
An example o f  the illusory capability o f  the senses is provided in the Sixth M editation:
‘Sometimes tow ers which had looked round from a distance appeared square 
from close up; and enormous statues standing on their pediments did not seem 
large w hen observed from  the ground. In these and countless other such cases, I 
found that the judgem ents o f  the external senses w ere m istaken.’10
Even the intensity o f  our experiences does not seem to contribute to their certainty. It is
possible to have vivid and real sensory experiences, and yet we can be dreaming.
A lthough the possibility o f  dreams leading us into error because o f  their convincing
reality is ultimately dismissed by Descartes because o f  the lack o f  continuity that we
experience while dreaming, the phenom enon o f  dreaming is still a strong attack on
sensory knowledge foundations. As Descartes observes in the First M editation :
‘H ow often, asleep at night, am I convinced o f  ju s t such familiar events -  that I 
am  here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire -  when in fact I am lying 
undressed in bed! Y et at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake w hen I 
look at this piece o f  paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out 
and feel m y hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this
8 Bernard W illiams, ‘D escartes’s use o f  Scepticism ’, in René Descartes Critical Assessments, ed. by 
G eorges J.D. M oyal, V o l.l,  Routledge, 1991, pp.475-76.
9 F irst M editation: A T V I 1 18: CSM  I I 12.
10 Sixth M editation: A T V I 1 76: CSM  II 53.
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would not happen w ith such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if  I did 
not remember other occasions w hen I have been tricked by exactly similar 
thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that 
there are never any sure signs by means o f  which being awake can be 
distinguished from  being asleep. The result is that I begin to  feel dazed, and this 
very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.11
The strongest form  o f  sceptical attack is the malicious demon or deceiving God
hypothesis. Even the relative security o f  a  priori knowledge claims could be threatened.
M athematical truths which are not subject to the same doubts as sensory experiences
could be subjected to this form  o f  sceptical attack:
‘W hat is more, since I sometimes believe that others go astray in cases where 
they think they have the m ost perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong 
every tim e I add tw o and three or count the sides o f  a square, or in some even 
simpler matter, i f  that is im aginable? But perhaps God would not have allowed 
me to be deceived in this way, since he is said to be supremely good. But if  it 
were inconsistent with his goodness to have created me such that I am deceived 
all the time, it would seem  equally foreign to his goodness to allow me to be
19deceived even occasionally; yet this last assertion cannot be m ade.’
Even w hen the existence o f  a deceitful God is questioned, the possibility o f  a malicious 
dem on still remains:
‘I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good and the source o f  
truth, but rather some malicious dem on o f the utm ost pow er and cunning has 
employed all his energies in order to deceive m e.’13
Descartes uses the malicious dem on as a thought experiment to take scepticism to the
extreme: he calls it a ‘slight...m etaphysical’14 doubt. The counter attack to the
malicious dem on is by appeal to  the existence o f  a benevolent God. Taken together, the
sceptical challenges cast doubt on all o f  the kinds o f  propositions that could function as
foundations for knowledge. External world claims o f  both the distant (illusions) and
close (dreams) types can be doubted, and even a priori knowledge claims are threatened
by the possibility o f  a malicious dem on or deceiving God form o f  attack. The question
11 F irst M editation: A T V I 1 19: C S M II  13.
12 F irst M editation: A T V I 1 21: C S M II  14.
13 F irst M editation: AT V I 1 22: C S M II  15.
14 Third M editation: AT V I 1 36: CSM  I I 25.
26
is: where else can Descartes turn in search o f  certain foundations? The answer to this 
question is: inward, it is a psychological turn  that leads Descartes to the first certainty: 
the Cogito and to the first person m ental state reports that seem to form the basis o f  
D escartes’s epistemology.
The foundational elem ents in D escartes’s  epistemology
Descartes takes direct, intuitive awareness o f  his own existence to be foundational. In
the Second M editation  he states:
‘I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true 
whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in m y m ind’.15
This statement is foundational as it does not depend on any other proposition for
justification. W hen Descartes goes further to  probe what is meant by ‘I ’ he discovers
that he is a thinking thing, this is what the essence o f  ‘I ’ is. The next question that
Descartes sets out to  answer is: what is meant by thinking? A list o f  cognitive powers is
given in response to that question:
‘But what then am  I? A  thing that thinks. What is that? A  thing that doubts, 
understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has 
sensory perceptions’.16
Thinking, on the Cartesian account, is at the core o f  our sensory experiences. An
example o f  this is in the Second M editation where Descartes comments:
‘I am now  seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this 
is false. Yet I certainly seem  to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be 
false; w hat is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is strictly just this, and in this 
restricted sense o f  the term  it is simply thinking’.17
There is a class o f  ideas that seem to be innate within us, ideas that w e do not
necessarily have any em pirical experience of. M athematical truths, for example are
within this a priori category. In  the First M editation  Descartes comments:
15 Second M editation: A T V I 1 25: C S M I I 17.
16 Second M editation: A T V I 1 28: CSM  II 19.
17 Second M editation : AT V I 1 29: C SM  II 19
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‘disciplines w hich depend on the study o f  composite things, are doubtful; while 
arithmetic, geom etry and other subjects o f  this kind, which deal only w ith the 
simplest and most general things, regardless o f  whether they really exist in 
nature or not, contain something certain and indubitable. For whether I am  
awake or asleep, tw o and three added together are five, and a square has no more 
than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths should incur any 
suspicion o f  being false.’18
A central theme alluded to in the above passage is the certainty o f  geometric principles,
irrespective o f  whether the objects that those principles refer to, exist or not. Descartes
expands this theme more explicitly in his references to the nature o f  triangular shapes.
In the Fifth M editation  we have the following:
‘When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if  perhaps no such figure exists, 
or has ever existed, anywhere outside my thought, there is still a determinate 
nature, or essence, or form o f  the triangle w hich is immutable and eternal, and 
not invented by me or dependent on my m ind.’19
The ideas o f  shape, num ber and motion seem to be innate in that when we discover
them  it is not as if  we are learning something new, w e remember what we knew before.
M athem atical shapes are not necessarily experienced through the senses, indeed some
mathematical figures are never encountered through sense experience. In  his reply to
Gassendi, Descartes rejects the idea that mathematical figures come to our mind via the
senses, in fact D escartes suggests that the mind imposes structure on what is observed
through sense experience:
‘Geometrical figures are composed for the most part o f  straight lines; yet no part 
o f  a line that was really straight could ever affect our senses, since when we 
examine through a  magnifying glass those lines which appear m ost straight we 
find they are quite irregular and always form  wavy curves. Hence when in our 
childhood w e first happened to see a  triangular figure drawn on paper, it cannot 
have been this figure that showed us how  we should conceive o f  the true triangle 
studied by geom eters, since the true triangle is contained in the figure only in the 
way in w hich a statue o f  M ercury is contained in a rough block o f  wood. But 
since the idea o f  the true triangle was already in us, and could be conceived by 
our mind more easily than the more composite figure o f  the triangle drawn on 
paper, when we saw the composite figure we did not apprehend the figure we
18 F irst M editation: A T V I 1 21: CSM  H 14.
19 Fifth M editation: AT V l l  64: CSM  II 44-45.
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saw, but rather the true triangle Thus w e would not recognise the
geometrical triangle from  the diagram on the paper unless our mind already 
possessed the idea o f  it from some other source.’ 0
As V an De Pitte notes about the reply to Gassendi:
‘The figure o f  M ercury is only there if  the skill o f  an artist is brought to bear on 
the wood to make it appear; and the idea o f  a triangle is only there if  the powers 
o f  the mind are em ployed to formulate it’.21
Having identified the propositions that are foundational in Descartes’s system, a
question that can be asked is: w hat kind o f  foundationalism does this imply? Given the
certainty o f  the Cogito and the apparent certainty o f  first person current mental state
reports that Descartes subscribes to , the basic propositions seem to fit into a strong,
classical foundationalist structure. The advantage o f  such a classical foundationalist
stance is that if  it is successful, the sceptic can be answered because the foundations
would not require justification from  other propositions as they would be self-evident
and immediately justified.
The strong classical foundationalist position avoids the difficulty that the weaker, 
moderate foundationalist theory faces, that if  the basic beliefs are less than certain, what 
else supports them  for justification? It would be useful to  take a closer look now at the 
foundations, the Cogito in particular, to see if  it provides the secure foundation 
Descartes needs.
The Cogito
The Cogito is the first truth that Descartes discovers in the Meditations. In the Second  
M editation  Descartes states:
20 Replies to Objections V: AT V I 1 382: CSM 262.
21 Frederick P. Van De Pitte, ‘Descartes’s Innate Ideas’, in René Descartes Critical Assessments, vol.l, 
ed. by Georges J.D. Moyal, Routledge, 1991, p. 143.
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‘this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by 
me or conceived in my m ind.’22
The Cogito is indubitable: doubting it confirms its truth. Other propositions do not have
the same status as the Cogito. Ayer23 gives the example o f  doubting that the battle o f
W aterloo was fought in 1815 and doubting whether tw o plus two equals four. In both
cases the proposition being doubted is true. In the case o f  tw o plus tw o equalling four,
the proposition is necessarily true. But in neither case does the truth o f  the proposition
that is doubted follow from  the truth o f  the proposition that I doubt it. In  other words, it
is not because I doubt it that its truth is established.
The truth o f  the proposition that I am thinking does follow from the truth o f  the 
proposition that 1 am doubting that I think, and so does the truth o f  the proposition that I 
exist. W hat makes the Cogito indubitable is that its truth follows from the fact that it is 
doubted, and the same applies to  ‘I exist’ or ‘sum’.
Ayer asks the question: can ‘I am  not thinking’ ever be true. Yes, if  I am  unconscious I 
am not thinking, I f  I do not exist, I am  not thinking. The uniqueness o f  the Cogito is that 
the denial o f  it by an individual has to  be false. But it is not formally self-contradictory. 
W hat makes it appear self-contradictory is the use o f  the personal pronoun ‘I ’. I f  this 
pronoun is replaced w ith a name or description, i f  Descartes had stated that Descartes is 
not thinking, what he stated would have been false, by his very act o f  stating it, but the 
proposition ‘Descartes is not thinking’ is not self-contradictory. As an indexical word, 
‘I ’ can be understood as pointing to someone who is thinking. In this sense, the 
proposition ‘I am  not thinking therefore I do not exist’ cannot state a truth. This 
inability to state a truth is not because it is self-contradictory, it is because the subject
22 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 25: C S M II17.
23 Sir Alfred J. Ayer, ‘Cogito Ergo Sum’, in René Descartes Critical Assessments, ed. by Georges J.D. 
Moyal, Vol. II, Routledge, 1991, p.220.
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word ‘I ’ points to something w hich according to the predicate does not exist. An 
important point though is, it is a  contingent rather than a necessary fact that there is 
something for the indexical ‘I ’ to refer to, my existence is not necessary.
The Cogito may be unique, but what is its purpose? It would seem strange to merely 
want to prove one’s existence. Frankfurt24 comments that Descartes is less concerned 
w ith proving his existence, than w ith establishing that his existence is certain or 
indubitable. The relevant passage in this regard is the following from the Second  
Meditation'.
‘In  that case am not I, at least something? But I have ju st said that I have no 
senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from  this? Am not I 
so bound up with a body and w ith senses that I cannot exist without them? But I 
have convinced m yself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no 
earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it not follow that I too do not exist? No: if  I 
convinced m yself o f  something then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver 
o f  supreme pow er and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. 
In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if  he is deceiving me; and let him deceive 
me as m uch as he can, he w ill never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I 
think that I am  something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I 
must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true 
whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my m ind.’25
Descartes does regard his existence as something inferred. Frankfurt’s point is that the
purpose o f  the inference is not to prove that his existence is true. I think Frankfurt’s
interpretation goes too far, after all, the last line in the passage quoted mentions truth. It
is probably more accurate to state that Descartes is not merely proving his existence, he
wants to  establish that the proposition that he exists is certain or indubitable as well as
being true.
The first doubt that Descartes uses to question the certainty o f  his existence is that he 
does not have senses or a body. A t this point, in the Second M editation  the result is 
undecided. Descartes, at this stage, only thinks o f  him self as something, he is unable to
24 Harry G. Frankliirt, ‘Descartes’s Discussion o f his Existence in the Second Meditation’, in René 
Descartes Critical Assessments, ed. by Georges J. D. Moyal, Vol. II, Routledge, 1991, pp. 185-206.
25 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 25: CSM II 16-17.
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w ork out the logical relation between the proposition that he exists and the possibility 
that he has no body or senses.
The next step that Descartes takes is to remember that he was persuaded from  the First 
Meditation  that maybe there are no real things at all: does this mean he does not exist? 
Descartes answers this question w ith an emphatic no. His view is that if  he convinced 
him self o f  something then he certainly existed.
Even i f  we accept the idea that D escartes’s goal is to  establish the certainty o f  his own 
existence, w hy does he use thinking to infer his existence? This is a question that 
Gassendi put to Descartes:
‘You could have made the same inference from  any one o f  your other actions,
• 9 A
since it is known by the natural light that whatever acts exists.’
Descartes, in his reply, denies that other actions such as walking, would suffice to infer 
the same degree o f  certainty as thinking. Using thinking instead o f  walking is superior 
because walking does not have the metaphysical certitude that characterises the Cogito. 
‘I walk, therefore I exist’ would be unsatisfactory because the motion o f  the body 
sometimes does not exist, as in dreams where I may appear to walk. The superiority o f  
the Cogito is that we can be certain o f  it, whereas the dream  argument undermines the 
certainty o f  inferring existence from  walking. But even if  the Cogito is unique, what 
epistemic status does it have?
The Epistemic Status of the Cogito
D escartes’s intention is for the Cogito to deliver both truth and certainty. But this role 
is not as straightforward as it may initially appear. The truth o f  the proposition ‘I am, I 
exist’ is confirmed by the act o f  thinking about it. The Cogito seems to be the source o f  
the criterion for tru th  and certainty: clarity and distinctness. A key point is that clarity
26 Replies to Objections V: AT V I 1 259: CSM 180.
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and distinctness is an intrinsic feature o f  the Cogito, it is not separate from it. As
Descartes states in the Third M editation :
‘In this first item o f  knowledge there is simply a clear and distinct perception o f
what I am asserting So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule
that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.27
The difficulty is that one detects a cautious rather than a confident revealing o f  clarity
and distinctness as the criterion for truth and certainty28. Why can Descartes only
“seem” to be able to formulate the clarity and distinctness rule? The answer is that even
clear and distinct perceptions can still be subject to doubt when the deceiving God or
malicious dem on hypotheses are applied to them. As Descartes comments only a couple
o f  paragraphs after revealing the criterion for truth and certainty:
‘But what about when I was considering something very simple and 
straightforward in arithmetic or geometry, for example that two and three added 
together make five, and so on?....perhaps some G od could have given me a 
nature such that I was deceived even in matters which seemed most evident.’29
Even though this is only w hat Descartes refers to as a ‘slight...m etaphysical’30 doubt it
still drives him to attempt to prove the existence o f  a benevolent God to securely
establish clarity and distinctness as the criterion for truth and certainty.
Aside from that ‘slight...m etaphysical’ doubt, D escartes’s project looks promising at 
this stage. The first foundational truth, the Cogito, has been identified. The Cogito 
seems to be unassailable because the very act o f  doubting it confirms its truth. The truth 
o f  the Cogito also seems to be something that is clearly and distinctly perceived. So the 
Cogito reveals the criterion for truth and certainty: that whatever is as clearly and 
distinctly perceived as the Cogito is true. The key question now  is: how  can we proceed
27 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 35: C S M II24.
281 am presenting here a summary o f  some observations made by Harry McCauley in his paper: ‘Circling 
Descartes’ in Maynooth Philosophical Papers, 2 (2004), 70-83 (pp.71-73).
29 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 35-36: CSM I I 25.
30 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 36: CSM H 25.
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Moving beyond the Cogito
The status o f  the basic propositions is only one aspect o f  the foundationalist theory, the 
other aspect is the issue o f  how  to get beyond the basic propositions. The classical 
foundationalist view is that deduction is the only valid method o f transm ission from 
basic to non-basic propositions. But does Descartes confine him self exclusively to 
deductive reasoning in the M editations? The first step in answering this question is to 
make some general observations about Descartes’s use o f  reason.
Reason
Descartes holds the view  that we cannot doubt the truth o f  what we intuit while we are
perceiving clearly and distinctly. A n example o f  this is in the Third Meditation'.
‘W hatever is revealed to me by the natural light -  for example from the fact that 
I am  doubting it follows that I exist, and so on -  cannot in any way be open to 
doubt.’31
W hile the intuition lasts, we are irresistibly drawn to what is intuited, but doubt may 
arise at other times, i f  G od’s existence is not known. In  a reply to Bourdin Descartes 
states:
‘Again, until we know  that God exists, we have reason to doubt everything (i.e. 
everything such that we do not have a clear and distinct perception o f  it before 
our minds, as I have often explained).’32
Descartes view  is that i f  we know  that God exists, we can accept the fact that something
that was once intuited, conclusively establishes its truth. The recollection is sufficient to
establish the truth o f  w hat we remember intuiting. I f  G od’s existence is not known, we
must accept that what we remember intuiting may be false, despite the fact that we
clearly and distinctly perceived it and at that time could not doubt it.
beyond the epistemic security o f the Cogito?
31 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 38: CSM II 27.
32 Replies to Objections VII: AT V I 1 546: CSM 373.
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The same doubts apply to  composite m athem atical knowledge. Descartes, referring to 
the geometrical principles o f  triangles states:
‘But as soon as I turn my m ind’s eye away from  the proof, then in spite o f  still 
remembering that I perceived it very clearly, I can easily fall into doubt about its 
truth, i f  I am  unaware o f  God. For I can convince m yself that I have a natural 
disposition to  go wrong from time to time in matters which I think I perceive as 
evidently as can be .’33
In the preceding passage we can see that the finding o f  a proof indubitable and
perceiving it w ith  the greatest certainty is not by itse lf sufficient for truth. So long as we
do not know G od’s existence, our certainty could be the w ork o f  a malicious deceiver
whose power forces us to be drawn irresistibly tow ards error. It is D escartes’s
determination to defeat even the ultimate sceptical challenge o f  the deceiving God and
malicious dem on hypotheses, a challenge that even the sceptics themselves did not think
of, that leads Descartes into a potential minefield o f  circular argumentation.
Circularity in Descartes’s reasoning
By the early part o f  the Third Meditation  several things have been established: the 
Cogito, which is the first certain truth, and the criterion for establishing truth and 
certainty, clarity and distinctness. Clarity and distinctness seems to be an intrinsic 
feature o f  the Cogito. One would imagine that from the solid foundational truth o f  the 
Cogito, combined w ith the method o f  establishing truth: clarity and distinctness, 
Descartes now has the tools that he needs to build up knowledge. As M cCauley 
comments:
‘we would confidently have expected that Descartes would now get down to the 
exciting business o f  rebuilding the edifice o f  knowledge on secure foundations, 
and that he would henceforth simply deploy his C+D criterion in order to make 
substantial philosophical progress. The sceptic had been defeated, the first 
certainty had been found, the criterion o f  truth and certainty had been 
revealed.’34
33 Fifth Meditation: AT V I 1 70: CSM I I 48.
34 Harry McCauley, ‘Circling Descartes’, in Maynooth Philosophical Papers, 2 (2004), 70-83 (p.71).
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The problem  is that Descartes did not proceed directly to build knowledge from the 
secure foundation o f  the Cogito. Perhaps haunted by the sceptical challenges that he had 
raised in the First M editation, Descartes felt the clarity and distinctness rule had to be 
vindicated by proving the existence o f  a benevolent God who would not deceive us. The 
existence o f  a  benevolent God who is not a deceiver is necessary to counter the claim 
that we could have been created by God in such a way that even our clear and distinct 
perceptions are untrue; we could be deceived into thinking that they are true. 
Unfortunately, the attem pt to prove G od’s existence opens up a charge o f  circularity in 
D escartes’s reasoning. Am auld is concerned w ith circularity in D escartes’s method 
when he writes:
‘I have one further worry, nam ely how  the author avoids reasoning in a circle 
w hen he says that we are sure that w hat we clearly and distinctly perceive is true 
only because G od exists. But w e can be sure that God exists only because we 
clearly and distinctly perceive this. Hence, before we can be sure that God 
exists, we ought to be able to be sure that whatever we perceive clearly and
i t
evidently is tru e .’
As a  response to the charge o f  circularity Descartes suggests that there are two different 
kinds o f  clear and distinct perceptions. In reply to Amauld, Descartes states that he 
‘made a distinction between what we in fact perceive clearly and what we remember 
having perceived clearly on  a previous occasion.’36 So the first kind o f  clear and distinct 
perception applies to situations when w e are paying direct attention to whatever is 
allegedly being clearly and distinctly perceived.
The second kind o f  clear and distinct perception refers to situations where we are 
remembering what was clearly and distinctly perceived in the past, but we are no longer 
paying direct attention to it. D escartes’s view is that clear and distinct perceptions, as 
we are currently having them, do not require G od’s existence to  support them. It is only
35 Replies to Objections IV: AT V I1 214: CSM 150.
36 Replies to Objections IV: A T V II246: CSM I I 171.
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clear and distinct perceptions that are recalled that require divine support. So if  
D escartes’s argument for the p roof o f  the existence o f  God in the Third M editation  only 
relies on clear and distinct perceptions that are being directly attended to then perhaps 
the circularity charge can be avoided. As M cCauley37 points out though: the problem is 
that in arguing for the existence o f  God, Descartes seems to depend on both current 
clear and distinct perception and clear and distinct perceptions that he is not directly 
attending to. I f  this is the case, then the circle has not been broken.
Even if  we set aside the circular argumentation charge, can we rely on reason itself? 
Frankfurt raises a difficulty concerning Descartes’s reasoning38: Given that the correct 
use o f  reason seems to lead to the conclusion that reason is reliable because o f  the 
existence o f  a veracious God, may it not also lead to the conclusion that there is an 
omnipotent dem on whose existence renders reason unreliable? Both o f  these 
conclusions together are incompatible, if  the proper use o f  reason establishes both o f 
them, then reason is unreliable. Descartes cannot take for granted that this is not the 
case.
In  response to  Frankfurt’s claim, I am  not so sure that one can talk o f  an omnipotent 
demon in the same way that Descartes refers to God being omnipotent. For Descartes, 
God is infinite perfection, lacking nothing. The omnipotent demon would lack 
goodness, and if  goodness were outside o f  the dem on’s power, then the dem on would 
not be truly omnipotent.
In the Second M editation  Descartes is searching for a secure starting point o f  
knowledge: ‘this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward
37 See McCauley’s ‘Circling Descartes’ especially pages 78-79 for analysis o f this issue.
38 Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘Descartes’s Validation o f Reason’, in René Descartes Critical Assessments, ed. by 
Georges J.D. Moyal, Vol I, Routledge, 1991, pp.475-76. This comment is endnote no. 22 on page 275.
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by me or conceived in m y m ind.’39 Descartes reaches this point before he proves the 
existence o f  God, in spite o f  the presence o f  the malicious demon that employs ‘all his 
energies in order to deceive m e.’40
I f  the malicious dem on hypothesis applied to all exercise o f  reason, then it is a 
meaningless hypothesis, because it cannot be tested as we would have to use reason to 
test it. Also the hypothesis could not be rejected. Descartes believed that he could reject 
the malicious dem on hypothesis. The rejection involves the certainty o f  the Cogito itself 
and proving from  the Cogito the existence o f  a veracious God. We can only arrive at a 
veracious God through the use o f  reason. I f  every use o f  reason cannot be trusted, then 
the proof o f  the existence o f  a veracious God cannot be trusted either.
I think that it is reasonable to suggest that Descartes could have avoided getting into a 
position where he left him self open to the charge o f  circular argumentation. After all, it 
was only to silence the ‘slight...m etaphysical’41 doubt that Descartes embarked on his 
perilous p roo f o f  G od’s existence. It seems to me that Descartes’s project still has a lot 
to offer w ith the foundational truth o f  the Cogito and the clarity and distinctness rule as 
a method for building knowledge. So perhaps reason as a process remains intact, but the 
question then becomes: where does the use o f  reason lead us? I w ill now  address this 
issue.
Reason as a bridge to the external world
D escartes’s analysis o f  the piece o f  w ax has been generally interpreted as demonstrating 
that the mind is better known than the body and also that the primary quality o f  material 
bodies is their extension in space. W hen the w ax melts, every sensory quality that it had 
disappears, and yet we would still say that the same wax remains. The only
39 First Meditation: AT V I 1 18: C S M II12.
40 First Meditation: AT V I 1 22: CSM I I 15.
41 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 36: CSM I I 25.
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characteristic that remains unchanged is that o f  the wax being an extended body. 
However, Ben M ijuskovic42 offers an interesting alternative explanation o f  the w ax 
passage in the Second Meditation. M ijuskovic claims that Descartes is attempting to 
show that the human mind has a pow er to make inferences and judgm ents to arrive at 
truths indirectly or mediately, as opposed to directly or immediately which is intuition. 
This then enables Descartes to argue to the existence o f  an external world.
Descartes’s use o f  the example o f  the w ax shows that we do not know an object by its 
changing, secondary qualities, but through a grasp o f  its quality o f  extension, a property 
which is conceived intellectually, in the understanding. W hat Mijuskovic objects to is 
the notion that D escartes’s aim in the Second Meditation is to show that the essential 
nature o f  matter is extension. The order o f  events in the Meditations is used by 
M ijuskovic to  lend credence to his theory. Descartes cannot prove the existence o f  the 
external world until he has first demonstrated the existence and goodness o f  God. This 
is because the malicious dem on could just as easily deceive him about the nature o f  
material bodies as he could about mathematical truths. But the existence o f  God is not 
proven until the Third Meditation. On this basis, it would not make sense to attempt to 
prove that the essence o f  material bodies is extension in the Second Meditation.
Apart from the w ax passage, M ijuskovic also refers to the ‘hats and coats’ example in 
the Second Meditation as additional evidence to  support his view. A comparison 
between the w ax and ‘hats and coats’ example yields the following: Descartes knows 
the wax by ‘scrutiny o f  the mind alone’43. In the same way, Descartes knows that he 
sees men, not merely machines covered with hats and coats, through mental focus:
42 Ben Mijuskovic, ‘Descartes’s Bridge to the External World: The Piece o f  W ax’, in René Descartes 
Critical Assessments, ed. by Georges J.D. Moyal, Vol. II, Routledge, 1991, pp.312-28.
43 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 32: CSM I I 21.
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‘I judge that they are men. And so something which I thought I was seeing w ith 
my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty o f  judgm ent which is in my 
m ind.’44
I f  D escartes’s purpose in the Second Meditation was to show that the essence o f  
material bodies is extension, then on  that basis, w ax and m en would be 
indistinguishable. The wax passage and the men on the street can be viewed as 
indicating the difference between direct, immediate knowledge and indirect inference.
On this view, Descartes is concerned to  show that the mind has an innate power o f  
inference, o f  going beyond what is directly presented to consciousness. In this sense, it 
is the pow er o f  inference in the mind that forms a  bridge to the external world. This 
enables Descartes to escape the charge o f  solipsism. I f  God, in his goodness, has given 
m an a faculty o f  inference, he must have given it for a  reason, this reason can only be to 
use it in knowing the external world. The Fifth Meditation begins w ith the question o f  
the essence or nature o f  material things, while it is not until the Sixth Mediation that 
their independent existence arises. I f  this interpretation is correct, then it would seem to 
be premature for Descartes to take up the problem  o f  extension o f  material bodies, 
before all o f  the implications o f  the idea o f  the self, God and the faculties o f  the mind 
are worked out. At the stage o f  the Second Meditation the deceiving power o f  a 
malicious dem on is still a possibility. I f  the mind is to make inferences, it seems to 
depend on a  key notion: the clarity and distinctness o f  what it perceives. The next task is 
to examine clarity and distinctness.
Clarity and Distinctness
D escartes’s theory o f  sense perception is w hat Ashworth calls a ‘representative 
theory’45 in which the ideas are intermediary between the mind and what is external to
44 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 32: CSM I I 21.
45 E.J. Ashworth, ‘Descartes’ Theory o f  Clear and Distinct Ideas’, in Cartesian Studies, ed. by R.J. Butler, 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972, pp.89-105.
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it. The first certain truth: ‘I think, I exist’ is the foundation stone, when Descartes 
examines this statement he finds that he has a clear and distinct perception o f  it. It is 
from  this starting point that Descartes is eventually able to establish the general rule: 
‘Whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.’46 
The only possible reason to doubt this clarity and distinctness rule is if  we, as humans, 
were created in such a way that our clear and distinct perceptions were false. The 
existence o f  G od dispels this doubt. As Ashworth notes, Descartes, in using the word 
‘idea’ rather than ‘concept’ to discuss cognition, breaks away from the scholastic 
tradition. In  classic scholastic terms, concepts had sense perceptions as their origin. 
There was a relationship between concepts and external objects. Descartes wanted to 
examine the mind and ideas in isolation, w ithout bringing any assumptions about the 
external world to the analysis. The meaning o f  ‘idea’ for Descartes has a broad 
application. It is taken to be anything the mind perceives, ‘perceive’ referring to any 
cognitive activity: sensing, imagining, and conceiving.
Is there a procedure for ensuring the clarity and distinctness o f  perception? Humber47 
believes there is. In  order to perceive clearly, w e should attend to things themselves, 
thoughts then spring to mind, essences and natures become apparent. But to perceive 
clearly is not necessarily to  perceive distinctly. The will is capable o f  acting 
independently and the w ill may judge that clearly perceived essences are related in ways 
not perceived by the intellect.
It may initially appear that Descartes’s m ethod for determining clarity and distinctness 
is subjective, but this m ay not be the case. H um ber gives the example o f  summing up a
46 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 35: C SM II 24.
47 James M. Humber, ‘Recognising Clear and Distinct Perceptions’, in René Descartes Critical 
Assessments, ed. by Georges J.D. Moyal, vo l.l, Routledge, 1991, pp.204-21.
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column o f  numbers on a piece o f  paper:48 It is possible to  not pay enough attention and 
to misread the numbers and come up with an incorrect total. This mistake is corrected 
by going back over the numbers, w ith due care. Similarly, Descartes knows that clear 
and distinct perceptions are assured w hen he is attentive and refuses to affirm that 
essences are related w hen his understanding does not perceive a  connection between 
those essences.
So it seems that D escartes’s m ethod o f  clarity and distinctness is as objective as the 
m ethod we use to sum up numbers, but even a person who has an objective method for 
ensuring truth, does not have a guarantee that he will never make a mistake.
Building upon the foundations
Any standard interpretation o f  D escartes’s project in the M editations has assumed that 
strict deduction is the only secure w ay o f  establishing any further knowledge beyond the 
foundations. Indeed, this has resulted in D escartes’s epistemology being classified as 
strong classical foundationalism. Robert Audi characterises D escartes’s epistemology in 
the following way:
‘Cartesian foundationalism  is widely taken to  imply (as for present purposes I 
shall assume it does) the following three principles: that (i) only beliefs (or other 
cognitions) that, owing to, say, their basis in the clarity and distinctness o f  their 
prepositional contents, achieve epistemic certainty are admissible for the 
foundational level -  call this axiomatism about foundations; (ii) only deductive 
inferences can transm it justification to superstructure elements -  call this 
deductivism about transmission; and (iii) if  one has these strong foundations,
one can (or even does) know that one has the relevant kind o f  certainty
(whatever that is) -  call this second-order foundationalism. This triad yields a 
very strong view; but, however famous, it is clearly not the only kind o f  
foundationalism. ’49
Is Audi correct in stating that only deductive inferences can justify non-basic
propositions in the Cartesian scheme? I w ill be challenging this view. But for the
48 See Humber, op.cit., pp.218-19.
49 Audi, Robert, The Structure o f  Justification, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp.361-62.
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moment I think it will be useful to look at the other signs that seem to require a 
classical, deductive interpretation o f  D escartes’s project.
Deductive Reasoning: The argument for the existence of God
D escartes’s argument for the existence o f  God in the Third M editation  can be read as a
deductive argument. It is im portant to mention the relevant background information that 
is in place before D escartes argues for the existence o f  God. Descartes has already 
established his first, certain piece o f  knowledge: the Cogito. The key feature o f  the 
Cogito is that it is clearly and distinctly perceived. The criterion for truth (the clarity 
and distinctness rule) is then derived from  the clarity and distinctness o f  the Cogito: that 
whatever is perceived very clearly and distinctly is true. The problem, as Descartes sees 
it, then becomes: how can we be certain that whatever w e perceive clearly and distinctly 
is true? There could be a  deceiving G od who ensures that even our clear and distinct 
perceptions are false. This is why Descartes feels that he has to prove the existence o f  a 
benevolent God who would not deceive us. Cottingham50 breaks down D escartes’s 
argument for the existence o f  G od in the Third Meditation  into four phases as follows:
1. Descartes examines the ideas he has within himself. One o f  these ideas is the 
idea o f  an infinite, all pow erful God. This is the first premise o f  the argument.
2. The second premise is an allegedly self-evident principle: ‘N ow  it is manifest by 
the natural light that there must be at least as much reality in the efficient and 
total cause as in the effect o f  that cause.’51 Cottingham calls this principle the 
‘Causal Adequacy Principle’.52 The Causal Adequacy Principle implies that if  
there is some item X, having the property F, then the cause which produced X 
must possess at least as much F-ness as is to be found in X  itself.
50 Cottingham, John, Descartes, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1986, pp.48-50.1 am summarising 
the key points that Cottingham makes.
51 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 40: CSM II 28.
52 Cottingham, ibid., p.49.
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3. The Causal Adequacy Principle can be applied to ideas, as well as ordinary 
objects. I f  an idea A  represents some object which is F, then the cause o f  the 
idea must itself contain as much reality as is to be found representatively in the 
idea.
4. Given that I have an  idea o f  God which represents him  as a being who is infinite, 
all powerful, etc., it follows from the results o f  points 2 and 3 that the cause o f  
this idea m ust be something which really contains in itself all the features that 
are in the idea representatively. Since I am a finite and imperfect being, then by 
the Causal Adequacy Principle I cannot be the cause o f  this idea. Also the idea 
cannot simply be a com bination o f  other ideas that I have because: ‘although one 
idea may perhaps originate from  another, there cannot be an infinite regress 
here; eventually one m ust reach a prim ary idea, the cause o f  which w ill be like 
an archetype w hich contains formally and in fact all the reality or perfection 
which is present only objectively or representatively in the idea’.53 So the 
ultimate cause o f  m y idea o f  God must be something that possesses all the 
perfections represented in the idea. As Descartes states: ‘So from what has been 
said it must be concluded that God necessarily exists.’54
Although the weak point o f  Descartes’s argument may be his reliance on  the Causal
Adequacy Principle itself55, the key point is that the argument proceeds deductively.
Another deductive argument is the proof o f  the world in the Sixth Meditation. Descartes
presents the argument in the following way:
‘N ow  there is in me a passive faculty o f  sensory perception, that is, a faculty for 
receiving and recognizing the ideas o f  sensible objects; but I could not make use
53 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 42: C SM II 29.
54 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 45: CSM II 31.
55 For some comments on Descartes’s use o f  the causal adequacy Principle, see Dicker, Georges, 
Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.100-102. Also 
Cottingham raises some concerns on page 51 o f  his book Descartes (1986).
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o f  it unless there was also an active faculty, either in me or in something else, 
which produced or brought about these ideas. But this faculty cannot be in me, 
since clearly it presupposes no intellectual act on my part, and the ideas in 
question are produced without my cooperation and often even against my will. 
So the only alternative is that it is in another substance distinct from me -  a 
substance w hich contains either formally or eminently all the reality which 
exists objectively in the ideas produced by this faculty (as I have just noted). 
This substance is either a body, that is, a corporeal nature, in which case it will 
contain formally and in fact everything which is to be found objectively or 
representatively in the ideas; or else it is God, or some creature more noble than 
a body, in which case it will contain eminently whatever is to be found in the 
ideas. But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not transmit 
the ideas to me either directly from  himself, or indirectly, via some creature 
which contains the objective reality o f  the ideas not formally but only eminently. 
For God has given me no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for these 
ideas; on the contrary, he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are 
produced by corporeal things. So I do not see how G od could be understood to 
be anything but a  deceiver i f  the ideas were transm itted from a source other than 
corporeal things. It follows that corporeal things exist. They may not all exist in 
a way that exactly corresponds with my sensory grasp o f  them, for in many 
cases the grasp o f  the senses is very obscure and confused. But at least they 
possess all the properties w hich I clearly and distinctly understand, that is, all 
those which, viewed in general terms, are comprised within the subject-matter o f  
pure m athem atics.’56
Descartes’s p roo f o f  the world argument can be divided into the following steps57:
1. I have sensory experiences that I do not seem to produce myself. There must be 
a cause o f  these experiences.
2. The cause o f  m y sensory experiences cannot be within me, as a thinking thing, 
as it does not presuppose my thought and the sensory experiences are produced 
independently o f  m y will.
3. The cause o f  m y sensory experiences must be some substance independent o f  
me. This substance m ust contain either formally or eminently all the reality that 
the ideas it produces contain objectively.
4. All the possible causes o f  my sensory experiences are: (a) a body (physical 
objects), (b) God him self or (c) some created thing ‘more noble than a body’.
56 Sixth Meditation: AT V I 1 79-80: C SM II 55.
57 The key points of my analysis are based on the comments that Georges Dicker makes in his book: 
Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.200-2.
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5. The cause o f  my sensory experiences cannot be God or any created substance 
other than bodies, for God has not given me any w ay o f  recognising any o f  these 
options, what I do have is a powerful inclination to believe that sensory 
experiences come from material objects.
So God would be a deceiver if  sensory experiences were produced in any other way. 
But God is not a deceiver.
6. Therefore material (corporeal) things exist.
A lthough there may be problem atic aspects to this argument, one chief concern being 
that it depends on the acceptance o f  D escartes’s arguments for the existence o f  God;
nonetheless, it is an example where strict deduction is used. I f  each o f  the premises is
accepted then the conclusion follows from  those premises.
I f  the Third M editation  argument for the existence o f  God is read deductively along 
with the p ro o f o f  the w orld argument in the Sixth M editation, then we can perhaps see 
why D escartes’s project has been characterised as strong, classical foundationalism. 
Scepticism is defeated by the certainty o f  the Cogito, which is clearly and distinctly 
perceived, the p roo f o f  the existence o f  a benevolent God ensures that our clear and 
distinct perceptions can be trusted, and we can then proceed to the p roof o f  the world. 
As Cottingham puts it: D escartes’s project moves in the following direction: ‘From Self 
to God to Knowledge o f  the W orld.’58
The traditional, deductive interpretation o f  D escartes’s project does seem to be 
supported by the more mathematical or geometrical display o f  the key concepts o f  the 
M editations that Descartes provides in the Objections and Replies to the M editations.59
58 Cottingham uses the phrase as a chapter heading in his book: Descartes (1986), p.47.
591 will be challenging this view as it does not tell the whole story.
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In  the Second Set o f  Replies60 D escartes lists ten  definitions covering what he means by 
thought, idea and so on. The reader is then guided through seven steps and various 
demonstrations are provided. So is A udi right when he states that ‘only deductive 
inferences can transm it justification to  superstructure elements’61 in the Cartesian 
scheme? I think the Cartesian picture m ay be more subtle than Audi suggests.
Non-deductive reasoning?
I think there are hints o f  alternative m ethods o f  reasoning other than strict deduction
being em ployed in the Meditations. One o f  these alternative methods o f  reasoning is
hypothetico-deduction. The process is as follows:
Step 1 -  a general hypothesis is formulated.
Step 2 -  a particular statement is deduced from the hypothesis.
Step 3 -  The statement is checked by experiments or observations.
A n example o f  a possible hypothetico-deductive62 reading is D escartes’s argument for
the existence o f  body in the Sixth M editation  :
‘I can, as I say, easily understand, that this is how  imagination comes about, if  
the body exists; and since there is no other equally suitable w ay o f  explaining 
im agination that comes to mind, I can make a probable conjecture that the body 
exists. But this is only a probability; and despite a careful and comprehensive 
investigation, I do not yet see how  the distinct idea o f  corporeal nature which I 
find in my im agination can provide any basis for a necessary inference that some 
body exists.’63
The structure o f  the proceeding argument can be sketched in the following way: I f  body 
exists, im agination is made up as follow s... There is no better or as good an explanation 
o f  the makeup o f  imagination, therefore body exists. So the existence o f  body is the 
hypothesis from  w hich our experience o f  imagination is deduced, as it is the best 
hypothesis, we have to accept the existence o f  body. This is a hypothetico-deductive
60 The geometrical display is to be found in: AT V II160-170: CSM: 113-120.
61 See A udi’s The Structure o f  Justification (1993), pp.361-62.
62 Descartes’s use o f this type o f argumentation is suggested by Frederick F. Schmitt in his essay: ‘Why 
Was Descartes a Foundationalist?’, in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. by Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 
University o f  California Press, 1986, pp.491-512. See especially pages 493-98.
63 Sixth Meditation: AT V II 73: CSM II 51.
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argument and my suggestion is that it is reasonable to read D escartes’s argument in this
way.
Are there any other traces o f  non-deductive inferences in the M editations? In chapter 
one64 I mentioned the idea o f ‘exem plary’ foundationalism where an epistemic principle 
is used as a reference o r standard against which propositions can be tested. The appeal 
to an exemplar or standard is not part o f  any deductive analysis. Perhaps the argument 
for the existence o f  God in the Third M editation  can be read this way? The details o f  an 
exemplary analysis would consist o f  the following:
1. The idea o f  God comes from the self.
2. The idea o f  G od is not deduced from the Cogito.
3. The key component is the causal adequacy principle: that if  there is some item 
X, having the property F, then the cause w hich produced X must possess at least 
as much F-ness as is to  be found in X itself.
4. The causal adequacy principle is not deduced from the Cogito, it is seen as 
certain because it shares the clarity and distinctness feature that makes the 
Cogito certain. So clarity and distinctness is used as an exemplar or standard 
against which propositions can be tested.
5. Given that I have an idea o f  God representing him as an infinite being, and since 
I am a finite being, then by the causal adequacy principle I cannot be the cause 
o f  my idea o f  God. Also the idea I have o f  God cannot be simply a combination 
o f  the other ideas that I have because: ‘although one idea may perhaps originate 
from another, there cannot be an infinite regress here; eventually one must reach 
a prim ary idea, the cause o f  which will be like an archetype which contains
64 See chapter one, p.21.
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formally and in fact all the reality or perfection which is present only objectively 
or representatively in the idea.’65
6. So the ultimate cause o f my idea o f  God must be something that possesses all 
the perfections represented in the idea. Therefore God exists.
Even if there are traces o f non-deductive inferences being made in the Meditations, is 
there any evidence to suggest that Descartes may have agreed with the use o f such non- 
deductive methods? I think there is. Although, as I mentioned earlier, Descartes sets out 
a deductive, geometrical display in the Replies to the Meditations, this is done after the 
discoveries o f  the Meditations have been made. This might suggest that it is possible to 
set out one’s knowledge deductively, in a step by step fashion after the knowledge has 
been obtained.
Descartes seems to favour the more analytic style o f the Meditations. In the Replies, just 
before Descartes sets out his discoveries in a geometrical or mathematical fashion, he 
comments:
‘But I know that even those who do concentrate, and earnestly pursue the truth, 
will find it very difficult to take in the entire structure o f my Meditations, while 
at the same time having a distinct grasp o f the individual parts that make it up. 
Yet I reckon that both the overall and the detailed scrutiny is necessary if  the 
reader is to derive the full benefit from my work. I shall therefore append here a 
short exposition in the synthetic style, which will, I hope, assist my readers a
little yet I am convinced that it is the Meditations which will yield by far the
greater benefit.’66
Although Descartes may not have explicitly placed any great emphasis on non- 
deductive inferences, if  there are any traces o f them at all, then this does not strictly fit 
into the strong, classical foundationalist picture. The classical foundationalist reading 
requires strict deduction only with no exceptions. My suggestion is that there may be
65 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 42: CSM II 29.
66 Second Set o f Replies: AT V I 1 159: CSM II 113.
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some exceptions in the Meditations.
Conclusion
I have proposed that Descartes employs a psychological approach to examine the origin 
and structure o f knowledge. Descartes confronts scepticism, taking it to extreme limits 
in an attempt to establish secure foundations for knowledge. The Cogito is that secure 
foundation, clearly and distinctly perceived. The clarity and distinctness o f perception 
becomes a method that can be employed to ensure certainty. As I mentioned in my first 
chapter foundationalism attempts to address two key concerns: to establish what the 
foundations o f  knowledge are, but also, how the transmission from the foundations to 
the rest o f  what we know, takes place. I have suggested in this chapter that there may be 
traces o f non-deductive reasoning in the Meditations. I f  this is the case, then we may 
have to revise the commonly accepted theory that Descartes is a strong classical 
foundationalist. My next chapter will examine critical attacks on foundationalism.
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Chapter Three: Challenges to Foundationalism
In the previous chapter I identified Descartes’s epistemology as presented in the 
Meditations as being foundational in structure. In this chapter I will examine some 
important critical attacks on foundationalism in general, but my main focus will be 
specifically on the critical attacks that target the kind o f foundationalism that 
traditionally has been attributed to Descartes. The general issues that are raised in 
relation to foundationalism are: firstly: is it possible to have basic beliefs at all? 
Secondly: is it possible for such beliefs to be incorrigible, as the stronger forms of 
foundationalism require? Perhaps basic beliefs that are less than certain, a feature o f the 
weaker forms o f foundationalism, have a more realistic chance in answering the 
sceptical challenge? Thirdly: even if it is possible to have basic beliefs, how do we get 
from the basics to the non-basics, in other words how does the transfer o f justification 
take place? Finally: does foundationalism successfully defeat the problem o f  the infinite 
regress o f  justification, a task which is seen to be foundationalism’s raison d’etre?
The problem of Basic Beliefs
In Chapter One I identified Bonjour’s view o f foundationalism as:
‘Some empirical beliefs possess immediate, intrinsic justification, not dependent 
upon other beliefs. These basic beliefs are the ultimate source o f justification for 
all empirical knowledge’.1
Before investigating the nature o f basic beliefs, I think it is important to place the debate
in context. Traditionally, a neat, epistemological division has been presented between
rationalism on the one hand and empiricism on the other. On a strict, rationalist account,
reason alone is regarded as sufficient to establish that a set o f  beliefs are indubitable.
On the empiricist side, basic beliefs and the justification they provide for other beliefs 
are verified by experience alone. The difficulty is that this neat classification may be too
1 Bonjour, Laurence, The Structure o f  Empirical Knowledge, Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 17.
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simple. Descartes is often placed in the camp o f the strict rationalist, yet there is 
evidence that he regards experimentation as a valid method to decide between 
competing hypotheses.2 Indeed, it would seem that a mixture o f  both rationalism and 
empiricism is needed. As Lehrer puts it, if  we were deprived o f reason, we would not be 
justified in believing any conclusion to be a logical consequence o f a premise, and if  we 
were deprived o f our senses, we would not be justified in believing there to be any 
objects o f  sense experience. So in the analysis o f  basic beliefs, I think more progress 
may be possible if  epistemology is not viewed, to use Lehrer’s phrase, as a 
‘battleground between rationalism and empiricism’.3
Having identified the need for flexibility between strict rationalism and strict 
empiricism, an important question is: where should the search for beliefs that are self­
justified begin? The notion o f  incorrigibility4 is o f paramount importance here. An 
incorrigible belief is a belief such that one cannot be mistaken in believing what one 
believes. More formally, Lehrer presents incorrigibility in the following way:
‘S has an incorrigible belief that P if and only i f  it is logically impossible that S
believes P and P is false.’5
The question that arises is: do we have any incorrigible beliefs? Lehrer does concede 
that the Cogito is an example o f  a contingent, incorrigible belief. My existence is 
contingent as my existence is not necessary, my belief that I exist is an incorrigible 
belief because the very act o f  my believing I exist entails my existence. Another 
incorrigible belief is the belief that I believe something. But is incorrigibility sufficient 
for justification? The logical impossibility o f  being mistaken, on its own, does not seem 
to be sufficient for justification.
2 An example o f this is in Discourse on the Method, part vi, p.41-2.
3 Lehrer, Keith, Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.78.
4 1 will present further analysis o f  incorrigibility in chapter four, pp.79-80.
5 Lehrer, ibid., p.81.
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A mathematical example will demonstrate this point: it is logically impossible that two 
plus seven should not equal nine. So it is logically necessary that two plus seven equals 
nine. It is logically impossible for someone to believe that two plus seven equals nine 
and be mistaken in their belief. But it is possible to believe a necessary truth without 
knowing that the belief is true, or it is possible not to be justified in such a belief. A 
necessary truth can be believed for the wrong reason. The example that Lehrer gives6 is 
that o f  someone who believes that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set 
o f natural numbers and the set o f even natural numbers. This is a logically necessary 
truth and the person’s belief in this truth is incorrigible. But the person could believe 
this truth for the wrong reason, for example, if  the person believes that after a certain 
point in the series o f  natural numbers that there are no more odd ones, then the person’s 
original belief is unjustified.
The main focal point o f  Lehrer’s criticism o f incorrigibility is targeted at the content o f 
what one believes. Someone may be convinced that he is convinced o f what he says, but 
subsequently realise that he was not convinced o f  what he originally said. An example 
that Lehrer uses is7: a man is asked what he believes Pi to be when rounded off to four 
decimal places. He replies from memory that Pi is 3.1417. He then immediately recalls 
that Pi equals 3.1415 and corrects himself. Such a man might be said to have believed 
that he believed that Pi was 3.1417 when he first answered, but then realised that in fact 
he did not believe that Pi is 3.1417, but rather believed it to be 3.1415.
Lehrer concludes that this example shows that someone can come to recognise that he 
does not believe what he says, and believes what he believes. This example seems to 
demonstrate that allegedly incorrigible beliefs about mental processes might be
6 See Lehrer, op.cit., p.82.
7 Ibid., pp.86-7.
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corrigible after all. Doubts about the incorrigibility o f beliefs may not even be the 
strongest challenge that foundationalism faces, doubts about the reliability o f thinking 
as a process have been raised by Lehrer. The argument is that it is possible to be 
mistaken in one’s beliefs about thinking as an ongoing process. This is an attack on the 
view that thinking as a process is incorrigible.
The example that Lehrer uses involves thinking that Bacon is the author o f Hamlet. 
The details are as follows: I am thinking that Bacon is the author o f  Hamlet. Secondly, I 
believe that Bacon is identical with Shakespeare. But this belief is not before my mind. I 
am asked what am I thinking. I might conclude that I was thinking that Shakespeare was 
the author o f Hamlet, because believing that Bacon is Shakespeare, I also believe that 
thinking that Bacon is such and such is the same as thinking that Shakespeare is such 
and such. I believe that thinking o f something o f a subject is the same thing as thinking 
the same thing o f anything identical to the subject. Am I correct in this? Lehrer’s reply 
is: no.
Lehrer explains this by stating that sometimes when we think we talk to ourselves. 
When I was thinking that Bacon is the author o f Hamlet, my thinking consisted o f me 
saying to myself: ‘Bacon is the author o f Hamlet’. To say Bacon is the author o f Hamlet 
is one thing, to say Shakespeare is the author o f Hamlet is another thing. Thinking that 
Bacon is the author o f  Hamlet is not necessarily the same thing as thinking that 
Shakespeare is the author o f Hamlet. We may therefore imagine that I was not thinking 
the latter when I was thinking the former. When I reported that I was thinking that 
Shakespeare was the author o f Hamlet, and believed what I said, I was quite mistaken. 
Thus believing that one is thinking such and such does not logically imply that one is
8 In Lehrer’s Knowledge (1974), p.88.
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th ink ing that. Lehrer’s point is that when I or anyone else has a belief about what is 
presently going on in our minds, this does not mean that my belief cannot possibly be 
false. I may believe that I am thinking one thing while thinking another. As Lehrer puts 
it: ‘The reason is that belief is not an action or even an occurrence’.9 
It is possible that I might have been thinking what I was thinking without believing 
what I was thinking was true. When people talk to themselves, they do not necessarily 
believe what they say. I f  my belief that I am thinking that Bacon is the author o f Hamlet 
can exist at the same time as my thinking that, then obviously my belief that I am 
thinking Shakespeare is the author o f  Hamlet can exist at the same time as my thinking 
Bacon is the author o f Hamlet. Lehrer concludes that all kinds o f mistakes are possible 
regarding what may be presently going on in someone’s mind. Lehrer also feels that the 
preceding argument can be extended to include surmising, doubting or pondering. 
Lehrer comments that ‘any state that involves conscious consideration o f  a statement is 
a state about which one can be mistaken’.10
It would seem that beliefs about sensations would be likely candidates for
incorrigibility. It is these beliefs about sensations that form the backbone o f Descartes’s
epistemology when he states in the Second Meditation-.
‘For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am 
asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. 
This cannot be false; what is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is strictly just 
this, and in this restricted sense o f the term it is simply thinking.’ 11
The problem is though, that it is logically possible to confuse almost any sensation with
some other sensation. Descartes was certainly aware o f the confusing nature o f
sensations. In the Third Meditation Descartes comments:
‘But as for all the rest, including light and colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat 
and cold and the other tactile qualities, I think o f these only in a very confused
9 In Lehrer’s Knowledge (1974), p.90.
10 Ibid., p.91.
11 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 29: C S M II19.
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and obscure way, to the extent that I do not even know whether they are true or 
false, that is, whether the ideas I have o f  them are ideas o f  real things or o f  non-
things the ideas which I have o f heat and cold contain so little clarity and
distinctness that they do not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the absence 
o f  heat or vice versa, or whether both o f them are real qualities, or neither is.’12
The possibility o f  confusing one sensation with another sensation is examined by Lehrer
• ■ 13who uses the example o f  a doctor telling a patient that itches are really pains . Because 
o f  the eminent reputation o f the doctor, the patient never doubts him. When the patient 
itches, she incorrectly believes that she is in pain. So, the belief that she is in pain does 
not logically imply that she is in pain. This apparent corrigibility o f  beliefs leads Lehrer 
to one o f the most devastating aspects o f his argument:
‘I f  a belief is corrigible, then it can be false... if  a belief can be false, then any 
justification o f  the belief guaranteeing its truth must be supplied by independent 
information. It is then concluded that if  a belief is corrigible it must be justified 
by such information, and, therefore, cannot be basic. If  this argument is decisive, 
then either we must abandon the foundation theory or conclude that we are 
ignorant o f  almost all we suppose we know.’14
The search for incorrigible beliefs that could potentially act as foundations to
knowledge, has taken Lehrer in a circle back to where he started. Doubts have been cast
over the incorrigibility o f  beliefs, in fact, more fundamentally damaging: doubts have
been cast over our knowledge o f the thinking process itself. It would seem that beliefs
about sensations cannot be trusted; confusion among sensations seems to be, at the very
least, a possibility. I f  most o f our beliefs are corrigible and need to be supported by
independent information, then they cannot be basic. 15 The only chink o f light for
12 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 43-44: CSM I I 30.
13 See Lehrer, op.cit., p.95.
14 Ibid., p.101.
15 Lehrer’s use o f  the link between independent information and justification has its critics. Daniel 
Howard-Snyder is one such critic. Snyder argues that the justification o f a basic belief might be derived 
from independent information that does not necessarily have to be accepted by the believer. The 
justification could be derived from independent information that a person is unaware of. A second 
possibility is that the justification o f a basic belief might be derived from independent information that is 
accepted, but the basic belief m ight not owe its justification to the acceptance o f that independent 
information. Snyder’s view is that it is not possible to ‘explain in a non-question-begging fashion why it 
is the case that, if  S’s belief owes its justification to some independent information and he accepts that 
information, then the justification o f S’s basic belief is derived from his acceptance o f that information.’ 
Snyder’s view is in his paper entitled: ‘Lehrer’s Case Against Foundationalism’, in Erkenntnis, 60 (2004), 
51-73 (pp.60-1).
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foundationalism in the bleak picture that Lehrer paints would be if  there were any 
beliefs that were self-justified: not in need o f any independent information to prop them 
up. For a belief to qualify as a basic belief, its justification has to be intrinsic to the 
belief. In this search for an intrinsic feature that provides justificatory support, Lehrer 
thinks o f  product guarantees16 as an example. I f  a company guarantees a product 
against defects in manufacture, this guarantee o f soundness is not proof that the 
individual product in question is sound. In a similar manner, the guarantee o f truth 
intrinsic to some beliefs may not be proof that an individual belief in question is true. 
The manufactured item may be defective and the belief may be erroneous, but it is still 
reasonable to attach some value to such guarantees.
The task is now to see if  any beliefs whose justification does not depend on independent 
information can be found. Lehrer examines the belief that I see something red17. It could 
be argued that it is not necessary in this situation to have any independent information, 
all that is needed is standard conditions and a normal observer.
Lehrer’s reply is that one needs to know more than that red things look red in standard 
conditions to normal observers, one must also be able to tell when conditions are 
standard and when an observer is normal. Independent information is therefore required 
for the justification o f this perceptual belief.
Another option is to reduce perceptual belief so as to end up with the belief that I see 
something, without specifying what sort o f thing it is that I see. At first glance, this kind 
o f belief does not seem to require any independent information for it to be justified. But 
Lehrer argues that there is reason to doubt this kind o f belief, if  the implication is that 
the ‘something’ is a real thing and not hallucinated or dreamt of.
16 See Lehrer’s Knowledge^1974), p. 102.
17 Ibid., pp. 103-4.
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There is need o f  independent information that would enable the person in question to 
decide if this is a case o f  seeing something, and not merely dreaming. It is possible for 
someone to hallucinate, so we cannot justifiably conclude that we see something as 
opposed to hallucinate something, unless we possess information enabling us to 
distinguish hallucination lfom the real thing.
Another possibility that may avoid the need for information for justification is a skill o f  
some kind. It could be argued that, once a person has learned to respond to certain types 
o f experience nothing more is required for the justification o f that experience. Someone 
may learn to distinguish whether or not they are seeing something, without appealing to 
any premises or making any conscious inferences.
The kind o f  argument that appeals to skills is compelling as it does seem to be the case 
that someone can have information that he cannot present verbally, and yet be able to 
use this information in various ways. Lehrer uses the example o f  knowing the shortest 
route between two locations, although not being able to tell someone the number o f the 
road18. A person may have the information they need to get from one location to 
another, and yet they may be poor at giving directions. The person has the skill needed 
to make the trip, but the crucial point is that the possession o f that skill involves the 
ability to use information about the route.
The requirement for independent information to justify experiences seems to extend
even to the sorts o f experiences that Descartes took to be basic, as Lehrer states:
‘Even the very subjective belief, that it seems to me that I am seeing something, 
is justified only i f  I have the information needed to tell whether it seems to me 
that I am seeing something; or whether I am having some quite different 
experience, for example, the experience o f wondering whether I am seeing 
something. I may wonder whether I am seeing something when it does not 
especially seem to me that I am seeing something, and unless I have the
18 See Lehrer, op.cit., p.107.
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information required to tell the difference, I am not completely justified in my 
belief. The most modest beliefs turn out to be the ones requiring independent 
information for their justification. The preceding argument uncovers a 
ubiquitous need for independent information to justify belief, and in so doing it 
undermines the foundation theory.’19
Perhaps the solution to locating basic beliefs is in our use o f  language? Lehrer refers to
Chisholm’s distinction20 between the comparative and non-comparative use o f  words.
Normally when we apply a word to either our own mental states or to things, the
application is based on a comparison we make. I f  we say something appears red, we
may be comparing the way this thing appears with the way other things appear. In using
words in a comparative way, we do seem to need independent information to justify
their application.
When words are used in a non-comparative manner though, we may not need 
independent information to justify them. Someone may believe that they are being 
‘appeared-to-redly’ or that they are ‘sensing-redly’.
To say that someone is sensing-redly does not entail that someone is sensing in the way 
that normal observers sense in normal conditions when they are sensing a red object. It 
may well be that one is sensing in that way, but it is not an analytic consequence o f the 
term ‘sensing-redly’ used non-comparatively.
But for someone to be completely justified in believing that he is sensing in a certain 
way, he must have information necessary to distinguish this way o f appearing from all 
others. Perhaps the belief that one is appeared-to-redly does not entail any comparison 
o f  one’s present state to any other, but it does entail that one’s present state is o f  a 
certain kind, and to be completely justified in believing it to be o f that kind, one must 
have the information needed to distinguish that state from other states.
19 Lehrer, Ibid., p .107.
20 Chisholm, Roderick, M., Theory o f  Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp.34-7.
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‘To be completely justified in believing anything about a state or object or
whatnot one always requires independent information.’21
If  the arguments that Lehrer uses against basic beliefs are correct, then the proponent o f 
foundationalism is left with a very slim base from which to build knowledge. I f  any 
belief about what I think or believe about any sensation or feeling is open to correction, 
then there are only two beliefs that have an incorrigible status: the Cogito, and the belief 
that I believe. So from such a small set o f merely two incorrigible beliefs, it would seem 
to be impossible to justify all o f  the beliefs that we regard as being justified so as to 
constitute knowledge.
One o f the key problems with empirical beliefs is that they do not seem to live up to the 
standard o f  incorrigibility. Following Lehrer, Williams22 notes: One can ‘seem’ to see 
an object with such and such properties, without actually seeing the object, and 
‘seeming to see’ cannot be distinguished from the true experience o f perceiving an 
object as it really is.
Even if  there was some standard for measuring a true experience from a false 
experience, it would have to be established empirically that experiences o f  such and 
such a character were o f  that type. The criterion would be independent and non- 
immediate, and so would give us inferential rather than immediate knowledge. For 
Williams, a belief can be a priori and still be open to revision on empirical grounds. The 
foundational project breaks down on this account when relatively a priori beliefs are 
taken to be absolutely a priori. No belief is worthy o f credence simply in virtue o f 
someone holding the belief.
Lehrer’s conclusion is:
21 In Lehrer’s Knowledge (1974), p .l 10.
22 Williams, Michael, Groundless Belief, Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1977, p.74.
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It seems that nothing can be cited as a special justification for a first person current 
mental state report. The credibility o f  a person’s observation statements cannot be 
established by appeal to the reliability o f  human perceivers -  some o f us are simply 
better than others at observation. Williams in identifying the subjective nature o f the 
reporting o f  mental states, puts his finger on their inherent weakness.
If  a proponent o f foundationalism attempts to argue that it is simply the brute fact o f 
being appeared to ‘that way’ is basic, it is hard to see how they can avoid the charge o f 
arbitrariness. There would be constant revision o f ‘that way’. Every observation would 
be unique with no guiding standard for its verification. What is needed is consistency, 
‘that way’ has to be the same every time.
What about the view that justification terminates not with beliefs about experiences, but 
with the experiences themselves? Williams argues that this then makes a perceptual 
foundation for knowledge unintelligible. I f  we cannot express the content o f an 
experience in a perceptual judgement then there is no way for experiences to serve as a 
check on anything, to back up one hypothesis rather than another. If  empirical 
knowledge is non-propositional then as Williams puts it we are:
‘Left completely in the dark as to how the alleged foundation o f knowledge is
supposed to perform the task demanded o f it.’23
Williams’s position is that knowledge cannot rest on ‘fixed and immutable 
foundations’24. Although at any given time we will have a solid core o f perceptual 
reports, this core can be subjected to drastic revision, due to deeper insights or 
theoretical advances. This is also a view that Aune advocates. Aune argues that 
knowledge cannot possibly be developed from a given set o f  basic concepts, as we
23 See Williams’s Groundless B e lie f (1977), p. 178_
24 Ibid., p.l 80.
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increase our knowledge, we generate new concepts. Basic claims involve what Aune
• 25refers to as ‘background assumptions’.
I f  the basic claims are observational in nature then the background assumptions involve 
the nature o f the observer, the character of the objects observed, and the particular 
means o f observation. The problem is that all observation claims cannot be directly 
justified by observation alone; there must be at least one reliable observer.
To summarise the key points made in this section: the issue that I addressed was the 
problem o f basic beliefs. It is generally accepted that there are two incorrigible beliefs: I 
am, I exist (the Cogito), and the belief that I believe. Lehrer raises doubts over whether 
the process o f thinking can be trusted and he also feels that all kinds o f mistakes are 
possible regarding current events taking place in someone’s mind. Lehrer attempts, and 
fails, to find any beliefs that do not require independent information to support their 
justification. This view is similar to Aune, who refers to the ‘background assumptions’ 
that he feels allegedly basic beliefs must have. The main focus o f Williams’s attack is 
directed at what he feels is the subjective nature o f first person current mental state 
reports. As if things could not get worse for foundationalism, basic beliefs are only one 
area o f critical attack, another problematic area is the transfer o f  justification from basic 
to non-basic beliefs.
The Transfer of Justification
Even if  the difficulties concerning basic beliefs are set aside, serious problems remain 
for any foundationalist theory to provide an adequate explanation o f how to build upon 
the foundations, justifying the rest o f what we know. By what process or mechanism do 
basic beliefs justify non-basic beliefs? Descartes identifies the need to avoid an infinite
25 Aune, Bruce, Knowledge, Mind, and Nature, Random House, New York, 1967, p.266.
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regress, when he states in the Third Meditation:
‘And although one idea may perhaps originate from another, there cannot be an 
infinite regress here; eventually one must reach a primary idea, the cause o f 
which will be like an archetype which contains formally and in fact all the 
reality or perfection which is present only objectively or representatively in the 
idea.’26
For advocates o f strong, classical foundationalism, deduction is the only acceptable 
method of transmission o f justification from basic to non-basic beliefs. Those who 
advocate a moderate form o f foundationalism would allow the use o f non-deductive 
inference mechanisms. There are substantial challenges to both strands o f 
foundationalism concerning the transfer o f  justification.
The use o f deduction as a method o f building knowledge from secure foundations is 
traditionally associated with Descartes. But as Comman27 states it seems that no 
deductive argument will enable us to get from basic to non-basic beliefs. The following 
example is used by Comman to demonstrate the implausibility o f  a non-basic statement 
being entailed by a basic statement:
(1) I am now seeing a yellow object.
The question is asked: what is the basic report most likely to yield (1)?
(2) I am now having an experience o f  something yellow, and I am now believing I 
am now seeing something yellow.
The problem is that (2) does not entail (1). This can be demonstrated by using a 
sentence from which it is clear that (2) does not entail (1). An example o f this is:
(3) I am hallucinating in a room containing nothing that is yellow.
26 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 42: C SM II 29.
27 Cornman, James, W., Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980,
pp.80-2.
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Hallucinations and illusory experiences are possible, so no statement about present 
experience and belief is sufficient, on its own, to ensure the truth o f a perception. So it 
is o f no help to support (2) with:
(4) I fully believe that I am a normal perceiver in normal conditions who is not 
hallucinating but rather is having a veridical visual experience.
It is clear that the conjunction o f (2) and (4) with (3) does not entail (1), because they 
are consistent with my now seeing nothing at all.
It seems that no basic reports entail (1). Even the following:
(5) I am now having an experience o f something yellow, and I am now a normal 
perceiver in conditions optimal for seeing the colour o f things.
Once again, as was stated earlier, it depends what is meant by ‘normal’ and ‘optimal’. I f  
we take the Cartesian scenario: if  it is possible for a normal perceiver to be in an 
optimal position and yet be fooled by the malicious demon, then (5) fails to entail (1).
I f  it is not possible to be a normal perceiver in optimal conditions and be fooled by a 
malicious demon, perhaps because conditions are not optimal when the malicious 
demon is at work, then it seems that (5) would entail (1). In other words if you could be 
absolutely sure that you are a normal perceiver in optimal conditions and if optimal 
conditions meant that it was impossible for a malicious demon to be at work, then you 
could be sure o f  (1) I am now seeing a yellow object. But there does not seem to be any 
way o f using basic reports in such a way that ‘makes it impossible that (5) is true and a 
Cartesian demon is at work’28. So it seems it is always possible to be in optimal 
conditions and yet be fooled by a malicious demon. Comman’s conclusion is that: ‘It is 
extremely unlikely that any basic report, no matter how complicated, entails (1).’
28 See Comman, op.cit., p.82.
29 Ibid.
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Cornman then looks at the possibility o f  using classical probability theory in examining 
basic reports. On this theory, if one is completely convinced o f something, the measure 
o f one’s belief has the number 1 assigned to it. I f  one is completely certain that a 
specified event cannot possibly happen, one’s belief that it will happen is assigned the
30number 0. The following example is presented:
L = ‘A sheet o f  paper lies before me.’
S = ‘I just had a visual experience o f a sheet o f  paper.’
A = ‘I tried to tear and believe I succeeded in tearing paper just now.’
E = ‘I am now having a visual experience o f tom  paper.’
Although Cornman does not do it, it is easy to see how the preceding statements can be 
applied to the wax passage in the Meditations'.
L = ‘A piece o f  wax lies before me.’
S = ‘I just had a visual experience o f a piece o f  wax.’
A = ‘I tried to melt the wax by bringing it to the fire and believe I succeeded in 
melting the wax just now.’
E = ‘I am now having a visual experience o f melted wax.’
It might be argued that the probability o f E, given S and A is almost 1, entails L.
Cornman argues though, that even if we allow that E, S, and A are basic reports, and
that a probability statement consisting only o f basic reports is itself a basic report, this
attempt fails. The entailment claim is false. The probability statement in its antecedent
does not entail that anything exists, and so does not entail L. This argument could be
viewed as a fatal attack on Cartesian foundationalism:
‘The failure o f  the thesis that basic reports entail non-basic statements shows 
why what I have called the Cartesian species o f traditional foundationalism leads 
to scepticism ...of empirical sentences, only basic reports are initially certain, 
and that the extension o f knowledge beyond the foundation is by deductive
30 Ibid., p.83.
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inference alone. This last requirement is made in order to guarantee inferential 
certainty o f  what is known. Thus, on the Cartesian view, each o f  us must begin 
only w ith his ow n basic reports and ‘conceptual’ truths as initial premises and 
try to extend his knowledge by deductive derivation.’31
As I com mented in chapter one32, it is only the strong, classical foundationalism that
insists on deduction being the only valid method o f progressing from basic to  non-basic
beliefs, the weaker, moderate forms o f  foundationalism would allow non-deductive
inference mechanisms to be used. The next question to address is: does inductive
argument enable us to transfer justification from  basic to non-basic beliefs?
Induction as a method for the transfer of Justification
Plantinga defines a direct, inductive argument as follows:
‘A direct inductive argument for S is an ordered pair o f  arguments o f  which the 
first member is a  simple inductive argument a  for S, and the second is a valid 
deductive argument one premise o f  which is the conclusion o f  a, the other 
premise being drawn from  S’s total evidence.’33
And Plantinga also states:
A  simple inductive argument for S is an argument o f  the following form:
Every A  such that S has determined by observation whether or not A  is B is such 
that S has determined by observation that A is B. Therefore, probably every A is 
a B .
C om m an’s view is that the enumerative induction that Plantinga is referring to will not 
work. W hen we look again at the observation report:
(1) ‘I am  now seeing a  yellow object.’
To use a direct, inductive argument to show that (1) is probable, we would need 
something like the following as a  conclusion o f  a simple inductive argument:
(6) Probably, every (alm ost every) time when I have an experience o f  something 
yellow  is a time when I am seeing something yellow.
See Com m an’s Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation (1980), p.83.
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32 See chapter one, p.7.
33 Plantinga, Alvin, God and other Minds, Cornel  University Press, 1967, p.251.
Then w ith the basic report (2): I am  now  having an experience o f  something yellow, and
I am  now  believing that I am now  seeing something yellow. I can then infer that it is
probable that I am  now seeing something yellow, i.e. (1). But in order to warrant the
inference to (6) by a simple inductive argument, the following premise is needed:
(7) ‘Every (alm ost every) tim e w hen I have an experience o f  something yellow, such 
that I have determined by observation whether or not it is a tim e when I am seeing 
something yellow, is such that I have determined by observation that this, which is a 
time w hen I am  having an experience o f  something yellow, is also a time when I am 
seeing something yellow.’
(7) is justified by a series o f  statements about me at present and in the past which are o f  
the form:
(8) ‘The present time is a  time w hen I am  having an experience o f  something yellow 
and have determined by observation that this, which is such a time, is also a time when I 
am  seeing something yellow .’
The problem  is that (8) is not a basic report, because observation is used to work out 
that the present time is a time that I am seeing something yellow.
Once again, the preceding argument would equally apply to Descartes’s description o f 
his sensory experiences w ith the piece o f  wax, the difficulty is that observation seems to 
be required to verify the experience.
A nother form  o f  induction is induction by analogy. But the same difficulty that applied 
to enumerative induction applies to induction by analogy. The structure o f  an analogical 
form  o f  argum ent is presented by C om m an34 as:
(i) Entities Oi, O2  , 0n have properties Pi, P2, .. ..P m in common.
(ii) Entities O2, O3, ... .0n have property Pm+i.
Therefore, it is probable that entity Oi has property Pm+i.
34 See Comman, op.cit., p.86.
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The general idea o f  an analogical argument is that the more something is like a  group o f  
other things in certain known respects, the more probable it is that it is also like them  in 
some additional, unknown respect.
To make the analogical style o f  argument relevant to (1) I am now  seeing a yellow 
object, Comman suggests rephrasing 1 as:35
(la )  The present mom ent (Oi) is a time when I see something yellow (Pm+i).
The first premise, (i) is not a problem, as the properties Pi through to Pm can be 
regarded as basic reports. It is premise (ii) that causes problem s because it is not a basic 
report. Premise (ii) ascribes the property Pm+i to mom ents o f  time, O2 through to 0n, but 
no sentence stating that a moment has property Pm+i is basic, because additional 
evidence is required to prove that the moment has that property.
Given the apparent difficulty w ith attempting to  use induction by analogy in the transfer 
o f  justification, are there any other possibilities? In  Chapter tw o36, I indicated that 
Descartes seems to use hypothetico-deductive argumentation. Maybe this form o f  
argument would enable the inference from  basic to non-basic beliefs?
' i n
Com m an presents the structure o f  a hypothetico-deductive argument as follows:
(1) Basic reports, bi, t>2, . . .bn are to be explained for s at t.
(2) Hypothesis, T, explains bi, b2, .. ..b n better at t  than any hypothesis that 
conflicts w ith T.
Therefore
(3) It is probable, for s at t, that T is true.
35 Comman, ibid., p.87.
36 See chapter two, pp.47-48.
37 Comman, ibid., pp.89-90.
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The only way for the hypothetico-deductive style o f  argument to enable the move from 
basic beliefs to non-basic beliefs is for the better hypothesis to be analytical in nature; 
anything else would be an appeal to  evidence, which in turn would have to be justified, 
taking us back to epistemological square one. W hat can w e conclude from all o f  this? 
As Com m an states:
‘So we have some reason to think that hypothetical induction, combined w ith 
deduction, enum erative induction, and induction by analogy, fails to provide the
T O
desired inferences.’
Perhaps there is one more avenue still open for the foundationalist: the use o f  some sort 
o f  epistemic principle that could be employed in tw o ways: (1) that whenever a belief is 
formed in a particular way it is automatically justified or basic and (2) the principle 
could be used to facilitate the transfer o f  justification from  basic to non-basic beliefs. I 
will be investigating the use o f  an epistemic principle in the transfer o f  justification 
from  basic to non-basic beliefs in chapter four, for now  1 will look at the issues 
surrounding epistemic principles used to  justify  basic beliefs.
Epistemic Principles
As I identified in chapter one39: the sceptic can continually press the question: how do 
you know? I f  we appeal to further propositions to justify what we claim to know, the 
sceptic can then question the basis for our knowing that those propositions are true.
This process can continue indefinitely w ith no resolution. Foundationalists have used 
epistemic principles as a  w ay o f  addressing the problem  o f  infinite regress o f  
justification. Epistemic principles usually involve the idea that if  a belief is formed in a 
particular way or under specified conditions then the belief is justified. An epistemic
38 Cornman, ibid., pp.90-1.
39 See chapter one, p.6.
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principle has to be somehow part o f  how  the belief is formed, because i f  the epistemic 
principle is external to how the belief is formed then the principle is then in need o f  
justification and the regress o f  justification continues. An epistemic principle could take 
the following form: whenever a belief is formed in manner X, it is a justified belief. An 
individual does not have to know what the principle is, but the principle has to be true. 
The principle o f  course cannot be arbitrarily chosen and it must show w hy the basic 
belief is justified w ithout any inferential support.
Among contem porary foundationalists, the “epistemic principles” approach is perhaps
most clearly evident in the w ork o f  Chisholm. In his book: Theory o f  Knowledge
Chisholm presents the following epistemic principle which he refers to as principle B:
‘I f  S believes that he perceives something to have a certain property F, then the 
proposition that he does perceive something to be F, as well as the proposition 
that there is something that is F, is one which is reasonable for S.’40
Despite the initial plausibility o f  Chisholm ’s epistemic principle B, a  serious flaw has
been detected by Flerbert Heidelberger41. The flaw involves the possibility that S might
have other knowledge which, when added to  B would be inconsistent w ith what S
believes thereby disallowing the conclusions o f  B. Chisholm presents the central
component o f  Heidelberger’s criticism as follows:
‘As applied to a particular case, principle (B) tells us that i f  a m an believes that 
he perceives a certain object to be yellow then the proposition that he does 
perceive that object to be yellow and the proposition that that object is yellow 
are reasonable for him. But let us suppose that the following facts are known by 
that man: there is a yellow light shining on the object, he remembers having 
perceived a m om ent ago that the object was white, and at that time there was no 
colored light shining on the object. Suppose that, in spite o f  this evidence, he 
believes that he perceives that the object is yellow. It would not be correct to say 
that for our man the proposition that the object is yellow is a reasonable one. 
M erely from  the fact that a  man believes that he perceives something to have a 
certain property F, it does not follow, accordingly, that the proposition that that 
something is F  is a reasonable one for him; for, as in our example, he may have 
other evidence which, w hen combined w ith the evidence that he believes that he
40 Chisholm, Roderick, Theory o f  Knowledge, Prentice-Hall, 1966, p.43.
41 Herbert Heidelberger, ‘Chisholm’s Epistemic Principles’, in Nous, 3 (1969), 73-82.
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perceives something to have F, may make the proposition that something is F  
highly unreasonable.42
Heidelberger’s criticism  is also echoed by Comman, who refers to an observer who
knows about the yellow light shining on the perceived object causing it to appear
yellow. Cornman notes:
‘Surely, given that s knows all this, it is at least not reasonable for him  that he is 
perceiving something yellow, regardless o f  whether he now  believes that he is 
now perceiving something to be yellow. So B must either be amended or 
abandoned.’43
Chisholm did revise principle B in response to  H eidelberger’s criticism. One such
revision o f  the principle is as follows:
‘Necessarily, for any S and any t, if  (i) S at t believes h im self to perceive 
something to be F, and if  (ii) there is no proposition i such that i is evident to S 
and such that the conjunction o f  i and the proposition that S believes him self to 
perceive something to be F  does not confirm the proposition that he does then 
perceive something to be F, as w ell as the proposition that something is, or was, 
F, is one that is beyond reasonable doubt for S at t.’44
Com m an explores a number o f  revisions that Chisholm makes to his epistemic
principles and his final verdict is that no m atter how  many revisions o f  these principles
Chisholm might come up with, it w ill always be possible to put together counter
exam ples which w ill show that the principles w ill allow conclusions about the epistemic
status o f  what S believes he perceives which are in fact mistaken.
To support his case against Chisholm ’s amended epistemic principles, Comm an 
presents some well known scenarios45 where coloured lights are shining on white 
objects causing an observer to wrongly believe that the object is yellow, or in which a 
malicious dem on is operating causing the perceiver to have false perceptual beliefs.
42 Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘On the Nature o f  Empirical Evidence’, in Essays on Knowledge and 
Justification, ed. by Georges S. Pappas and Marshall Swain, Cornell University Press, 1978, pp. 253-278 
(pp.270-1).
In Cornman’s Skepticism, Justification and Explanation (1980), p.93.
44 Chisholm, ibid., p.272.
45 See Comman, ibid., pp.94-96.
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The m ost devastating scenario em ployed by Com m an is where a person might refuse to 
take note o f  countervailing evidence even though that evidence is readily available to 
him. C om m an’s conclusion is that if  someone avoids what would make some relevant 
proposition reasonable for him, an observer would be able to  infer, by means o f  an 
epistemic principle, that he is perceiving something to be F, and this Comm an says 
would surely be incorrect in such a case.46
The advantage o f  an appeal to  epistemic principles as a w ay o f  justifying basic beliefs is 
that if  successful, then basic beliefs could be justified without further inferential 
support. But if  C om m an’s analysis o f  the failure o f  epistemic principles is correct47, 
then it seems that there is no end to the cycle o f  justification o f  beliefs. The 
foundationalist theory would still be threatened by an infinite regress o f  justification. I 
will now  look at this in more detail.
The Infinite R egress Argument
All theories o f  epistemic justification attempt to solve the problem  o f  an infinite regress 
o f  justification. The regress is set up because we seem to have chains o f  beliefs, that is 
beliefs that are based on other beliefs, and if  we refer to a proposition to justify another 
proposition, the question arises again as to how that proposition is justified, this kind o f  
questioning could continue indefinitely. As I indicated in m y first chapter the 
possibilities for an epistemic chain are:
1. The chain m ight be infinite.
2. The chain m ight be circular.
3. The chain m ight term inate w ith a belief which is not knowledge.
4. The chain term inates w ith a belief which is direct knowledge.
461 am paraphrasing here what Comman states on p.97.
471 will be challenging Cornman’s analysis in my next chapter (pp. 105-6) where I will take issue with the 
idea o f someone avoiding reasonable evidence to arrive at a perceptual belief.
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In relation to the first possibility, that an epistemic chain might be infinite, there is a
view that having an infinite set o f  beliefs is not possible. Audi expresses doubts that
humans can have infinite sets o f  beliefs. Audi gives an example o f  the claim that we
have an infinite set o f  arithmetical beliefs, say tw o is twice one, four is twice tw o, and
so on. Audi comments:
‘Surely for a finite mind there w ill be some point or other at which the relevant 
proposition cannot be grasped. The required formulation (or entertaining o f  the 
proposition) would, on  the way “tow ard” infinity, become too lengthy to permit 
understand mg it.’
Audi is not suggesting that we cannot believe that the mathematical formulation
expresses a truth; he is saying that the believing o f  a  tru th  is not sufficient for believing
the actual truth that it expresses. As he puts it:
‘Since we cannot understand the formulation as a  whole, we cannot grasp that 
truth; and w hat we cannot grasp, we cannot believe.’49
The second possibility for an epistemic chain is that it is circular. Audi is an opponent
o f  the view that justification could be circular, he states:
‘The possibility o f  a  circular epistemic chain as a basis o f  knowledge has been 
taken much more seriously. The standard objection has been that such circularity 
is vicious, because one would ultimately have to  know something on the basis o f  
itself -  say p on the basis o f  q, q on the basis o f  r, and r  on the basis o f  p .’50
The third option: that an  epistemic chain term inates in a belief that is not knowledge is
seen as not very viable by Audi. However this is a view that seems to have been held by
Wittgenstein:
‘Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;-but the end 
is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind o f  
seeing  on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom o f  the language- 
gam e.’51
Audi, Robert, The Structure o f  Justification, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.127.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 128.
51 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, On Certainty, ed. by G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. Von Wright, Basil Blackwell 
Oxford, 1969, paragraph 204., p.28e.
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It would be hard to see how  knowledge could originate through the belief o f  a
proposition that S does not know. Despite the apparent difficulty in holding such a
position, Audi does offer an account o f  circumstances where knowledge could originate
through belief o f  a proposition that is not known. The example52 involves the following:
suppose that it seems that I hear music and on the basis o f  this partly justified belief that
there is music playing, I believe that my daughter has come home and she has come
home, can I be said to know  this? The answer is not clear. It is unclear whether the
belief that there is m usic playing is sufficiently reasonable to give me knowledge that
music is playing. Audi points out that the stronger our tendency to say that I know my
daughter is home, the stronger the inclination to say that I do after all know  that there is
music in the air. Audi states:
‘I f  there can be an epistemic chain w hich ends w ith belief that is not knowledge, 
only because it ends, in this way, w ith justification, then we are apparently in the 
general vicinity o f  knowledge. We seem to  be at most a  few degrees o f  
justification away. Knowledge is not emerging from nothing, as it were -  the 
picture originally evoked by the third kind o f  epistemic chain -  but from 
something characteristically m uch like it: justified true belief. There would thus 
be a foundation after all: not bedrock, but perhaps ground that is nonetheless 
firm enough to yield a foundation we can build upon.’ 3
The third option for the epistemic chain, even w ith A udi’s qualified circumstances, still
seems to me to  be problematic. H ow can we be ‘in the general vicinity’ o f  knowledge?
Surely one either know s something or one does not. The difficulty that modest
foundationalism, to  which Audi subscribes, faces, is because the foundations are not
certain, extra justification is needed to prop them  up. Another difficulty then arises as to
how  do you determine objectively when sufficiently reasonable grounds have been
obtained for justifiably believing something? Who decides w hat “sufficient” means, and
52 Audi, op.cit., p. 127.
53 Ibid., pp. 128-9.
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what method do they use for deciding? It seems then, that the weaker forms o f  
foundationalism have a  difficult task in dealing w ith the epistemic regress problem.
This then brings me to  the fourth possibility o f  an epistemic chain: that the chain 
term inates w ith a belief which is direct knowledge. This is knowledge not dependent on 
further beliefs. This knowledge could be grounded in experience, in A udi’s example, his 
hearing o f  the music that led him  to believe that his daughter was home. Another way 
that direct knowledge could be grounded is intuitively: I f  A  is one mile from  B, then B 
is one mile from  A.
As Audi explains, beliefs that are grounded in experience are normally expected to be 
true, as experience seems to connect the beliefs it grounds to the reality that those 
beliefs are about. An example o f  this is when I know that there is music playing: it is 
just because I hear the music, not on the basis o f  some further belief o f  mine. The chain 
that grounds A udi’s knowledge that his daughter is home, is anchored in his auditory 
perception, w hich in turn reflects the musical reality represented by his knowledge that 
there is music playing. This reality explains his perception, and it indirectly explains his 
believing the proposition that he knows on the basis o f  that evidence, that his daughter 
is home.
The stronger form o f  foundationalism, w ith basic beliefs that are certain, would seem to 
be the best candidate for addressing the epistemic regress problem. I f  there can be 
beliefs that do not depend on other beliefs for justification, it would seem that the 
regress o f  justification could be stopped. The justification o f  the basic beliefs could be 
provided by some sort o f  epistemic principle: beliefs that are formed under this 
principle would be regarded as justified. This kind o f  epistemological system seems to
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be what Descartes had in mind. It is reasonable to  view the clarity and distinctness rule
as an epistemic principle, as D escartes states in the Third M editation :
‘I now  seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive 
very clearly and distinctly is true.’54
One o f  the difficulties that epistemic principles face, as I identified earlier in this
chapter, is that their selection seems to be arbitrary. There does not seem to be anything
special about choosing clarity and distinctness as a guiding principle. It might seem that
it could be argued that Descartes could have ju s t as easily said something like: whatever
I perceive and have a good “feeling” about, or perceptions that my “instinct” tells me
are true, are true. It might appear that the words “feeling” or “instinct” seem to make as
m uch sense as a guiding principle as perceptions that are “clearly” and “distinctly”
perceived. I w ill argue in chapter four though, that there is something special about
clarity and distinctness as a guiding principle that makes it superior to mere feelings or
instincts.
I think it would be useful at this stage to pull together the various strands o f  critical 
attack against foundationalism and present them  in one, coherent argument. This is my 
next task.
Bonjour’s  Anti-foundationalist a rgum ent
Bonjour arguably presents one o f  the most concise forms o f  an anti-foundationalist 
argument55. Bonjour’s com ments neatly draw together some o f  the issues that I have 
raised in this chapter:
(1) ‘There are basic, em pirical beliefs which are justified and their justification 
does not depend on any further empirical beliefs.
(2) For a  belief to  be justified there needs to be a reason why it is likely to  be 
true.
54 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 35: C S M II24.
55 Once again, it is important to stress that Bonjour presented this argument before he joined the 
foundation alist camp.
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(3) For a belief to be justified for a particular person, requires that this person 
be in cognitive possession o f  such a reason.
(4) The only w ay to be in cognitive possession o f  such a reason is to believe 
w ith justification the prem ises from which it follows that the belief is likely 
to be true.
(5) The premises o f  such a  justifying argument for an empirical belief cannot be 
entirely a priori; at least one o f  the premises m ust be empirical.
Therefore the justification o f  a supposed empirical belief m ust depend on the 
justification o f  at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (1); it follows 
therefore that that there can be no basic empirical beliefs.’ 56
Bonjour’s position is that justification ultimately depends on additional empirical
beliefs which need to be justified themselves. I f  Bonjour’s assessm ent is correct, then
foundationalism does not successfully deal w ith the infinite regress problem, as basic
beliefs turn  out not to be self-justified after all.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have identified the key issues that any foundationalist theory must 
address: (1) is it possible to have basic beliefs or propositions; whose justification does 
not depend on references to  other beliefs or propositions? (2) What is the nature o f  any 
basic beliefs, are they incorrigible or corrigible? (3) H ow  does the transfer o f 
justification take place from  basic to non-basic beliefs? Is this transfer o f  justification 
restricted to strict deduction only, as the strong classical foundationalist theory would 
maintain, or can the transfer o f  justification occur by non-deductive mechanisms, such 
as induction by analogy, or hypothetico-deduction, as the more moderate strands o f  
foundationalism would allow? (4) W hat are the challenges facing foundationalism’s 
attempt to solve the infinite regress problem  and what role do epistemic principles play 
in this solution?
In relation to incorrigible basic beliefs, it seems there are only two that are capable o f  
resisting critical attack: the Cogito and my belief that I believe. I f  there are only two
56 Bonjour presents this in his The Structure o f  Empirical Knowledge (1985), p.32.
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incorrigible beliefs, how  do we build the superstructure o f  knowledge on such a small 
foundation? A corollary to  this is the problem  that if  m ost o f  our beliefs are corrigible, 
then how  are they justified?
The transfer o f  justification from  basic to  non-basic beliefs is particularly problematic. 
A lthough deduction may be successfully used in mathematical or other a priori 
disciplines, it does not seem to be sufficient w hen applied to empirical situations. An 
extra factor seems to  be needed to ensure the truth o f  perceptions. A  similar difficulty 
arises w ith inductive methods o f  inference, external observations seem to be required to 
verify true experiences. The hypothetico-deductive style o f  inference, if  it is to have any 
chance at all o f  success, must be analytical in nature. I f  an appeal to evidence is needed, 
then that evidence has to be justified and we are back into a cycle o f  justification once 
more.
Epistemic principles, such as D escartes’s clarity and distinctness rule, initially might
appear to provide a m ethod o f  dealing with the epistemic regress problem, but it has
sometimes been argued that when we probe deeper we find that they are often arbitrarily
chosen. As Lehrer comments:
‘I f  a belief is corrigible, then it can be fa lse ...if  a belief can be false, then any 
justification o f  the belief guaranteeing its truth must be supplied by independent 
information. It is then concluded that if  a belief is corrigible it must be justified 
by such information, and, therefore, cannot be basic. I f  this argument is decisive, 
then either we must abandon the foundation theory or conclude that we are 
ignorant o f  alm ost all we suppose we know .’57
The key question now  is: can D escartes’s epistemology be read in such a way that it can
put up a defence against the critical challenges presented in this chapter? My final
chapter will address this question.
57 In Lehrer’s Knowledge (1974), p.101.
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Chapter Four: A Cartesian Defence
In chapter three I presented some strong challenges that foundationalism must face up to 
i f  it is to  provide a credible alternative to  epistemological scepticism. The task o f  this 
chapter is to assess whether a non-traditional interpretation o f  D escartes’s project in the 
M editations can w ithstand those challenges and therefore give us compelling reasons to 
adopt foundationalism. To make this assessment I will examine the following issues 
raised in chapter three: what is the nature and epistemic status o f  basic beliefs? H ow can 
the transfer o f  justification take place from  basic to non-basic beliefs? I f  epistemic 
principles are used in the transfer o f  justification; what is their epistemic status, how  are 
they justified? The answers to these questions will indicate whether Cartesian 
foundationalism can provide an adequate solution to the infinite regress problem and 
counter sceptical attacks on knowledge as Descartes intended.
The Nature and S ta tus of Foundational Beliefs
D escartes’s aim  is clear from  the very first page o f  the First Meditation:
‘Reason now  leads me to think that I should hold back m y assent from opinions 
w hich are not completely certain and indubitable ju st as carefully as I do from 
those which are patently false.’1
Descartes uses the term s ‘indubitable’ and ‘certain’ in the above passage. But the search
for basic, foundational beliefs in contemporary epistemological debate is also closely
linked w ith the notion o f  incorrigibility. Susan Haack draws a distinction between the
terms ‘indubitable’, ‘certain’, ‘infallible’ and ‘incorrigible’ in the following way:
indubitable suggests ‘im munity to doubt’2, certain and infallible suggests ‘immunity to
error’ and incorrigible suggests ‘immunity to  correction’.
1 First Meditation: AT V I 1 18: CSM I I 12.
2 Haack presents definitions o f incorrigible, indubitable, certain and infallible on page 38 of her book: 
Evidence and Inquiry, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1995.
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W hile recognising the nuances o f  H aack’s account, it is o f  interest to note a comment
made by Robert Audi in this context. Audi observes that while incorrigibility does not
entail infallibility or indubitability, the latter pair entail each other and both o f  them
entail incorrigibility. Audi states that:
‘Infallibility and indubitability each entail -  though neither is entailed by -  
incorrigibility, i f  the latter doctrine is false, so are the other tw o.’3
Audi then goes on to employ the modus tollens that if  incorrigibility can be shown to be
false, then that w ill bring the falsity o f  infallibility or indubitability along with it.
Descartes’s com m itm ent seems to be to indubitability and therefore, following Audi, he
is committed to incorrigibility, so if  incorrigibility falls to criticism, as recent critics o f
foundationalism think it does, then so does Descartes’s position. In the discussion which
follows it will be im portant to bear these interconnections between the various terms o f
epistemic appraisal in mind since much o f  w hat Descartes has to offer is couched in the
language o f  indubitability while m uch recent discussion is couched in the language o f
incorrigibility.
In  chapter three I made the point that it is widely accepted that the Cogito and the belief 
that I believe something are indubitable, hence incorrigible, and I will now  examine the 
Cogito once again as it plays a  crucial role in D escartes’s epistemology.
The Cogito
The Cogito is the first truth that Descartes discovers. It is immune from  all the varieties 
o f  doubt, even the extreme deceptions o f  the malicious dem on cannot dent its 
authenticity:
‘But there is a  deceiver o f  supreme pow er and cunning who is deliberately and 
constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, i f  he is deceiving 
me; and let him  deceive me as m uch as he can, he will never bring it about that I 
am  nothing so long as I think that I am  something. So after considering
3 Audi, Robert, The Structure o f  Justification, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 168.
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everything very thoroughly, I m ust finally conclude that this proposition, I  am, 1 
exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my 
m ind.’4
As I indicated in chapter tw o5, the Cogito is special, it does have a unique status that
other propositions do not have. As Cottingham observes:
‘The proposition “I am thinking” is indubitable in a  special way: doubting it 
confirms its tru th .’6
Cottingham goes on to state that even premises such as “I am hoping” would not have 
the required indubitability. ‘I doubt that I am  hoping’ is not indubitable, doubting that 
one is hoping does not entail that one is hoping, since doubting is not a case o f  hoping. 
Apart from the fact that “I am thinking” has a status o f  indubitability, m y own existence 
necessarily follows from  the indubitable awareness that I am at this moment thinking. 
For as long as I am engaged in the activity o f  thinking, I must exist.
Descartes had stated near the beginning o f  the Second M editation  that he was looking
for an Archim edean point o f  certainty:
‘Archimedes used to demand just one firm an immovable point in order to shift 
the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if  I manage to find just one 
thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable.’7
W ith the Cogito, Descartes found that first certain and unshakeable thing, so what is the
problem ? The problem  is that the Cogito provides a very slim foundation upon which
systematic knowledge o f  the world can be built. As Cottingham observes:
‘There is a  risk that Descartes will remain isolated in the secure but
unproductive arena o f  subjective self-awareness, unable to proceed any further
without risk o f  error.’8
H ow  can Descartes proceed any further beyond the security o f  the Cogito? When
Descartes reflects on the Cogito at the beginning o f  the Third M editation he discovers
4 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 25: CSM I I 17.
5 See chapter two, pp.30-1.
6 Cottingham, John, Descartes, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1986, p.38.
7 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 24: CSM II 16.
8 Cottingham, ibid., p.47.
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the key feature o f  the Cogito: it is clearly and distinctly perceived:
‘I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is 
required for my being certain about anything? In  this first item o f  knowledge 
there is simply a clear and distinct perception o f  w hat I am  asserting; this would 
not be enough to  make me certain o f  the truth o f  the m atter if  it could ever turn 
out that something which I perceived w ith such clarity and distinctness was 
false. So I now  seem to  be able to  lay it down as a general rule that whatever I 
perceive very clearly and distinctly is true.’9
From  the clarity and distinctness o f  the Cogito, Descartes derives the general principle
that whatever else is perceived w ith clarity and distinctness is true. This is a
monum ental discovery, a method has been discovered that w hen applied correctly,
enables us to construct systematic knowledge. I think that the key point here is not that
the Cogito is m erely one foundational belief that is alm ost trivially true, it is that the
Cogito provides a tem plate against which we can measure and test other propositions.
Like any method or procedure, mistakes are possible in its application. W hen there is
confusion, say in the case o f  sensory experiences, that confusion often arises because
things are not clear and distinct. The clarity and distinctness rule is an objective method
applied subjectively in each individual case. It is similar to what Humber10 identified as
the m ethod for summing a column o f  numbers: the method itself is sound, but mistakes
can be made in its application.
I believe that the clarity and distinctness rule can be used to counter Lehrer’s attack on 
thinking as an incorrigible process. In chapter three I mentioned Lehrer’s example o f  
thinking that Bacon is the author o f  H am let.11 A  sketch o f  the main points o f  Lehrer’s 
argum ent should be sufficient now  . Lehrer suggests that thinking as a process is an 
activity that cannot be trusted. The fact that someone believes that they are thinking o f  
something does not im ply that the person is actually thinking o f  that thing. Lehrer’s
9 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 35: CSM II 24.
10 James M. Humber, ‘Recognising Clear and Distinct Perceptions’, in René Descartes Critical 
Assessments, ed. by Georges J.D. Moyal, Vol. 1, Routledge, 1991, pp.218-19.
11 This example is in Lehrer, Keith, Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 1974, p.88.
12 See above, pp.54-5 for the full details.
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contention is that all kinds o f  mistakes are possible regarding what may be presently 
going on in som eone’s mind.
In  fact, Lehrer feels that his argument can be extended to include mental processes such 
as surmising, doubting or pondering. He concludes that:
‘any state that involves conscious consideration o f  a statement is a  state about
which one can be m istaken.’
I think one can object to Lehrer’s argum ent regarding holding the tw o beliefs that Bacon 
is the author o f  Hamlet and Shakespeare is the author o f  Hamlet, at the same time. 
Lehrer does reply to this kind o f  objection by saying I can believe that I am thinking 
that Bacon is the author o f  Ham let at the very tim e at which 1 am thinking that. A belief 
can coexist w ith a thought and be quite distinct from the thinking. Up to this point I 
think Lehrer is correct, but, he goes on  to argue if  my belief that I am  thinking that 
Bacon is the author o f  Hamlet can exist at the same time as my thinking that, then 
obviously m y belief that I am thinking Shakespeare is the author o f  Hamlet can exist at 
the same tim e as m y thinking Bacon is the author o f  Hamlet, therefore the objection 
fails.
It seems to m e that Lehrer is guilty o f  level confusion. It is one thing to  believe that you 
are believing something, but this is not the same thing as believing at the same time two 
contradictory beliefs such as Bacon is the author o f  Hamlet and Shakespeare is the 
author o f  Hamlet. I f  we apply a Cartesian approach to this issue I think we can say that 
if  I have the two beliefs that Bacon is the author o f  Hamlet and Shakespeare is the 
author o f  Hamlet, then there is confusion, because they both cannot be true, I cannot 
clearly and distinctly believe both. In Cartesian terms, I should withhold m y assent. It 
seems that the degree o f  confusion that Lehrer believes can be part o f  the cognitive
13 See Lehrer, op.cit., p .9I.
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processes may not be present after all, or at least if  the confusion is present we can 
respond. I believe that it is too hasty to cast doubts over our entire cognitive processes, 
as Lehrer appears to want us to do. Given that our cognitive processes in general may be 
cautiously trusted, the next issue is w hether the content o f  our cognitions, particularly 
our beliefs about sensory experiences can enjoy the same trust.
Beliefs about Sensations
It is beliefs about sensations that Descartes seems to regard as being foundational:
‘For example, I am  now  seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am 
asleep so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem  to see, to hear, and to be warmed. 
This cannot be false; w hat is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is strictly just 
this, and in this restricted sense o f  the term  it is simply thinking.’14
Lehrer uses the possibility o f  confusing sensations to demonstrate that such confusion is
possible and therefore beliefs based on sensations cannot be completely trusted.
Lehrer’s line o f  thought seems to  be that if  m ost o f  our beliefs are corrigible in this way
and need to be supported by independent information for justification, then the beliefs
cannot be basic.
The example that Lehrer provides is that o f  a doctor informing a patient that itches are 
really pains and because o f  the reputation o f  the doctor, the patient never doubts him. 
W hen the patient experiences an  itch, she incorrectly believes that she is in pain. So, the 
patient believing that she is in pain does not imply that she is in pain. The main point 
about this scenario is that the patient is not really justified in believing that itches are 
pains. She has no valid grounds for believing that she is in pain when she itches. It is 
not clear why itches should be regarded as pains. There is nothing intrinsic to the 
experience o f  pain or itches that justifies one in believing that itches are pains.
It is o f  course possible to experience confusion w ith sensations. This is something that 
Descartes was well aware of: in the Third M editation Descartes states:
14 Second Meditation: AT V I 1 29: CSM I I 19.
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‘But as for all the rest, including light and colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat 
and cold and the other tactile qualities, I think o f  these only in a very confused 
and obscure way, to the extent that I do not even know  whether they are true or 
false, that is, w hether the ideas I have o f  them  are ideas o f  real things or o f non-
things the ideas which I have o f  heat and cold contain so little clarity and
distinctness that they do not enable m e to tell whether cold is merely the absence 
o f  heat or vice versa, or whether both o f  them  are real qualities, or neither is.’15
Lehrer takes the apparent corrigibility o f  beliefs to deliver a seemingly fatal blow to
foundationalism:
‘I f  a belief is corrigible, then it can be fa lse ...if  a  belief can be false, then any 
justification o f  the belief guaranteeing its truth m ust be supplied by independent 
information. It is then concluded that if  a belief is corrigible it must be justified 
by such information, and, therefore, cannot be basic. I f  this argument is decisive, 
then either we must abandon the foundation theory or conclude that we are 
ignorant o f  almost all we suppose we know .’
In the above passage, Lehrer regards the justification o f  a  belief as being supplied by
‘independent’ information. It is because the belief needs to be propped up with this
independent information, that it cannot be basic. This is presumably because a basic
belief is either not in need o f  justification, or its justification must be intrinsic and not
independent o f  the belief itself.
It is interesting to  note that Lehrer does go on to identify that a  belief could be regarded 
as being basic if  the justification for believing it is intrinsic to the belief itself. Lehrer 
mentions the idea a product guarantee16, guaranteeing the product against defects in 
manufacture. Such a guarantee is not p roof that the individual product in question is free 
from  defects. In a similar manner, the guarantee o f  truth intrinsic to some beliefs may 
not be proof that an individual belief in question is true. The manufactured item may be 
defective and the belief may be incorrect, but it may still be reasonable to attach some 
value to the product guarantee or the belief. Lehrer’s main goal in examining sensations
15 Third Meditation: AT V I 1 43-44: CSM II 30.
16 See Lehrer’s Knowledge (1974), p.102.
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is to highlight their confusing nature and in so doing, to demonstrate that beliefs 
concerning sensations are corrigible. It seems that the only w ay for a basic belief to be 
justified is i f  that belief does not require independent information to  prop it up. Lehrer 
then sets him self the task o f  searching for any beliefs that do not depend on independent 
inform ation for their justification. I will now  assess Lehrer’s continued search for basic 
beliefs.
The Independent Information Obstacle
Lehrer attempts to determine whether any beliefs can be found whose justification does 
not depend on  independent information. I f  an alleged basic belief depends on 
independent inform ation for its justification, then the belief is not truly basic. The 
sensory belief that ‘I see something red ’ is examined. It might be argued that no 
independent information is needed to justify  the belief that ‘I see something red’, all that 
is needed is standard observational conditions and a normal observer. Lehrer’s response 
to this claim is that one must be able to  tell when conditions are standard and what is 
meant by a ‘norm al’ observer. The conclusion drawn is that independent information is 
required for the justification o f  a perceptual belief.
Even if  a perceptual belief is reduced to its minimal state, perhaps by saying something 
like: ‘I believe that I see som ething’ w ithout specifying w hat that ‘something’ is, it 
seems that independent information is required. The ‘som ething’ has to be distinguished 
as a real thing, not the product o f  a dream  or hallucination.
The idea here is that it is possible for someone to hallucinate, so we cannot justifiably 
conclude that we see something as opposed to hallucinate that we see something, unless 
we possess inform ation enabling us to distinguish hallucination from  the real thing.
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On Lehrer’s account, the necessity o f  possessing independent information for
justification o f  beliefs seems to  directly undermine the kinds o f  experiences that
Descartes took to be basic:
‘Even the very subjective belief, that it seems to m e that I am  seeing something, 
is justified only if  I have the inform ation needed to tell whether it seems to me 
that I am seeing something; or whether I am  having some quite different 
experience, for example, the experience o f  wondering w hether I am seeing 
something. I may w onder w hether I am  seeing something when it does not 
especially seem to me that I am  seeing something, and unless I have the 
inform ation required to tell the difference, I am not completely justified in my 
belief. The most modest beliefs turn out to be the ones requiring independent 
inform ation for their justification. The preceding argument uncovers a 
ubiquitous need for independent information to justify belief, and in so doing it 
undermines the foundation theory.’17
Perhaps the confusion concerning beliefs and their justification is merely on a linguistic
level? Lehrer does consider this possibility but he concludes that our use o f  language
offers no escape from  the need to possess independent information to justify basic
beliefs. As w as discussed in chapter three, w hen words are used comparatively it does
seem that extra information is needed to  justify them. For example: i f  I say something
appears red, I may be com paring the way this thing appears w ith the w ay other things
appear. However, w hen words are used in a non-comparative way, we may not need
independent inform ation for justification. The non-comparative use o f  words applies in
cases like someone believing that they are being ‘appeared-to-redly’ or that they are
‘sensing redly’. The notion involved here is that to say that someone is ‘sensing redly’
may allow  one to sidestep the issue o f  normal observers in norm al conditions. It may
well be that one is sensing in norm al conditions as a normal observer, but it is not an
analytical consequence o f  the term  ‘sensing-redly’ used non-comparatively.
Lehrer’s response to  the initially prom ising case o f  the non-comparative use o f  language 
not requiring independent inform ation for justification is highly critical. The central
17 In Lehrer’s Knowledge (1974), p.107.
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idea behind his objection is once again the need for independent verification o f  sensory 
experiences w ith additional information. A lthough Lehrer does concede that the belief 
that one is ‘appeared to redly’ does not entail any com parison o f  one’s present state to 
any other state, it does entail though that one’s present state is o f  a certain kind, and to 
be com pletely justified in believing it to be o f  that kind, one must have the information 
needed to distinguish the current state from other states. Lehrer’s overall analysis is 
that:
‘To be completely justified in believing anything about a state or object or 
w hatnot one always requires independent inform ation.’18
I f  Lehrer is correct in his analysis o f  the impossibility o f  any belief not needing
independent information for its justification, then the outlook for foundationalism does
seem to  be bleak. The next stage is to  identify whether foundationalism can respond to
the serious attacks levelled against basic beliefs and to assess how  effective that
response is.
A Defence of Basic Beliefs
A  defence o f  basic beliefs needs to involve the following elements: firstly, a resolution 
o f  the justification issue: can it be shown that justification is intrinsic to an allegedly 
basic belief or is independent inform ation required? Secondly, can it be demonstrated 
that sensory experiences have a foundational aspect? I will examine each o f  these areas 
in turn, focusing first on the justification o f  basic beliefs.
The search for intrinsic justification within beliefs aspiring to be basic seems to be the 
correct path to follow. I f  the justification o f  a belief depends on external factors such as 
other beliefs, then the original belief cannot be considered as being truly basic. Lehrer 
does recognise that the justification would have to be an intrinsic feature o f  a belief, if
18 Lehrer, op.cit., p .l 10.
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that belief is to qualify as a basic belief. But I do not think that he really pursues that 
quest for an internal, intrinsic feature. W hen Lehrer examines the belief that ‘I see 
something red’ he does not m ention anything internal to  the content o f  that belief, he 
immediately shifts the focus outwards and discusses standard conditions and normal 
observers.
This outward or external focus is evident again in Lehrer’s analysis o f  a perceptual 
belief reduced to its minimal content: the belief that I see something  without specifying 
exactly w hat object is seen. The reason that Lehrer provides for doubting this kind o f  
belief is that the something  has to be distinguished from a  hallucinatory experience or a 
dream. I think that it is correct to say that real experience has to be distinguished from 
hallucinations or dreams, but why assume that ‘independent’ information is required to 
decide if we are really seeing something or merely dreaming? This issue o f  the potential 
confusion between hallucinatory or dream experiences w ith reality was addressed by 
Descartes in the M editations.
D escartes’s treatm ent o f  the issue may provide some insight into the intrinsic
justification versus independent information debate. Descartes was well aware o f  the
potential damage that dreams could cause to any epistemological account: in the First
M editation  the phenom enon o f  dreaming forms the basis o f  one o f  the strongest
challenges to what we think we know:
‘H ow  often, asleep at night, am I convinced o f  ju s t such familiar events -  that I 
am here in m y dressing-gown, sitting by the fire -  when in fact I am lying 
undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I 
look at this piece o f  paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out 
and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know  what I am doing. All this 
would not happen w ith such distinctness to  someone asleep. Indeed! As if  I did 
not remember other occasions w hen I have been tricked by exactly similar 
thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that 
there are never any sure signs by means o f  which being awake can be
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distinguished from  being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this 
very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep.’19
Descartes seeks to resolve the dream argument in the Sixth M editation:
‘Accordingly, I should not have any further fears about the falsity o f  what my 
senses tell me every day; on the contrary, the exaggerated doubts o f  the last few 
days should be dismissed as laughable. This applies especially to the principal 
reason for doubt, nam ely my inability to distinguish between being asleep and 
being awake. For I now notice that there is a  vast difference between the two, in 
that dreams are never linked by m em ory w ith all the other actions o f  life as 
waking experiences are. If, while I am  awake, anyone were suddenly to appear 
to me and then disappear immediately, as happens in sleep, so that I could not 
see where he had come from or where he had gone to, it would not be 
unreasonable for me to judge that he was a ghost, or a vision created in my 
brain, rather than a real man. But w hen I distinctly see where things come from 
and where and when they come to me, and w hen I can connect my perceptions 
o f  them  with the whole o f  the rest o f  my life w ithout a break, then I am  quite 
certain that when I encounter these things I am  not asleep but awake. And I 
ought not to have even the slightest doubt o f  their reality if, after calling upon all 
the senses as well as my memory and my intellect in order to check them, I 
receive no conflicting reports from any o f  these sources.’20
The crucial point in D escartes’s analysis o f  the dream  argument is that the solution he
proposes is arrived at by examining the internal, intrinsic structure o f  dreams compared
to waking experience. There is no appeal to ‘independent’ information as Lehrer’s
account requires. The intrinsic feature o f  waking experience is its continuity. Although
we can dream  continuous dreams, the continuity does not last long before something
else pops into our head. Schmitt notes in his analysis o f  the dream passage that there are
two competing theories attempting to explain apparent waking experience: the dream
hypothesis, and the body hypothesis (that the objects o f  apparent waking experience are
currently perceived bodies). Descartes favours the body hypothesis because it more
adequately explains apparent waking experience.
I think that Schmitt offers a  reasonable analysis o f  the dream passage when he states:
‘We can o f  course string two dream hypotheses together to account for two 
episodes o f  experience. But the body hypothesis concerning these episodes is 
superior to the dream  hypothesis in its pow er to explain an additional fact. The
19 First Meditation: AT V I 1 19: C SM II 13.
20 Sixth Meditation: AT V I 1 89-90: CSM II 61-62.
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b o d y  h y p o th e s is  e x p la in s  n o t  ju s t  th e  tw o  e p iso d e s , b u t a lso  th a t  th e  e p iso d e s  
b e a r  a  re la tio n  o f  c o n tin u ity . T h e  b o d y  h y p o th e s is  e x p la in s  th is  fa c t b e c a u se  it 
h a s  a  c o m p o n e n t th a t  re m a in s  c o n s ta n t a c ro ss  e p iso d e s , th e  c o m p o n e n t 
a c c o rd in g  to  w h ic h  p a r tic u la r  b o d ie s  a re  p e rc e iv e d . T h e  d re a m  h y p o th e s is , 
h o w e v e r, le a v e s  th e  e p iso d e s  u n re la te d  a n d  c a n n o t e x p la in  th e  fa c t o f  
c o n tin u ity .’21
T h e  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  d re a m  p a ss a g e  in  th e  Meditations d o e s  n o t re v e a l th a t  no 
in fo rm a tio n  is  n e e d e d  fo r  ju s tif ic a tio n : it su g g e s ts  th a t th e re  is no  n e e d  fo r  independent 
in fo rm a tio n  to  e x p la in  c e r ta in  k in d s  o f  p h e n o m e n a . T h is  d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  
in fo rm a tio n  a n d  in d e p e n d e n t in fo rm a tio n  is c ru c ia l in  re s p o n d in g  to  L e h re r ’s g e n e ra l 
a t ta c k  o n  C a r te s ia n  s ty le  fo u n d a tio n s  th a t I re fe r re d  to  e arlie r:
‘E v e n  th e  v e ry  su b je c tiv e  b e lie f , th a t  it see m s to  m e  th a t I  a m  se e in g  so m e th in g , 
is  ju s t i f ie d  o n ly  i f  I h a v e  th e  in fo rm a tio n  n e e d e d  to  te ll  w h e th e r  it s e e m s  to  m e  
th a t  I a m  se e in g  so m e th in g ; o r  w h e th e r  I  a m  h a v in g  so m e  q u ite  d iffe re n t 
e x p e r ie n c e , fo r  e x a m p le , th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  w o n d e rin g  w h e th e r  I a m  see in g  
s o m e th in g . I  m a y  w o n d e r  w h e th e r  I a m  see in g  so m e th in g  w h e n  it d o e s  n o t 
e sp e c ia l ly  s e e m  to  m e  th a t  I a m  se e in g  s o m e th in g , a n d  u n le s s  I  h a v e  th e  
in fo rm a tio n  re q u ire d  to  te l l  th e  d if fe re n c e , I  a m  n o t c o m p le te ly  ju s t i f ie d  in  m y  
b e lie f. T h e  m o s t m o d e s t b e lie fs  tu rn  o u t  to  b e  th e  o n e s  re q u ir in g  in d e p e n d e n t 
in fo rm a tio n  fo r  th e ir  ju s tif ic a tio n . T h e  p re c e d in g  a rg u m e n t u n c o v e rs  a  
u b iq u ito u s  n e e d  fo r  in d e p e n d e n t in fo rm a tio n  to  ju s tify  b e lie f , a n d  in  so  d o in g  
u n d e rm in e s  th e  fo u n d a tio n  th e o ry .’22
N o tic e  h o w  th e re  is  a  su b tle  c h a n g e  th a t  ta k e s  p la c e  in  th e  p a ssa g e  ju s t  q u o te d . L e h re r
m o v e s  f ro m  s ta tin g  th a t  su b jec tiv e  b e l ie f  c a n  o n ly  b e  ju s t i f ie d  ‘i f  I h a v e  th e  information
n e e d e d  to  te l l  w h e th e r  it see m s to  m e  th a t  I a m  se e in g  so m e th in g ; o r  w h e th e r  I a m
h a v in g  so m e  q u ite  d if fe re n t e x p e r ie n c e , ’, to  h is  c o n c lu s io n  a t th e  end  o f  th e
p a ssa g e  w h ic h  is  th a t  ‘T h e  p re c e d in g  a rg u m e n t u n c o v e rs  a  u b iq u ito u s  n e e d  fo r
independent information to  ju s t i fy  b e lie f , a n d  in  so  d o in g  it u n d e rm in e s  th e  fo u n d a tio n
th e o ry .’ W h y  m a k e  th e  ju m p  fro m  ‘in fo rm a tio n ’ to  ‘in d e p e n d e n t in fo rm a tio n ’? T h e
d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o  is n o t ju s t  m e re ly  sem a n tic : it is a t  th e  v e ry  h e a r t o f  th e
is su e  in  q u e s tio n . A t th is  s ta g e  in  L e h re r ’s a rg u m e n t h e  is  a lle g e d ly  lo o k in g  fo r  an y
b e l ie f  w h o se  ju s t i f ic a t io n  is  in tr in s ic  to  itse lf. I t  is p e rh a p s  n o t su rp ris in g  th a t  h e  d o es
21 Frederick F. Schm itt, ‘W hy w as D escartes a Foundationalist?’, in E s s a y s  o n  D e s c a r t e s ’ M e d i t a t i o n s ,
ed. by A m élie  O ksenberg Rorty, U niversity o f  California Press Ltd., 1986., p .495.
22 In Lehrer’s Knowledge (1974), p.107.
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n o t  f in d  a n y  in tr in s ic  ju s ti f ic a t io n  b e c a u s e  h e  m a k e s  no  d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  
‘in fo rm a tio n ’ a n d  ‘in d e p e n d e n t in fo rm a tio n ’.
T h e  la ck  o f  d is t in c tio n  b e tw e e n  in fo rm a tio n  a n d  in d e p e n d e n t in fo rm a tio n  is  a p p a re n t in  
L e h re r ’s a n a ly s is  o f  th e  b e l ie f  th a t, so m e o n e  m a y  h a v e , th a t  th e y  a re  b e in g  ‘a p p e a re d -to -  
re d ly ’, o r  th a t  th e y  a re  ‘s e n s in g -re d ly ’. L e h re r  c o rre c tly  p o in ts  o u t th a t  to  b e  c o m p le te ly  
ju s t i f ie d  in  b e lie v in g  th a t  o n e  is  se n s in g  in  a  p a r tic u la r  w ay , o n e  m u s t h av e  th e  
in fo rm a tio n  n e c e s sa ry  to  d is tin g u ish  b e tw e e n  th a t  w a y  o f  a p p e a r in g  f ro m  a ll  o th e r  w a y s  
o f  a p p ea rin g . B u t o n c e  m o re , L e h re r  d o e s  n o t se e m  to  c o n s id e r  th e  p o s s ib il ity  th a t th e  
in fo rm a tio n  th a t is  re q u ire d  c o u ld  so m e h o w  b e  in tr in s ic  to  th e  b e l ie f  itse lf. H is  
c o n c lu s io n  c o n c e rn in g  se n s in g  in  p a r tic u la r  w a y s  is:
‘T o  b e  c o m p le te ly  ju s t i f ie d  in  b e lie v in g  a n y th in g  a b o u t a  s ta te  o r  o b je c t o r
w h a tn o t o n e  a lw a y s  re q u ire s  in d e p e n d e n t in fo rm a tio n ’.23
It is o n e  o f  th e  k e y  o b je c t io n s  to  th e  fo u n d a tio n a l p ro je c t  th a t  b e lie fs  a b o u t sen sa tio n s  
re q u ire  in d e p e n d e n t v e r if ic a tio n  an d  a re  th e re fo re  n o t tru ly  b asic . W h a t I h a v e  a tte m p te d  
to  s h o w  in  th is  s e c tio n  so  fa r is th a t it m a y  b e  p o s s ib le  fo r  ju s tif ic a tio n  to  b e  a n  in tr in sic  
fe a tu re  o f  s e n s o ry  b e lie fs  a n d  th e re fo re  to  fo c u s  o n  e x te rn a l re a so n s  fo r  ju s tif ic a tio n  
m a y  be m isg u id e d . B u t i f  th a t  a n a ly s is  is c o rre c t, th e n  th e  ta s k  n o w  b e c o m e s  th e  ra th e r  
d a u n tin g  c h a lle n g e  o f  d e m o n s tra tin g  how ju s t i f ic a t io n  c a n  be  in tr in s ic  to  sen so ry  
b e lie fs . I t  is m y  c o n te n t io n  th a t  n o t o n ly  c a n  ju s t i f ic a t io n  b e  in tr in s ic  to  b e lie fs , b u t a lso  
th a t  th e  Meditations c a n  be  in te rp re te d  in  th a t  w a y . T h e  f irs t s tep  in  sh o w in g  h o w  
ju s tif ic a tio n  c a n  b e  a n  in tr in s ic  fe a tu re  o f  fo u n d a tio n a l b e lie fs  is to  ad d re ss  th e  
p re p o s it io n a l  /  n o n -p ro p o s it io n a l d ile m m a .
23 See Lehrer, op.cit., p.110.
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The Propositional / Non-Propositional Dilemma
F o u n d a tio n a lis m  fa c e s  a  se r io u s  d ile m m a  re g a rd in g  th e  s e n so ry  e x p e r ie n c e s  th a t  a re  
a lle g ed  to  g ro u n d  th e  fo u n d a tio n a l b e lie fs : th e re  is  e ith e r  so m e  sen se  in  w h ic h  th e  
se n so ry  e x p e r ie n c e s  a re  p ro p o s itio n a l, o r  s u c h  e x p e r ie n c e s  a re  n o t p ro p o s itio n a l. I f  
se n so ry  e x p e r ie n c e s  h a v e  no  p ro p o s itio n a l s ta tu s , th e n  th e y  c a n n o t re q u ire  ju s tif ic a tio n , 
b u t it is d if f ic u lt  to  see  h o w  th e y  c o u ld  th e n  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f  
p ro p o s it io n a l b e lie fs . I f  s e n so ry  e x p e r ie n c e s  a re  re g a rd e d  as  h a v in g  a  p ro p o s itio n a l 
fa c e t, th e n  th e re  m a y  n o t  be  an y  d if f ic u lty  in  th in k in g  o f  th e m  as  re la tin g  to  b e lie fs  in  
su c h  a  w a y  a s  to  e n ab le  th e  ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  th o s e  b e lie fs , b u t q u e s tio n s  c o u ld  be  ra is e d  
a b o u t th e  e p is te m ic  s ta tu s  o f  th e  e x p e r ie n c e s  th e m se lv e s .
B o n jo u r24, w h o  n o w  o v e r tly  d e fe n d s  a  fo rm  o f  C a r te s ia n  fo u n d a tio n a lism , p re s e n ts  th e  
d ile m m a  fa c in g  fo u n d a tio n a lis m  b y  f ir s t  id e n tify in g  th e  s tru c tu re  o f  a  fo u n d a tio n a l 
b e l ie f  a s  c o n s is tin g  o f  th e  fo llo w in g  tw o  fe a tu re s , in  a d d itio n  to  th e  s e n so ry  e x p e r ie n c e  
itse lf:
1. ‘T h e re  is th e  a lle g e d ly  b a s ic  o r  fo u n d a tio n a l b e l ie f  w h o se  c o n te n t p e rta in s  to  
so m e  a sp e c t o f  th a t  e x p e rien c e .
2. T h e re  is w h a t a p p e a rs  to  b e  a  se c o n d , in d e p e n d e n t m e n ta l a c t, an  a c t o f  d ire c t 
a p p re h e n s io n  o f  th e  re le v a n t e x p e r ie n tia l fe a tu re . I t  is th is  s e c o n d  a c t th a t  is 
su p p o se d  to  su p p ly  th e  p e rs o n ’s re a s o n  fo r  th in k in g  th a t th e  b e l ie f  is  t r u e .’25
T h e  k e y  q u e s tio n  is: w h a t  is th e  e p is te m ic  s ta tu s  o f  th e  s e c o n d  m e n ta l a c t?  I f  it is
c o g n itiv e  a n d  c o n c e p tu a l, h a v in g  a s  its  c o n te n t th e  p ro p o s itio n  o r  c la im  th a t  th e
e x p e r ie n c e  h a s  th e  s p e c if ic  c h a ra c te r  in d ic a te d  b y  th e  b e lie f , th e n  i f  th is  s e c o n d  m e n ta l
a c t is i t s e l f  ju s t if ie d , it is  e a sy  to  see  w h y  th is  s e c o n d  m e n ta l a c t p ro v id e s  a  re a so n  fo r
th in k in g  th a t  th e  b e l ie f  is  tru e .
24 Laurence Bonjour, ‘Toward a D efen se  o f  Em pirical Foundationalism ’, in R e s u r r e c t i n g  O l d - F a s h i o n e d  
F o u n d a t i o n a l i s m ,  ed. by M ichael R. D e Paul, R owm an & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2001 , pp.21-37.
25 Ibid., p .23.
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B u t it is d if f ic u lt  to  see  w h y  th is  s e c o n d  m e n ta l a c t d o e s  n o t re q u ire  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f  
so m e  so rt, so m e  re a s o n  fo r  th in k in g  th a t its  p ro p o s it io n a l c o n te n t is tru e . If, o n  th e  o th e r  
h a n d , th e  s e c o n d  m e n ta l a c t o f  d ire c t  a p p re h e n s io n  is n o n -c o g n itiv e  a n d  n o n -c o n c e p tu a l 
in  c h a ra c te r , n o t  in v o lv in g  a n y  p ro p o s it io n a l  c la im  a b o u t th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  
e x p e r ie n c e , th e n  a lth o u g h  no  is su e  o f  ju s t i f ic a t io n  a rise s , it is d if f ic u lt to  see  h o w  such  
a n  a c t o f  d ire c t a p p re h e n s io n  c a n  p ro v id e  a n y  re a s o n  fo r  th in k in g  th e  o rig in a l 
su p p o se d ly  fo u n d a tio n a l b e l ie f  is  tru e . I f  a  p e rs o n  w h o  is  d ire c tly  a c q u a in te d  w ith  a n  
e x p e r ie n c e  is n o t p ro p o s itio n a lly  a w a re  th a t  it h a s  su c h  a n d  su c h  fe a tu re s , in  w h a t w a y  
is  h is  b e l ie f  th a t h e  h a s  a n  e x p e r ie n c e  w ith  th o s e  fe a tu re s  ju s tif ie d  b y  th e  a c t  o f  d ire c t 
a c q u a in ta n c e ?  B o n jo u r  re g a rd s  th is  d ile m m a  as  th e  fu n d a m e n ta l o b je c tio n  to  
fo u n d a tio n a lism . I t  is  th ro u g h  a n a ly s is  o f  w h a t B o n jo u r  re fe rs  to  as  ‘c o n sc io u s  
e x p e r ie n c e ’26 th a t  th e  s o lu tio n  to  th e  fo u n d a tio n a l d ile m m a  is  to  b e  fo u n d . I  w il l  n o w  
p ro c e e d  to  in v e s tig a te  B o n jo u r ’s c la im s  to  d e te rm in e  h o w  e ffe c tiv e  th e y  are .
The conscious experience of foundational beliefs
A  m e ta b e l ie f  is a  b e l ie f  a b o u t a  b e l ie f  o r  th o u g h t. A s  w e  s a w  e a r lie r , L e h re r  ra is e d  th e  
p o s s ib il i ty  o f  d o u b tin g  th e  re l ia b il i ty  o f  m e ta b e lie fs . H o w  c a n  I ju s t i fy  th e  b e l ie f  th a t  it 
se e m s  to  m e  th a t I  a m  se e in g  so m e th in g , w ith o u t b e in g  a b le  to  te l l  th e  d iffe re n c e  
b e tw e e n  se e m in g  to  see  so m e th in g  a n d  w o n d e rin g  w h e th e r  I a m  see in g  so m e th in g ?  A s I 
n o te d  in  c h a p te r  th re e : W illia m s  a lso  e x p re sse s  th e  sam e  c o n c e rn  th a t ‘se e m in g  to  s e e ’ 
c a n n o t b e  d is tin g u is h e d  f ro m  th e  tru e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  p e rc e iv in g  a n  o b je c t as  it re a lly  is. 
B o n jo u r  fe e ls  th a t  th e  a n sw e r  to  th is  p ro b le m  lie s  in  a p p e a lin g  to  th e  ‘c o n sc io u s  
e x p e r ie n c e ’27 in v o lv e d  in  h a v in g  th e  b e l ie f  th a t  it see m s to  m e  th a t  I a m  see in g
26 See Bonjour, op.cit., p .24. Bonjour does recognise that h is theory h inges on a v iew  o f  consciousness as 
an intrinsic property o f  a m ental state. The alternative v iew , proposed by D avid  R osenthal is that one 
m ental state becom es conscious on ly  by being the object o f  a second mental state; a higher-order thought 
that one is in the first m ental state. B ut 1 agree with Bonjour that this leads to a very unlikely infinite  
hierarchy o f  higher-order thoughts. See pp .26-28 o f  B onjour’s paper for m ore details on this debate.
27 Ibid., P .24.
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so m e th in g . T h e re  a re  tw o  in tr in s ic  a n d  e s s e n tia l a sp e c ts  o f  h a v in g  th e  b e l ie f  th a t it 
s ee m s  to  m e  th a t  I see  so m e th in g , o n e  a s p e c t  is th e  p ro p o s itio n a l c o n te n t th a t  it seem s to  
m e  th a t  I a m  se e in g  s o m e th in g , an d  th e  se c o n d  a sp e c t  is th e  fe a tu re  o f  m y  h o ld in g  th a t 
b e lie f. T h e  c ru c ia l p o in t  is th a t  th e se  a re  tw o  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  o n e  a w a re n e ss . T h e re  is 
n o th in g  re f le c tiv e : th e re  is  n o  se c o n d  o rd e r  m e n ta l a c t w ith  th e  p ro p o s itio n a l c o n te n t 
th a t  I  h a v e  th e  b e l ie f  in  q u e s tio n . T h e y  a re  c o m p o n e n ts  o f  th e  f ir s t  le v e l s ta te  o f  th e  
b e l ie f  itse lf. T h e y  b o th  c o n tr ib u te  to  m a k e  th e  b e l ie f  w h a t it is, ra th e r  th a n  so m e  o th e r  
b e l ie f  o r  a  d if fe re n t so rt o f  c o n sc io u s  s ta te  a lto g e th e r .
O n  th is  a c c o u n t, th e  m o s t fu n d a m e n ta l e x p e r ie n c e  in v o lv e d  in  b e lie v in g  th a t  I  se e m  to  
see  so m e th in g  is  n o t  a  re f le c tiv e  a w a re n e ss , n o r  is  it a  p u re ly  n o n -c o g n itiv e  a w a re n e ss  
th a t  w o u ld  n o t re f le c t th e  sp e c if ic  n a tu re  o f  th e  b e l ie f  a n d  its  c o n ten t. T h e  ‘b u il t- in ’ 
a w a re n e ss  o f  c o n te n t d o e s  n o t  re q u ire  ju s tif ic a tio n . I n  fa c t th e  a w are n e ss  o f  c o n te n t is 
in fa llib le . W e c a n n o t b e  m is ta k e n  in  th e  a w a re n e ss  o f  c o n te n t, as  B o n jo u r  s ta tes :
‘th e re  is no  in d e p e n d e n t fac t o r  s itu a tio n  fo r  it to  b e  m is ta k e n  a b o u t .’
B o n jo u r  v ie w s  th e  m e ta b e l ie f  a s  a  d e sc r ip tio n  o f  th e  c o n te n t in v o lv e d  in  th e  a w a re n e ss  
o f  c o n te n t. B y  c o n sc io u s ly  h a v in g  th a t  b u il t- in  a w a re n e ss , I a m  in  a  p o s it io n  to  ju d g e  
w h e th e r  o r  n o t  th e  d e s c r ip tio n  is  c o rre c t. T h e  e p is te m ic  s ta tu s  o f  su c h  a  m e ta b e l ie f  is 
th a t it c a n  b e  ju s t i f ie d  in  th e  sen se  th a t  th e re  is  a n  in te rn a lly  a c c e ss ib le  re a so n  fo r 
th in k in g  th a t  it is tru e , b u t  th e  re a so n  c a n  a v o id  a n y  a p p e a l to  fu r th e r  b e lie fs  th a t  w o u ld  
th e m s e lv e s  be  in  n e e d  o f  ju s tif ic a tio n . In d e e d , I  w ill  a rg u e  la te r  th a t  D e s c a r te s ’s c la r ity  
a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  c a n  g o  a  lo n g  w a y  to w a rd s  p ro v id in g  a  c o m p e llin g  c ase  fo r 
th in k in g  th a t  a  b e l ie f  is tru e .
28 See Bonjour, op.cit., p.25.
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A  v ita l p o in t  th a t  B o n jo u r  m a k e s  is  th a t  th e  m e ta b e l ie f  is  n o t  i ts e lf  in fa llib le . I t  w o u ld  be
p o ss ib le  to  h a v e  a  b e l ie f  a b o u t a  b e l ie f  th a t  d o e s  n o t a c c u ra te ly  re f le c t  th e  c o n te n t
c o n ta in e d  in  th e  b u il t- in  a w a re n e ss  o f  th e  o r ig in a l  b e lie f . T h e  p o s s ib il i ty  fo r  e r ro r  in
b e lie fs  a b o u t b e lie fs  is s ti l l  a  v e ry  re a l th re a t. A s  B o n jo u r  sta tes:
‘S u c h  a  m is ta k e  m ig h t b e  a  c a s e  o f  m e re  in a tte n tio n , o r  it m ig h t re su lt f ro m  th e  
c o m p le x ity  o r  o b sc u r ity  o f  th e  b e l ie f  c o n te n t i t s e l f  o r  f ro m  so m e  fu rth e r 
p ro b le m .’ 9
B o n jo u r ’s v ie w  th a t  e m p ir ic a l e x p e r ie n c e  h a s  th e  tw o  a sp e c ts  o f  in fa llib le , b u ilt- in
a w a re n e ss  th a t  th e n  le ad s  to  a  ju d g m e n t o f  th e  c o rre c tn e s s  o f  a n y  d e sc r ip tio n  o f  th a t
e x p e r ie n c e , se e m s  to  re in fo rc e  D e s c a r te s ’s re fe re n c e  to  th e  ‘h a ts  a n d  c o a ts ’ e x am p le  in
th e  Second Meditation'.
‘B u t th e n  i f  I lo o k  o u t o f  th e  w in d o w  a n d  see  m e n  c ro s s in g  th e  sq u a re , a s  I ju s t  
h a p p e n  to  h a v e  d o n e , I n o rm a lly  s a y  th a t  I see  th e  m e n  th e m s e lv e s , ju s t  as  I say  
th a t  I see  th e  w a x . Y e t do  I see  a n y  m o re  th a n  h a ts  a n d  c o a ts  w h ic h  co u ld  
c o n c e a l a u to m a to n s?  I judge  th a t  th e y  a re  m e n . A n d  so  so m e th in g  w h ic h  I 
th o u g h t  I w a s  s e e in g  w ith  m y  e y e s  is in  fa c t g ra sp e d  so le ly  b y  th e  fa c u lty  o f  
ju d g e m e n t w h ic h  is  in  m y  m in d .’ 0
G iv e n  th a t  o u r  sen so ry  e x p e r ie n c e  m a y  h a v e  a  b u ilt- in  a w a re n e ss  a n d  a  ju d g m e n ta l
a sp e c t to  th a t  sam e  a w a re n e ss , th e  n e x t is su e  to  a d d re ss  is  to  o ffe r  a n  e x p la n a tio n  o f  th e
re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  c o n te n t o f  o u r  e x p e r ie n c e s  a n d  th e  b e lie fs  th a t  w e  m ay  h o ld
c o n c e rn in g  th a t  c o n te n t.
The relationship between the content of experience and belief
A  k e y  o b je c t io n  to  B o n jo u r ’s v ie w  re v o lv e s  a ro u n d  th e  id e a  th a t  th e  c o n te n t o f  a
p e rc e p tu a l  e x p e r ie n c e  is  n o n -p ro p o s itio n a l o r  n o n -c o n c e p tu a l in  c h a ra c te r . I t  is th e n  
a rg u e d  th a t  a n  a w a re n e s s  o f  th a t  c o n te n t c a n n o t h av e  a n y  ju s t i f ic a to ry  s ta tu s  to  a  b e l ie f  
th a t  is fo rm u la te d  in  c o n c e p tu a l o r  p ro p o s itio n a l te rm s . T h e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e
c o n te n t a n d  th e  b e l ie f  is m e re ly  cau sa l. A s  D a v id so n  s ta tes :
29 See Bonjour, op .cit., p .25.
30 Second M editation: A T  V I 1 32: C S M I I 21 .
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‘T h e  re la t io n  b e tw e e n  a  s e n sa tio n  a n d  a  b e l ie f  c a n n o t b e  lo g ica l, s in ce  se n sa tio n s  
a re  n o t  b e lie fs , o r  o th e r  p ro p o s itio n a l a ttitu d e s . W h a t th e n  is th e  re la t io n ?  T h e  
a n sw e r  is, I  th in k , o b v io u s : th e  re la t io n  is c au sa l. S e n sa tio n s  c a u s e  so m e  b e lie fs  
an d  in  th is  sen se  a re  th e  b a s is  o r  g ro u n d  o f  th o s e  b e lie fs . B u t a  c a u sa l 
e x p la n a tio n  o f  a  b e l ie f  d o e s  n o t  sh o w  h o w  o r  w h y  th e  b e l ie f  is ju s t i f ie d .’31
T h e  im p lic a tio n  fo r  th e  b u ilt- in  a w a re n e s s  o f  s e n s o ry  c o n ten t, o n  D a v id s o n ’s v iew ,
w o u ld  be th a t  e v e n  i f  it w e re  tru e , it w o u ld  n o t p la y  a n y  p a r t  in  ju s t i f ic a t io n  an d
th e re fo re  w o u ld  h a v e  n o  re a l  e p is te m o lo g ic a l s ig n if ic a n ce .
B o n jo u r  a g re e s  w ith  th e  p re m ise  in  th e  o b je c t io n  th a t  s e n so ry  e x p e r ie n c e  is  e s se n tia l ly  
n o n -c o n c e p tu a l in  c h a ra c te r . T h e  v isu a l e x p e r ie n c e s  w e  h a v e  se e m  to  b e  fa r to o  d e ta iled  
to  c a p tu re  th e m  a d e q u a te ly  in  a n y  c o n c e p tu a l  o r  p ro p o s itio n a l fo rm u la tio n . T h e  e x a m p le  
th a t B o n jo u r  o ffe rs  is  th e  sc e n a rio  th a t  e v e n  i f  w e  im a g in e  a n  id e a lly  c o m p le te  
c o n c e p tu a l d e sc r ip tio n , v e ry  sp e c if ic  s h a d e s  o f  c o lo u r  fo r  e x am p le , it is n o t  th e  sam e  
th in g  as  a c tu a lly  e x p e r ie n c in g  th e  p a tte rn  o f  c o lo u rs  itse lf. I th in k  th a t  th is  a c c o u n t has  
a n  in tu itiv e  a p p e a l. I t  is  c o m m o n  fo r  p e o p le  to  d e sc r ib e  e x p e r ie n c e s  th a t  th e y  h av e  h ad , 
b u t th e re  is re c o g n itio n  th a t  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  i t s e l f  is r ic h e r  th a n  a n y  d e sc r ip tio n  o f  it. 
A lth o u g h , th e  fa c t th a t  th e  sp ec ific  c o n te n t o f  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  is i t s e l f  n o n -p ro p o s itio n a l 
an d  n o n -c o n c e p tu a l, d o e s  n o t m e a n  th a t it c a n n o t be  d e sc r ib e d  w ith  v a r io u s  d e g re e s  o f  
de ta il a n d  p re c is io n .
I t  is p o s s ib le  th a t  th e  re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  th e  n o n -c o n c e p tu a l c o n te n t an d  a  c o n c e p tu a l 
d e sc r ip tio n  m a y  n o t b e  a  lo g ic a l re la tio n s h ip , b u t it is n o t m e re ly  c a u s a l e ith e r , as  
D a v id so n  a rg u e s . I t  c o u ld  b e  w h a t B o n jo u r  ca lls  a  ‘d e sc r ip tiv e  r e la t io n ’ .32 T h e  n a tu re  o f  
th e  e x p e r ie n tia l c o n te n t c a n  fo rm  th e  b a s is  fo r  th in k in g  th a t  th e  d e sc r ip tio n  is tru e  o r  
c o rre c t, o r, u n tru e  a n d  in c o rre c t. W h e n  I h a v e  a  c o n sc io u s  s ta te  o f  s e n s o ry  e x p e rie n c e , I
31 Bonjour quotes D avidson on p.29 o fh is  ‘Toward a D efense o f  Em pirical Foundationalism'.
32 Ibid., p.30.
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a m  a w a re  o f  th e  sp e c if ic  s e n so ry  c o n te n t o f  th a t s ta te  s im p ly  b y  v ir tu e  o f  h a v in g  th a t 
e x p e r ie n c e . I f  I h a v e  a  sec o n d -le v e l, m e ta b e l ie f  th a t a tte m p ts  to  d e sc rib e  th a t 
e x p e r ie n c e , an d  i f  I  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  d e sc r ip tiv e  c o n te n t o f  th a t b e lie f, I s e e m  to  b e  in a n  
id e a l p o s it io n  to  ju d g e  w h e th e r  th e  c o n c e p tu a l d e sc r ip tio n  is a c c u ra te , a n d  to  be  ju s tif ie d  
in  h o ld in g  th e  b e lie f. V ie w e d  in  th is  w a y , B o n jo u r  o b se rv e s  th a t p e rh a p s  ‘th e  g iv e n , is, 
a f te r  a ll, n o t  a  m y th ! ’33 I t  seem s th a t  a  p o te n tia l  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  e m p ir ic a l ju s t if ic a tio n  
e x is ts , c o n s is tin g  o f  b e lie fs  a b o u t th e  c o n te n t o f  s e n s o ry  e x p e rien c e .
P ro p o s in g  a  d e sc r ip tiv e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  sen sa tio n s  a n d  b e lie fs  is  n o t w ith o u t its 
d if f ic u ltie s . T h e re  is  a  p o te n tia l d if f ic u l ty  in  su g g e s tin g  th a t  ju s t i f ic a t io n  re lie s  in  so m e 
w a y  o n  th e  d e sc r ip tiv e  c a p a c ity  th a t  p e o p le  h a v e  to  d e sc rib e  th e ir  e x p e r ie n c e s . T h e  
p ro b le m  se e m s  to  b e  th a t  a n y  d e sc r ip tio n  th a t  w e  p ro v id e  w ill  a lw a y s  fa ll sh o rt o f  a 
c o m p le te , id e a l d e sc r ip tio n . I f  th is  is  th e  c a se , th e n  do  w e  h a v e  th e  c a p a b ility  to  p ro v id e  
a d e q u a te  d e sc r ip tio n s?  E v e n  i f  w e  ta k e  th e  c a se  o f  a r tis ts  o r  w in e - ta s te rs 34, o r  any o n e  
e lse  w h o  h as  a  h ig h ly  d e v e lo p e d  se n s o ry  a w a re n e ss , it is s till d o u b tfu l th a t su ch  a  
p e rso n  c o u ld  p ro v id e  a  d e sc r ip tio n  d e ta ile d  e n o u g h  to  c a p tu re  all o r  e v e n  m o s t o f  th e  
c o n te n t o f  p h y s ic a l  w o r ld  e x p e r ie n c e s . E v e n  a llo w in g  fo r  a  m o m e n t th a t  w e  d id  p o sse ss  
th e  n e c e s sa ry  c o g n itiv e  a b ili t ie s  fo r  fu ll d e sc r ip tio n s , th e  tim e  a n d  e f fo r t  re q u ire d  to  
fo rm u la te  d e sc r ip tio n s  th a t  a re  ju s t i f ie d  w o u ld  n o t b e  p ra c tic a l. C o m m o n  sen se  seem s to  
in d ic a te  th a t  p e o p le  d o  n o t g o  a ro u n d  ju s tify in g  e v e ry  e x p e r ie n c e  b y  e x h a u s tiv e ly  
d e sc r ib in g  it e i th e r  in te rn a lly , to  th e m s e lv e s , o r  e x te rn a lly  to  o th e r  p e o p le  th ro u g h  
lan g u ag e .
33 See B onjour, op.cit., p .31.
34 Ibid., p .32.
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B o n jo u r ’s su g g e s tio n  is  th a t  w e  ‘c o n c e p tu a lly  g ra s p ’35 th e  c o n te n t o f  s e n s o ry  e x p e rien c e  
in  te rm s  o f  th e  p h y s ic a l o b je c ts  an d  s itu a tio n s , th a t  w e  w o u ld  b e  in c lin e d , o n  th e  b asis  o f  
e x p e r ie n c e , o th e r  th in g s  b e in g  e q u a l, to  th in k w e  a re  p e rc e iv in g . T a k e  th e  ex am p le  o f  
so m e o n e  w h o  h as  a  v isu a l b e l ie f  a b o u t a  p h y s ic a l o b jec t. T h e  g ra sp  o f  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  
th is  e x p e r ie n c e  is th a t  th e re  is a w a re n e ss  th a t  th e  p e rc e p tu a l c la im  is a  re s u lt  o f  v is io n , 
th e  p e r s o n  sees  th e  o b je c t an d  th is  v is u a l e x p e r ie n c e  is su c h  to  m a k e  it lo o k  as th o u g h  an  
o b je c t  is p re s e n t.
I t  is in te re s tin g  th a t  B o n jo u r ’s s u g g e s tio n  o f  g ra sp in g  th e  c o n te n t o f  s e n so ry  e x p e rien c e
se e m s  to  ech o  D e sc a r te s ’s v ie w  th a t  w e  c a n  k n o w  so m e th in g  w ith o u t fully  g ra sp in g  it:
‘T o  g ra sp  so m e th in g  is  to  e m b ra c e  it in  o n e ’s th o u g h t; to  k n o w  so m eth in g  it 
su ff ic e s  to  to u c h  it, ju s t  a s  w e  c a n  to u c h  a  m o u n ta in  b u t n o t p u t o u r  a rm s  a ro u n d  
i t . ’36
E v e n  i f  o n e  a c c e p ts  th e  v ie w  th a t  th e re  is a  d e sc r ip tiv e  r e la t io n  b e tw e e n  th e  c o n te n t o f  
e x p e r ie n c e  a n d  th e  b e lie fs  w e  h o ld  c o n c e rn in g  th a t  c o n te n t, a  k e y  q u e s tio n  s till re m a in s : 
d o  w e  h a v e  a n y  w a y  o f  ju s t i f ia b ly  d is tin g u is h in g  a p p e a ra n c e  fro m  re a lity . I t  is to  th is  
is su e  th a t  I w ill  n o w  tu rn .
Appearance versus Reality
B o n jo u r  p o s e s  th e  q u e s tio n : h o w  d o e s  th e  a p p e a ra n c e  o f  a  c e r ta in  s o r t o f  p h y s ic a l o b je c t 
o r  s itu a tio n  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  c la im  th a t  su c h  a  p h y s ic a l o b je c t is 
a c tu a lly  p re s e n t a n d  b e in g  p e rc e iv e d ?
T h e  b a s is  fo r th e  in fe re n c e  f ro m  s e n s o ry  e x p e r ie n c e  to  p h y s ic a l re a lity  m a y  be  fo u n d  in  
th e  fu n d a m e n ta l  fa c ts  a b o u t su c h  s e n s o ry  e x p e rien c e . T h e re  is th e  sp o n ta n e o u s  c h a ra c te r  
o f  a p p e a ra n c e s  a n d  th e  fa c t th a t  th e y  fit to g e th e r  an d  re in fo rc e  e a c h  o th e r  in  a  c o h e re n t
35 See B onjour’s ‘Toward a D efen se  o fE m p irica l Foundationalism 1, (2001 ), p.33.
36 Letter to M ersenne o f  27  M ay 1630: A T  1 152.
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fa sh io n , p re se n tin g  in  B o n jo u r ’s te rm s : ‘a  re la tiv e ly  s e a m le s s  a n d  c o m p lic a te d  p ic tu re  
o f  a n  o n g o in g  w o r ld .’37
I t  is th e  fu n d a m e n ta l fa c ts  a b o u t s e n so ry  e x p e r ie n c e  th a t  D e sc a r te s  see m s to  h av e  b e e n
a w a re  o f  in  th e  d re a m  p a s s a g e  in  th e  Sixth Meditation:
T h i s  a p p lie s  e sp e c ia l ly  to  th e  p r in c ip a l r e a s o n  fo r  d o u b t, n a m e ly  m y  in a b ility  to  
d is tin g u ish  b e tw e e n  b e in g  a s le e p  a n d  b e in g  a w a k e . F o r  I n o w  n o tic e  th a t  th e re  is 
a  v a s t  d if fe re n c e  b e tw e e n  th e  tw o , in  th a t  d re a m s  a re  n e v e r  lin k e d  b y  m e m o ry
T O
w ith  a ll th e  o th e r  a c tio n s  o f  life  as  w a k in g  e x p e r ie n c e s  a re .’
I t  is  th e  sam e  ‘r e la tiv e ly  s e a m le s s ’ fe a tu re  o f  o u r  w a k in g  e x p e r ie n c e  th a t  le ad s  
D e sc a r te s  to  fa v o u r  o u r  w a k in g  e x p e r ie n c e  o v e r  o u r  d re a m  e x p erien c e . B o n jo u r  a lso  
m e n tio n s  th e  c o h e re n t n a tu re  o f  e x p e r ie n c e  w h e re  th in g s  fit to g e th e r  a n d  re in fo rc e  e a c h  
o th e r . I  th in k  th e re  is  a  re m a rk a b le  s im ila r ity  b e tw e e n  th is  a sp e c t o f  B o n jo u r ’s a c c o u n t 
a n d  D e s c a r te s ’s a c c o u n t re fe r r in g  to  p e rc e p tio n s  in  th e  c lo s in g  lin es  o f  th e  Sixth 
Meditation-.
‘A n d  I o u g h t n o t to  h a v e  e v e n  th e  s lig h te s t d o u b t o f  th e ir  re a lity  if, a f te r  c a llin g  
u p o n  a ll th e  se n se s  a s  w e ll as  m y  m e m o ry  a n d  m y  in te lle c t in  o rd e r  to  c h ec k
•  -2Q
th e m , I  re c e iv e  n o  c o n flic tin g  re p o rts  f ro m  a n y  o f  th e se  s o u rc e s .’
A p a r t  f ro m  th e  r e la t iv e ly  se a m le ss  a sp e c t o f  p h y s ic a l  re a li ty  an d  th e  re in fo rc in g  
e x p e r ie n c e s  w e  h a v e  o f  th a t  re a lity , D e sc a r te s  se e m s  to  u se  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  
ru le  as  a n  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  to  a d d  ju s tif ic a to ry  w e ig h t to  b e lie fs . T h is  is a n  is su e  th a t  I 
w ill  re tu rn  to  in  a  la te r  sec tio n .
Summary
S o  fa r  in  th is  c h a p te r  I h a v e  e x a m in e d  th e  n a tu re  a n d  s ta tu s  o f  fo u n d a tio n a l b e lie fs . T h is  
th e m e  h a s  o c c u p ie d  a  re la t iv e ly  la rg e  s e c tio n  o f  th is  c h a p te r . I th in k  th is  re f le c ts  th e  fac t 
th a t  m o s t o f  th e  d e b a te  c o n c e rn in g  fo u n d a tio n a lism  is  fo c u se d  o n  th e  c la im  th a t  th e re
37 See Bonjour, op.cit., p .36.
38 Sixth M editation: A T  V I 1 89: C SM  II 61.
39 Sixth M editation: A T  V I 1 90: C SM  I I 62.
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c a n  be  e p is te m o lo g ic a l fo u n d a tio n s . A  s u m m a ry  o f  so m e  o f  th e  k e y  p o in ts  m a y  b e  
h e lp fu l a t  th is  s tag e . T h e  C o g ito  is  th e  f irs t c e r ta in ty  in  D e s c a r te s ’s e p is te m o lo g ic a l 
a c c o u n t. P a r t o f  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  C o g ito  is th a t  it is c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  
p e rc e iv e d . T h is  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  m a y  be  a b le  to  a ss is t in  th e  ju s tif ic a tio n  o f  o th e r  
b e lie fs , a  c la im  th a t  I  w ill be  re tu rn in g  to  la te r. I t  see m s th a t o n  a n y  a c c o u n t, 
in fo rm a tio n  is n e e d e d  to  ju s t i fy  b e lie fs , b u t th is  in fo rm a tio n  m a y  b e  so m e h o w  in tr in s ic  
to  th e  b e l ie f  in  q u e s tio n . T h e  d e m o n s tra t io n  o f  how ju s t i f ic a t io n  m a y  b e  in tr in s ic  le d  to  
B o n jo u r ’s a c c o u n t o f  c o n sc io u s  e x p e r ie n c e  w ith  a  d e sc r ip tiv e  re la tio n sh ip  b e tw e e n  th e  
c o n te n t o f  a  b e l ie f  a n d  th e  b e l ie f  itse lf. F in a lly , it w a s  s u g g e s te d  th a t  th e  se a m le ss  an d  
c o h e re n t e x p e r ie n c e  th a t  se e m s  to  c h a ra c te r is e  p h y s ic a l  re a lity  a lo n g  w ith  th e  c la r ity  a n d  
d is tin c tn e s s  o f  s u c h  e x p e r ie n c e  m a y  b e  w h a t fa c ili ta te s  o u r  d is tin c tio n  b e tw e e n  
a p p e a ra n c e  a n d  re a lity . T h e  n e x t ta s k  is  to  lo o k  a t th e  is su e  o f  h o w  ju s tif ic a tio n  m a y  b e  
tra n s fe rre d  fro m  b a s ic  to  n o n -b a s ic  b e lie fs .
The Transfer of Justification
G iv e n  th a t  it se e m s  re a so n a b le  to  h o ld  th a t  b e lie fs  a b o u t sen sa tio n s  m a y  q u a lify  as
b a s ic , h o w  d o  w e  b u ild  u p o n  th e se  fo u n d a tio n s?  B y  w h a t p ro c e ss  o r  m e c h a n ism  do
b a s ic  b e lie fs  ju s t i fy  n o n -b a s ic  b e lie fs?  O n  th e  s tro n g , c la s s ic a l fo u n d a tio n a lis t  a c c o u n t
d e d u c tio n  is  th e  o n ly  m e th o d  o f  b u ild in g  k n o w le d g e  f ro m  th e  fo u n d a tio n s . A s  I
id e n tif ie d  in  c h a p te r  th r e e 40: it  is h a rd  to  see  h o w  k n o w le d g e  o u ts id e  o f  m a th e m a tic a l o r
lo g ic a l a re n a s  c o u ld  b e  c o n s tru c te d  u s in g  d e d u c tio n . I a lso  n o te d  th a t C o m m a n  a tta c k s
w h a t he  re g a rd s  as  C a r te s ia n  fo u n d a tio n a lis m  in  th e  fo llo w in g  w ay :
‘T h e  fa ilu re  o f  th e  th e s is  th a t b a s ic  re p o r ts  e n ta il n o n -b a s ic  s ta te m e n ts  sh o w s 
w h y  w h a t I h a v e  c a lle d  th e  C a r te s ia n  sp ec ie s  o f  tra d it io n a l fo u n d a tio n a lism  lead s  
to  s c e p t ic i s m . . .o f  e m p ir ic a l  sen te n c e s , o n ly  b a s ic  re p o r ts  a re  in itia lly  c e rta in , 
a n d  th a t th e  e x te n s io n  o f  k n o w le d g e  b e y o n d  th e  fo u n d a tio n  is  b y  d e d u c tiv e  
in fe re n c e  a lo n e . T h is  la s t re q u ire m e n t is m a d e  in  o rd e r  to  g u a ra n te e  in fe re n tia l 
c e r ta in ty  o f  w h a t  is k n o w n . T h u s , o n  th e  C a r te s ia n  v ie w , e a c h  o f  u s  m u s t b e g in
40 See chapter three, p.78.
101
o n ly  w ith  h is  o w n  b a s ic  re p o r ts  an d  ‘c o n c e p tu a l’ tru th s  as in itia l p re m ise s  a n d  
try  to  e x te n d  h is  k n o w le d g e  b y  d e d u c tiv e  d e r iv a tio n .’41
T h e  a s s u m p tio n  th a t C o rn m a n  is m a k in g  is  th a t D e sc a r te s  re lie s  e x c lu s iv e ly  o n
d e d u c tiv e  in fe re n c e . A s  I s u g g e s te d  in  c h a p te r  tw o , th e re  is e v id e n c e  in  th e  Meditations
a n d  e lse w h e re  in  D e s c a r te s ’s w o rk  th a t  o th e r  m e th o d s  o f  ju s t i f ic a t io n  a re  u sed . T h e
d re a m  p a s s a g e  in  th e  Sixth Meditation c a n  be  v ie w e d  a s  a  h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tiv e
a rg u m e n t. T h e  g e n e ra l fo rm  o f  th e  h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tiv e  a rg u m e n t is id e n tif ie d  b y
C o rn m a n 42 as:
(1 ) B a s ic  re p o rts , b i, b 2 , . . .b „  a re  to  b e  e x p la in ed  fo r  s a t t.
(2 ) H y p o th e s is , T , e x p la in s  b i ,  b 2 , . . . b n b e tte r  a t t  th a n  any  h y p o th e s is  th a t 
c o n f lic ts  w ith  T .
T h e re fo re
(3 )  I t  is p ro b a b le , fo r  s a t t, th a t T  is tru e .
C o rn m a n  in d ic a te s  th a t  fo r  a  h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tiv e  s ty le  a rg u m e n t to  su cc e ed  in  th e  
t ra n s fe r  o f  ju s tif ic a tio n  f ro m  b a s ic  to  n o n -b a s ic  b e lie fs , th e  b e s t h y p o th e s is  n e e d s  to  be 
a n a ly tic a l in  n a tu re . I f  th e re  is a n  a p p e a l to  e v id en c e , th is  e v id e n c e  w o u ld  th e n  h a v e  to  
be  ju s t i f ie d  s ta r tin g  a  sp ira l o f  ju s t i f ic a to ry  c la im s.
A t th is  s ta g e  a n  im p o r ta n t q u e s tio n  a rises : is D e s c a r te s ’s u se  o f  th e  h y p o th e tic o -  
d e d u c tiv e  a rg u m e n t in  th e  d re a m  p a s s a g e  a n a ly tic a l in  n a tu re ?  I th in k  th a t it is. 
D e sc a r te s ’s a p p e a l to  th e  re a li ty  o f  o u r  w a k in g  e x p e r ie n c e  o v e r  th e  d re a m  h y p o th e s is  is 
b a se d  o n  e x a m in in g  th e  in tr in s ic  fe a tu re s  o f  d re a m s  w ith  th e  in tr in s ic  fe a tu re s  o f  o u r  
w a k in g  e x p e rie n c e . I t  is s ig n if ic a n t th a t in  th e  d re a m  p a ss a g e  D e sc a r te s  re fe rs  to  
‘d is t in c t ly ’ see in g  w h e re  th in g s  h a v e  c o m e  fro m  an d  w h e re  th e y  g o  to  w h ile  a w ak e ,
41 Cornman, James, W ., S k e p t i c i s m ,  J u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  a n d  E x p l a n a t i o n ,  D . R eidel Publishing Com pany, 1980, 
p .83.
42 Ibid., pp.89-90.
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c o m p a re d  to  th e  s u d d e n  a p p e a ra n c e  a n d  d is a p p e a ra n c e  o f  th in g s  in  d re a m s. T h e re  see m s 
to  be  a n  im p lic it a p p e a l to  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  p rin c ip le  to  ju s t i fy  p e rc e p tu a l 
c la im s. I t is im p o r ta n t to  s tre ss  th a t  D e sc a r te s  d o e s  n o t  e x p lic itly  re fe r  to  h y p o th e tic o -  
d e d u c tio n  a s  a  m e a n s  o f  tra n s fe rr in g  ju s tif ic a tio n , I a m  o n ly  su g g e s tin g  th a t th e  seed s  
a re  th e re  w ith in  th e  Meditations an d  th a t  i f  th e  Meditations a re  re a d  in  th is  w a y  th e n  
D e sc a r te s ’s e p is te m o lo g y  m a y  be  in  a  b e tte r  p o s it io n  to  re sp o n d  to  sce p tic a l a tta ck s . I f  
h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tio n  is  c o m b in e d  w ith  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  
th e n  re lia b ility  is  a d d e d  to  in fe re n c es . I w ill n o w  e x a m in e  in  m o re  d e ta il th e  u se  o f  
e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le s .
Epistemic Principles
O n e  o f  th e  fu n c tio n s  o f  an  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  is to  p ro v id e  ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  b asic  
b e lie fs . T h e  fo rm  th a t a n  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  c o u ld  ta k e  is: w h e n e v e r a  b e l ie f  is fo rm ed  
in  m a n n e r  X , it is  a  ju s t i f ie d  b e lie f. I f  a n  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  is  to  b e  u se d  fo r  a lle g ed ly  
b a s ic  b e lie fs , it w ill h a v e  to  b e  a n  in te rn a l o r  in tr in s ic  fe a tu re  o f  th e  b e l ie f  itse lf , b e ca u se  
i f  th e re  is an  a p p e a l to  a n y  e x te rn a l fa c to rs  o r  b e lie fs , th o s e  fa c to rs  th e m s e lv e s  w ill th e n  
re q u ire  ju s tif ic a tio n .
T h e re  a re  tw o  re q u ire m e n ts  th a t a n y  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  m u s t sa tisfy : (1 ) th e  e p is tem ic  
p r in c ip le  c a n n o t b e  a rb itra r i ly  c h o se n , a n d  (2 ) th e  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  m u s t sh o w  w h y  
th e  b a s ic  b e l ie f  is  ju s t i f ie d  w ith o u t any  in fe re n tia l su p p o rt. In  th e  Meditations D e sc a r te s  
se e m s  to  u se  th e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  a s  a n  e p is te m ic  p rin c ip le . I  w ill n o w  a sse ss  
D e s c a r te s ’s u se  o f  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  it c a n  w ith s ta n d  
th e  k in d s  o f  c ritic a l a t ta c k  th a t  a re  o f te n  d ire c te d  a t e p is te m ic  p rin c ip le s .
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The Clarity and Distinctness Rule as an Epistemic Principle
I t  is  in  th e  Third Meditation th a t  D e sc a r te s  f ir s t  fo rm u la te s  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn ess
ru le  fo r  e s ta b lish in g  tru th . T h e  c la r ity  an d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  is s ta te d  a s  fo llo w s:
‘S o  I n o w  s e e m  to  b e  a b le  to  la y  it d o w n  a s  a  g e n e ra l  ru le  th a t w h a te v e r  I p e rc e iv e  v e ry  
c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  is t r u e .’43
T h e  ta s k  is n o w  to  see  h o w  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le , as  a n  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le , 
can  w ith s ta n d  th e  o b je c tio n s  th a t  a re  le v e lle d  a g a in s t su c h  p r in c ip le s . O n e  o f  th e  k e y  
c r it ic ism s  o f  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le s  is th a t  th e y  s e e m  to  b e  a rb itra r i ly  c h o se n . A t first 
g la n ce , it m a y  a p p e a r  th a t  th e re  is  n o th in g  sp e c ia l a b o u t D e sc a r te s  c h o o s in g  c la r ity  and  
d is tin c tn e s s  a s  a  y a rd s tic k  a g a in s t w h ic h  to  m e a s u re  th e  tru th  o f  p e rc e p tio n . B u t I th in k  
th e re  is  s o m e th in g  sp e c ia l in  D e s c a r te s ’s c h o ic e  o f  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s . T h e  sp ec ia l 
c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  is  d u e  to  its  so u rce .
T h e  so u rc e  o f  th e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is t in c tn e s s  ru le  is in  th e  C o g ito . T h e  k e y  fe a tu re  o f  th e  
C o g ito  is  th a t  it is c le a r ly  a n d  d is t in c tly  p e rc e iv e d . A s  D e sc a r te s  n o te s  in  th e  Third 
Meditation:
‘I  a m  c e r ta in  th a t  I a m  a  th in k in g  th in g . D o  I n o t th e re fo re  a lso  k n o w  w h a t is 
re q u ire d  fo r  m y  b e in g  c e r ta in  a b o u t a n y th in g ?  In  th is  f ir s t  ite m  o f  k n o w le d g e  
th e re  is s im p ly  a  c le a r  a n d  d is t in c t  p e rc e p tio n  o f  w h a t I a m  a ss e r tin g ; th is  w o u ld  
n o t b e  e n o u g h  to  m a k e  m e  c e r ta in  o f  th e  t r u th  o f  th e  m a tte r  i f  it c o u ld  e v e r  tu rn  
o u t  th a t  s o m e th in g  w h ic h  I p e rc e iv e d  w ith  su c h  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  w as  
fa lse . S o  I n o w  se e m  to  b e  a b le  to  la y  it d o w n  a s  a  g e n e ra l ru le  th a t  w h a te v e r  I 
p e rc e iv e  v e ry  c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  is  t r u e .’44
T h e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  lo c a tin g  th e  C o g ito  i t s e l f  a s  th e  so u rc e  o f  th e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is tin c tn e ss
ru le  c a n n o t b e  o v e rs ta te d . T h e  C o g ito  is  in c o rrig ib le , in d u b ita b le . C la r ity  an d
d is tin c tn e s s  is  a n  in tr in s ic , in te rn a l fe a tu re  o f  th e  C o g ito . So fa r  fro m  b e in g  a rb itra ry , th e
43 Third M editation: A T  V I 1 35: C SM  Ü  24.
44 Third M editation: A T  V l l  35: C S M I I 24.
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c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  see m s to  e n jo y  a  v e ry  sp ec ia l, u n iq u e , p r iv i le g e d  s ta tu s . T h e  
k e y  q u e s tio n  n o w  is: h o w  is th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  to  be  a p p lie d ?
The application of the clarity and distinctness rule
T h e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  p r in c ip le  c a n  b e  u s e d  a s  a  te m p la te  o r  b lu e p rin t a g a in s t 
w h ic h  w e  c a n  te s t  p e rc e p tu a l c la im s. P e rc e p tio n s  c an  b e  ju d g e d  o n  th e  b a s is  o f  w h e th e r  
th e y  p o s se s s  th e  s a m e  le v e l o f  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  a s  th e  C o g ito , w ith  a n  a ff irm a tiv e  
a n sw e r  to  th is  q u e s tio n  in d ic a tin g  th e  t r u th  o f  th e  b e l ie f  in  q u e s tio n . T h e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  
th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is t in c tn e s s  ru le  is n o t  in fa llib le . I t is a n  o b je c tiv e  m e th o d  a p p lie d  
su b je c tiv e ly . A s  I m e n tio n e d  e a r lie r  in  th is  c h a p te r , B o n jo u r  d e sc rib e s  sen so ry  
e x p e r ie n c e s  a s  c o n sc io u s  s ta tes . I a m  a w a re  o f  th e  sp ec ific  s e n so ry  c o n te n t o f  th a t  s ta te  
s im p ly  b y  h a v in g  th e  e x p e r ie n c e . I f  I  h a v e  a  sec o n d -le v e l, m e ta b e l ie f  th a t  a tte m p ts  to  
d e sc r ib e  th a t  e x p e r ie n c e , a n d  i f  I u n d e rs ta n d  th e  d e sc rip tiv e  c o n te n t o f  th a t  b e lie f, I 
se e m  to  b e  in  a n  id e a l p o s i t io n  to  ju d g e  w h e th e r  th e  c o n c e p tu a l d e sc r ip tio n  is acc u ra te . 
T h is  is p e rh a p s  w h e re  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is t in c tn e s s  p r in c ip le  c o m e s  in , fa c ilita tin g  o u r  
ju d g in g  o f  c o n c e p tu a l d e sc rip tio n s .
In  C h a p te r  th re e 45 I id e n tif ie d  th a t  th e  e p is te m ic  p rin c ip le s  a p p ro a c h  h as  b e e n  
c h a lle n g e d  b y  H e id e lb e rg e r  an d  C o rn m a n . A lth o u g h  C o rn m a n  d id  p ro v id e  a  n u m b e r  o f  
tra d it io n a l  s c e n a r io s  a g a in s t th e  su p p o rte rs  o f  th e  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le s  s tra te g y , th e  co re  
o f  h is  c h a lle n g e  se e m e d  in  th e  e n d  to  re s t  o n  th e  c la im  th a t a  p e rs o n  m ig h t se e k  to  avo id  
re le v a n t e v id e n c e  e v e n  in  c a se s  w h e re  th a t  e v id e n c e  w a s  re a d ily  a v a ila b le  to  h im .
I t  see m s to  m e  th a t th e  c u rio u s  p a r t o f  C o rn m a n ’s a rg u m e n t is th e  id e a  o f  so m eo n e  
a v o id in g  re le v a n t e v id e n c e  to  a rriv e  a t  a  p e rc e p tu a l c la im . H o w  c a n  so m e o n e  a v o id  
e v id e n c e  th a t m a k e s  it re a so n a b le  to  ju d g e  th a t  th e ir  p e rc e p tio n  m a y  be  m is ta k e n ?  In  
D e s c a r te s ’s sc h e m e  s u c h  a n  in fe re n c e  w o u ld  n o t b e  ju s tif ie d , b e c a u se  th e  o rig in a l
45 See chapter three, pp.70-2.
105
p e rc e p tio n  w a s  n o t  c le a r  a n d  d is tin c t. I f  m y  a n a ly s is  is  c o rre c t, th e n  c la r ity  an d  
d is tin c tn e s s  m a y  h a v e  a  ro le  in  ju s tif ic a tio n . T h e  q u e s tio n  th a t  n o w  a rises  is: i f  th e  
c la r ity  a n d  d is t in c tn e s s  ru le  is n o t a rb itra r i ly  c h o se n  a n d  it m a y  p la y  a  ro le  in  
ju s tif ic a tio n , c a n  it a s s is t  in  p ro v id in g  a  s o lu tio n  to  th e  in f in ite  re g re ss  a rg u m e n t?  I w ill  
n o w  a d d re ss  th is  q u e s tio n .
A Solution to the infinite regress argument?
A s  I id e n tif ie d  in  c h a p te r  th re e 46, it s ee m s  th a t  th e  s tro n g e r  fo rm  o f  fo u n d a tio n a lism  
w o u ld  h a v e  a  b e t te r  c h a n c e  o f  p ro v id in g  a  s o lu tio n  to  th e  re g re ss  p ro b le m . I f  o n e  c a n  
re a c h  a  p o in t w h e re  th e re  a re  b e lie fs  th a t  a re  ju s t i f ie d  w ith o u t a p p e a l to  fu r th e r  b e lie fs  o r  
e x te rn a l e v id e n c e , th e  re g re s s  c a n  b e  s to p p e d . T h e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  m a y  h a v e  
a  p a r t to  p la y  in  th e  te rm in a tio n  o f  re g re ss .
T h e  e a r ly  B o n jo u r , b e fo re  sw itc h in g  to  th e  fo u n d a tio n a lis t  c am p , p re s e n te d  a  k e y  an ti- 
fo u n d a tio n a lis t  a rg u m e n t:
(1 ) ‘T h e re  a re  b a s ic , e m p iric a l b e lie fs  w h ic h  a re  ju s t i f ie d  an d  th e ir  ju s ti f ic a t io n  d o e s  
n o t  d e p e n d  o n  a n y  fu r th e r  e m p ir ic a l b e lie fs .
(2 ) F o r  a  b e l ie f  to  b e  ju s t i f ie d  th e re  n e e d s  to  b e  a  re a so n  w h y  it is lik e ly  to  be  tru e .
(3 ) F o r  a  b e l ie f  to  b e  ju s t i f ie d  fo r  a  p a r t ic u la r  p e rs o n , re q u ire s  th a t  th is  p e rs o n  b e  in  
c o g n itiv e  p o s s e s s io n  o f  s u c h  a  re a so n .
(4 ) T h e  o n ly  w a y  to  b e  in  c o g n itiv e  p o s s e s s io n  o f  su c h  a  re a so n  is  to  b e lie v e  w ith  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  th e  p re m is e s  f ro m  w h ic h  it fo llo w s  th a t th e  b e l ie f  is lik e ly  to  be 
tru e .
(5 ) T h e  p re m is e s  o f  su c h  a  ju s tify in g  a rg u m e n t fo r  a n  e m p ir ic a l b e l ie f  c a n n o t be  
e n tire ly  a  p r io r i ;  a t  le a s t o n e  o f  th e  p re m is e s  m u s t be  em p iric a l.
T h e re fo re  th e  ju s t i f ic a t io n  o f  a  s u p p o se d  e m p ir ic a l b e l ie f  m u s t d e p e n d  o n  th e  
ju s ti f ic a t io n  o f  a t le a s t o n e  o th e r  e m p ir ic a l b e lie f , c o n tra d ic tin g  (1 ); it fo llo w s  th e re fo re  
th a t  th e re  c a n  b e  n o  b a s ic  e m p iric a l b e l ie f s .’47
B o n jo u r ’s a n a ly s is  is  th a t  ju s t i f ic a t io n  u ltim a te ly  d e p e n d s  o n  a d d itio n a l e m p ir ic a l 
b e lie fs  w h ic h  in  tu r n  n e e d  to  b e  ju s tif ie d , a n d  i f  th is  is  th e  c a se , th e  c y c le  o f  ju s tif ic a tio n
46 See chapter three, pp .75-6 .
47 Bonjour, Laurence, T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  E m p i r i c a l  K n o w l e d g e ,  Harvard U niversity Press, 1985, p.32.
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c o n tin u e s . O n  th is  re a d in g , th e re  is n o  te rm in a tio n  o f  ju s tif ic a to ry  re g re ss . H o w e v e r, th e  
c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  is  so m e th in g  th a t  w e  c a n  b e  in  c o g n itiv e  p o s se s s io n  o f  a n d  
c a n  p ro v id e  a  re a s o n  w h y  a  b e l ie f  is lik e ly  to  b e  tru e . C la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  is  n o t a  
se p a ra te  b e lie f , it is  a  fe a tu re  o f  o u r  e m p ir ic a l e x p e r ie n c e  th a t  m a y  o r  m a y  n o t be  
p re se n t, a n d  is  c a p a b le  o f  e n d in g  th e  c y c le  o f  ju s tif ic a tio n . A t th is  s tag e  I th in k  it w o u ld  
b e  u se fu l to  id e n tify  w h e re  D e sc a r te s  fits  in to  th e  fo u n d a tio n a lis t  p ic tu re .
Descartes’s foundationalism
D e s c a r te s ’s e p is te m o lo g ic a l p ro je c t  in  th e  Meditations c a n  b e  in te rp re te d  in  th e  
fo llo w in g  w ay :
(1 ) T h e  p ro p o s it io n  ‘I  th in k , I  a m ’ is th e  so lid , c e r ta in , fo u n d a tio n . T h e  C o g ito  is n o t 
m e re ly  th e  ‘c e r ta in  a n d  u n s h a k e a b le ’ p o in t  o f  d e p a r tu re  fo r  k n o w le d g e  a c q u is itio n  th a t 
D e sc a r te s  re fe rs  to  in  th e  Second Meditation: it is a lso  th e  so u rc e  o f  th e  e p is te m ic  
p r in c ip le  o f  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e ss .
(2 ) T h e  C o g ito  is s o m e th in g  w h o se  tru th  is c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  p e rc e iv e d . T h e  tru th  o f  
a n y th in g  e lse  th a t  is  v e ry  c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  p e rc e iv e d  is e n su red . F ro m  th is  
o b s e rv a tio n  w e  c a n  d e r iv e  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le : w h a te v e r  is p e rc e iv e d  v e ry  
c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  is  tru e .
(3 ) T h e  ro le  o f  G o d : th e re  is n o  d o u b t th a t  D e sc a r te s  p la c e d  g re a t im p o r ta n c e  o n  
a tte m p tin g  to  p ro v e  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  G o d  to  c o p p e r  fa s te n  h is  e p is te m o lo g y . T h e  ro u te  
th a t  D e sc a r te s  ta k e s  is, to  b o r ro w  a  c h a p te r  h e a d in g  fro m  C o ttin g h a m : ‘f ro m  s e l f  to  G o d
4 8to  k n o w le d g e  o f  th e  w o r ld ’ . D e sc a r te s  w a s  p ro b a b ly , a s  C o ttin g h a m  o b se rv e s  ‘o v e r-
48 This is the heading o f  chapter three in C ottingham ’s D e s c a r t e s ,  B lackw ell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 
1986, p.47.
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a m b itio u s ’49 in  th is  a sp e c t o f  h is  p ro je c t. W h a t is s ig n if ic a n t a b o u t D e s c a r te s ’s a rg u m e n t 
fo r  G o d ’s e x is te n c e  is  th e  w a y  it is  d e v e lo p e d . A s  I id e n tif ie d  in  c h a p te r  tw o :
th e  c a u sa l a d e q u a c y  p r in c ip le , o n  w h ic h  th e  p r o o f  d e p e n d s , is s e e n  a s  c e r ta in , n o t 
d e d u c tiv e ly  b u t b e c a u s e  it sh a re s  th e  sam e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  a s  th e  C o g ito . So 
th e re  d o e s  s e e m  to  b e  e v id e n c e  h e re  o f  D e sc a r te s  u s in g  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  o f  th e  
C o g ito  in  a n  e x e m p la ry  w a y , a s  a  s ta n d a rd  a g a in s t w h ic h  o th e r  p ro p o s itio n s  c a n  b e  
m e asu re d .
(4 ) In  re la tio n  to  e m p ir ic a l k n o w le d g e : b e lie fs  a b o u t sen so ry  e x p e r ie n c e s  h av e  a  
fo u n d a tio n a l element th a t  is c e r ta in , in d u b ita b le .
(5 ) I t  is  b y  a p p lic a tio n  o f  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le  th a t  w e  m a y  be 
a b le  to  ju s tify  b a s ic  b e lie fs  a n d  fa c ili ta te  th e  tra n s fe r  o f  ju s tif ic a tio n  f ro m  b a s ic  to  n on - 
b a s ic  b e lie fs . T h e  k e y  fa c to r  c o n c e rn in g  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  as  a n  e p is te m ic  
p r in c ip le  is th a t  it is in te rn a l. I t  is n o t so m e th in g  e x te rn a l, w h ic h  th e n  n e e d s  to  be 
ju s tif ie d .
(6 ) I t  is d u e  to  th e  in tr in s ic  n a tu re  o f  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  p r in c ip le  a n d  b e c a u se  o f  
its  s e c u re  so u rc e  in  th e  C o g ito , th a t  th is  p e rh a p s  p ro v id e s  a  v ia b le  so lu tio n  to  th e  in fin ite  
re g re ss  p ro b le m . J u s tif ic a tio n  c a n  be  tra c e d  b a c k  u lt im a te ly  to  sen so ry  b e lie fs  w h ic h  c a n  
b e  ju s t i f ie d  in te rn a lly , w ith o u t a p p e a lin g  to  e x te rn a l e v id en c e .
I f  I  a m  c o rre c t in  m y  a sse ssm e n t, th e n  w e  sh o u ld  n o t be  to o  h a s ty  in  c la s s ify in g  
D e sc a r te s  as  a  s tro n g , c la s s ic a l fo u n d a tio n a lis t. A lth o u g h  D e sc a r te s  d o e s  in s is t o n  
c e r ta in  a n d  in d u b ita b le  fo u n d a tio n  fo r  k n o w le d g e , a  c e r ta in ty  th a t th e  C o g ito  p ro v id e s , 
h e  se e m s  to  e m p lo y  a lte rn a tiv e  m e th o d s  o th e r  th a n  d e d u c tio n  to  g e t b e y o n d  th a t
49 See Cottingham, op.cit., p.73.
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fo u n d a tio n . I t  is  re a so n a b le  to  v ie w  th e  c la r ity  an d  d is tin c tn e s s  o f  th e  C o g ito  as  an  
e x e m p la r  o r  s ta n d a rd  a g a in s t w h ic h  o th e r  p ro p o s itio n s  c a n  b e  m e a su re d . I t  is  fo r  th is  
re a s o n  th a t  I  fe e l it m a y  b e  p o s s ib le  to  in te rp re t D e s c a r te s ’s fo u n d a tio n a lism  a s  sh o w in g  
‘e x e m p la ry ’ te n d e n c ie s .
Conclusion
I n  th is  c h a p te r , I  h a v e  o f fe re d  a n  a c c o u n t o f  D e s c a r te s ’s e p is te m o lo g ic a l p ro je c t  in  th e  
Meditations th a t  d e v ia te s  f ro m  th e  tra d itio n a l, c la s s ic a l a cc o u n t. W ith  th e  C o g ito , 
D e sc a r te s  d is c o v e re d  th e  A rc h im e d e a n  p o in t  o f  c e r ta in ty  th a t  he  w a s  se a rc h in g  fo r. I t  is 
th e  re c o g n it io n  o f  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  th a t  c h a ra c te ris e s  th e  C o g ito , th a t  lead s  
D e sc a r te s  to  th e  d is c o v e ry  o f  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le . I t  is  th e  a p p lic a tio n  o f  th e  
c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  th a t , I  fee l, lif ts  D e s c a r te s ’s e n d e a v o u rs  o u t o f  th e  ‘is o la te d ’ 
a n d  ‘su b je c tiv e  s e l f  a w a re n e s s ’ th a t  C o ttin g h a m 50 sp e a k s  o f. T h e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e ss  
ru le  is  a b le  to  do  th is  b e c a u s e  it is  a n  o b je c tiv e  ru le  th a t  is su b je c tiv e ly  a p p lie d , ju s t  a s  a  
m e th o d  fo r  s u m m in g  u p  a  c o lu m n  o f  n u m b e rs  is  a n  o b je c tiv e  m e th o d , su b je c tiv e ly  
a p p lied .
A s  a n  e p is te m ic  p r in c ip le , th e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  see m s to  b e  o f  th e  r ig h t 
c a lib re  to  a n sw e r th e  sce p tic s : it is n o t  a rb itra r i ly  c h o se n , as  its  so u rc e  is th e  C o g ito  
itse lf , a n d  its  e m p lo y m e n t is in te rn a l w ith o u t th e  n e e d  o f  ju s t i f ic a to ry  su p p o rt. 
D e s c a r te s ’s a p p a re n t u se  o f  h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tiv e  s ty le  a rg u m e n ta tio n  is s ig n if ic a n t. 
D e sc a r te s  h im s e lf  d o e s  n o t  e m p h a s ise  su c h  a rg u m e n ta tio n , b u t i f  it is  c o rre c t  to  c la im  
th a t  e v e n  tra c e s  o f  h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tiv e  a rg u m e n ta tio n  a re  p re s e n t in  th e  Meditations 
th e n  D e sc a r te s  m a y  n o t  b e  a  s tr ic tly  s tro n g  c la s s ic a l fo u n d a tio n a lis t  as  p re v io u s ly  
th o u g h t. A s  I h a v e  a lre a d y  m e n tio n e d , s tro n g  c la s s ic a l fo u n d a tio n a lis m  in s is ts  o n  
s ta n d a rd  d e d u c tio n  exclusively a s  a  w a y  o f  b u ild in g  k n o w le d g e .
50 In C ottingham ’s D e s c a r t e s  (1986), p.47.
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T h e re  is  a n o th e r  v ita l in g re d ie n t th a t  c a n  b e  m e n tio n e d : th e  p o s s ib il ity  o f  h y p o th e tic o -  
d e d u c tiv e  a rg u m e n ta tio n  combined w ith  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le . A  h y p o th e tic o -  
d e d u c tiv e  a rg u m e n t in v o lv e s  te s t in g  c o m p e tin g  h y p o th e se s  to  see  w h ic h  h y p o th e s is  
o ffe rs  th e  b e s t  e x p la n a tio n . A  c r it ic  m ig h t a rg u e  th a t  th e re  is no  s ta n d a rd  in  e v a lu a tin g  
w h a t is th e  b e s t  e x p la n a tio n . T h e  c la r ity  an d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  u s e d  as  a n  e x e m p la r  
p ro v id e s  th a t  s ta n d a rd  a n d  c a n  u ltim a te ly  p ro v id e  ju s tif ic a tio n . So th e re fo re , 
ju s t i f ic a to ry  w e ig h t is a d d e d  to  h y p o th e tic o -d e d u c tio n .
P e rh a p s  w ith  th e  C o g ito  a s  th e  u n sh a k e a b le  fo u n d a tio n , th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e ss  ru le  
u se d  to  b o th  ju s tify  b a s ic  b e lie fs  a n d  p ro v id e  a  m e c h a n is m  fo r  th e  tra n s fe r  o f  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  fro m  b a s ic  to  n o n -b a s ic  b e lie fs , C a r te s ia n  fo u n d a tio n a lis m  m a y  p ro v id e  a  
re a so n a b le  s o lu tio n  to  th e  in f in ite  re g re s s  p ro b le m  a n d  in  so  d o in g , a t  le a s t w e a k e n  th e  
a rg u m e n ts  o f  th e  sc e p tic s .
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Conclusion
A s  id e n tif ie d  in  c h a p te r  o n e 1: th e re  a re  tw o  c ru c ia l q u e s tio n s  th a t  a  fo u n d a tio n a lis t 
th e o ry  o f  ju s t i f ic a t io n  m u s t a d d re ss : f irs tly , c a n  th e re  be  fo u n d a tio n s  to  o u r  k n o w le d g e ?  
S e c o n d ly , e v e n  i f  e p is te m ic  fo u n d a tio n s  a re  p o ss ib le , h o w  do  w e  b u ild  th e  re s t o f  w h a t 
w e  k n o w  u p o n  th o s e  fo u n d a tio n s ?  In  re la t io n  to  th e  f ir s t  q u e s tio n : D e sc a r te s  see m s  to  
h a v e  id e n tif ie d  a  s ec u re , u n a s s a ila b le  fo u n d a tio n  in  th e  C o g ito . T h e  k e y  fe a tu re  o f  th e  
C o g ito  is th a t  it is c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  p e rc e iv e d . T h e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  is 
th e n  d e r iv e d  f ro m  th e  C o g ito , th a t  w h a te v e r  is v e ry  c le a r ly  a n d  d is tin c tly  p e rc e iv e d  is 
tru e . I t  is th e  u se  o f  th e  c la r i ty  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  a s  a n  e x e m p la r  o r  s ta n d a rd  a g a in s t 
w h ic h  o u r  p e rc e p tio n s  c a n  b e  te s te d , th a t  m a y  fa c ilita te  th e  a n sw e r  to  th e  s ec o n d  
q u e s tio n  o f  h o w  w e  b u ild  k n o w le d g e  u p o n  th e  fo u n d a tio n s . A s  o b se rv e d  in  c h a p te r  
fo u r2: th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  u se d  a s  a n  e p is te m ic  p rin c ip le , m a y  b e  c a p a b le  o f  
w e a k e n in g  th e  s c e p tic a l a tta c k , a s  th e  C o g ito  is n o t  a rb itra r i ly  c h o se n  ( its  so u rc e  is th e  
C o g ito  itse lf) , a n d  th e  d e p lo y m e n t o f  th e  c la r ity  a n d  d is tin c tn e s s  ru le  is in te rn a l, it is n o t 
in d e p e n d e n t, in  n e e d  o f  ju s t i f ic a to ry  su p p o rt.
O n  th e  c la s s ic a l fo u n d a tio n a lis t  a cc o u n t, d e d u c tio n  is th e  only a c c e p ta b le  m e a n s  o f  
b u ild in g  k n o w le d g e . A s  A u d i s ta te s , re fe rr in g  to  C a r te s ia n  fo u n d a tio n a lism : ‘o n ly  
d e d u c tiv e  in fe re n c e s  c a n  tra n s m it  ju s t i f ic a t io n  to  su p e rs tru c tu re  e le m e n ts .’3 B u t as  I 
h a v e  a rg u e d  in  c h a p te rs  tw o  a n d  fo u r, it is  re a so n a b le  to  p ro p o se  th a t  D e sc a r te s ’s 
e p is te m o lo g y  d o e s  n o t re ly  solely o n  s tr ic t d e d u c tiv e  in fe re n c es . In  th e  Rules fo r the 
Direction o f  the Mind D e s c a r te s  in d ic a te s  th a t sc ie n c e  c a n n o t be d e v e lo p e d  o n  a  p u re ly
1 See chapter one, p.4.
2 See chapter four, p. 109.
3 A udi, Robert, T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  J u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  Cambridge U niversity Press, 1993, pp.361-2.
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a  p r io r i  b asis : h e  a rg u e s  th a t  it is u n re a so n a b le  to  ‘e x p e c t t ru th  to  g e rm in a te  fro m  o u r  
h e a d s  like  M in e rv a  f ro m  th e  h e a d  o f  J u p ite r .’4
T h e  se q u e n c e  o f  th e  Meditations is p re s e n te d  in  w h a t C o ttin g h a m  c a lls  th e  ‘o rd e r  o f
d is c o v e ry ’.5 T h is  se q u e n c e  is  th e  ro u te  th a t an y o n e  th in k in g  a b o u t th e  is su e s  in  th e
Meditations w o u ld  p ro b a b ly  ta k e . E v e n  th o u g h  D e sc a r te s  d o e s  p re s e n t a  m o re
m a th e m a tic a l o r  g e o m e tr ic a l d isp la y  o f  th e  Meditations in  th e  Replies, h e  d o e s  s e e m  to
fa v o u r  th e  m o re  a n a ly tic a l s ty le  o f  th e  Meditations. A s  I n o te d  in  c h a p te r  tw o 6: b e fo re
g iv in g  th e  g e o m e tr ic a l la y o u t D e sc a r te s  s ta tes :
‘y e t  I  a m  c o n v in c e d  th a t  it is  th e  Meditations w h ic h  w ill  y ie ld  b y  fa r  th e  g re a te r  
b e n e f i t .’7
I f  D e sc a r te s  re a lly  b e lie v e d  th a t  s tr ic t d e d u c tio n  w a s  th e  o n ly  w a y  to  b u ild  k n o w le d g e , 
th e n  w h y  d id  he  n o t s im p ly  p ro v id e  th e  g e o m e tr ic a l d is p la y  o n ly ?  A s  su g g e s te d  in  
c h a p te r  tw o : a  re a so n a b le  in te rp re ta tio n  m a y  b e  th a t  p e rh a p s  k n o w le d g e  c a n  be 
p re s e n te d  in  a  m a th e m a tic a l o r  d e d u c tiv e  m a n n e r  after it h a s  b e e n  o b ta in e d . T h is  m a y  
a c c o u n t fo r  th e  g e o m e tr ic a l d is p la y  in  th e  Replies a f te r  th e  d isc o v e r ie s  o f  th e  
Meditations h a d  b e e n  m a d e .
A  fin a l q u e s tio n  th a t  m a y  b e  ra is e d  is: d o e s  a ll o f  th is  m a k e  it e a sy  to  o b ta in  k n o w le d g e ?  
T h e  a n sw e r  to  th a t is a n  e m p h a tic  no! I b e lie v e  R ic h a rd  F u m e r to n  su m m a rise s  th e  
s itu a tio n  w e ll:
‘In  c o m m o n  p la c e  in q u ir ie s  w e  s im p ly  a ssu m e  k n o w le d g e  o f  th e  p a s t  b a se d  o n  
m e m o ry , th e  fu tu re  b a se d  o n  in d u c tiv e  in fe re n c e , th e  e x te rn a l w o rld  b a se d  o n  
p e rc e p tio n . T h e  q u e s tio n  is w h e th e r  w e  c a n  m o v e  fro m  th is  d a ta  to  o th e r  
c o n c lu s io n s  e m p lo y in g  in fe re n c e s  w e  g iv e  o u rs e lv e s  a s  le g itim a te . W h e n  w e
4 R ules for the Direction o f  the M ind: A T  X  380: CSM  1 2 1 .
5 Cottingham , John, D e s c a r t e s ,  B lackw ell Publishers Ltd., Oxford, 1986, p.48.
6 See chapter tw o, p.49.
7 Second Set o f  R eplies: A T  V I I 159: C SM  I I 113.
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s ta r t d o in g  p h ilo s o p h y , w e  s to p  g e ttin g  g ifts . W e  m u s t ju s t i fy  w h a t w e  n o rm a lly  
d o  n o t b o th e r  to  ju s t i f y  a n d  it m a y  n o t be  p o s s ib le  to  do  i t ’ .8
D e sc a r te s  w a s  w e ll a w a re  o f  th e  d if f ic u ltie s  in  p u rs u in g  k n o w le d g e , as  he  s ta te s  in  th e
c lo s in g  lin e s  o f  th e  Meditations'.
‘B u t s in ce  th e  p re s s u re  o f  th in g s  to  b e  d o n e  d o e s  n o t  a lw ay s  a llo w  u s  to  s to p  an d  
m a k e  su c h  a  m e tic u lo u s  c h ec k , it m u s t b e  a d m itte d  th a t  in  th is  h u m a n  life  w e  a re  
o f te n  lia b le  to  m a k e  m is ta k e s  a b o u t p a r tic u la r  th in g s , a n d  w e  m u s t a c k n o w le d g e  
th e  w e a k n e ss  o f  o u r  n a tu re .’9
P e rh a p s  D e s c a r te s ’s e p is te m o lo g ic a l  le g a c y  is th a t  h e  p re s e n te d  h is  id e a s  in  th e
Meditations in  a  w a y  th a t  le n d s  i t s e l f  to  p h ilo s o p h ic a l e x p lo ra tio n . P h ilo so p h y  m a y  n o t
a lw a y s  o ffe r  so lu tio n s , b u t  it sh o u ld  p ro v id e  a v e n u e s  o f  e x p lo ra tio n . O n e  su c h
e x p lo ra tio n , w h ic h  I h a v e  a tte m p te d  to  illu m in a te , is th e  p o s s ib le  exemplary
fo u n d a tio n a lis t  te n d e n c ie s  w ith in  th e  Meditations. O n  th is  in te rp re ta tio n , D e sc a r te s
p ro v id e s  a  viable, i f  n o t  a  d e f in itiv e  a c c o u n t o f  k n o w le d g e  p o s se ss io n , in  sp ite  o f  th e
c o m p le x ity  o f  th e  ta s k  a n d  th e  fa llib il i ty  o f  o u r  h u m a n  n a tu re .
8 Richard Fumerton, ‘C lassical Foundationalism ’, in R e s u r r e c t i n g  O l d - F a s h i o n e d  F o u n d a t i o n a l i s m ,  ed. 
by M ichael R. D e  Paul, R ow m an & L ittlefield  Publishers Inc., 2001, p. 19.
9 Sixth M editation: A T  V I 1 90: C SM  II 62.
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